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The Problem 
"(A lawyer robot) with a far grater memory 
capacity than any of the others and with a 
brain-computer that operates on logic. 
That's what the law is, isn't it - logic?" 
"I suppose it is," said Lee. "At least its 
supposed to be It just wouldn't work. 
To practice law, you must be admitted to the 
bar. To be admitted to the bar, you must 
have a degree in law and pass an examination 
and, although there's never been an occasion 
to establish a precedent, I suspect the 
applicant must be human." ... 
"All they'd need to do would be read the 
books," said Albert. "Ten seconds to a page 
or so. Everything they read would be stored 
in their memory cells." ... 
Lee scrubbed his chin with a knotted fist and 
the light of speculation was growing in his 
eyes. "It might be worth a try. If it 
works, though, it'll be an evil day for 
jurisprudence. " 
Clifford D. Simak 
Ouoted by [Bing, p61, 1977) 
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Abstract 
The general problem approached in this thesis is 
that of building computer based legal advisory 
programs (otherwise known as expert systems or 
Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems). Such 
computer systems should be able to provide an 
individual with advice about either the general 
legal area being investigated, or advice about how 
the individual should proceed in a given case. 
In part the thesis describes a program (the ELl 
program) which attempts to confront some of the 
problems inherent in the building of these 
systems. The ELl system is seen as an 
experimental program (currently handling welfare 
rights legislation) and development vehicle. It 
is not presented as a final commercially 
implementable program. We present a detailed 
criticism of the type of legal knowledge contained 
within the system. 
The second, though in part intertwined, major 
subject of the thesis describes the 
jurisprudential aspects of the attempt to model 
the law by logic, a conjunction which is seen to 
be at the heart of the computer/law problem. We 
suggest that the conjunction offers very little to 
those who are interested in the real application 
of the real law, and that this is most forcefully 
seen when a working computer system models that 
conjunction. 
Our conclusion is that neither logic nor 
rule-based methods are sufficient for handling 
legal knowledge. The novelty and import of this 
thesis is not simply that it presents a negative 
conclusion; rather that it offers a sound 
theoretical and pragmatic framework for 
understanding why these methods are insufficient -
the limits to the field are, in fact, defined. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVlEV 
This thesis describes both the philosophical and pragmatic problems 
inherent in an attempt to engineer a legal advisory system. Much of the 
thesis therefore deals with aspects of a jurisprudential nature: also 
other already existing systems are examined and analyzed. The 
particular jurisprudential subject is that of logic and the law, because 
- we argue such a conjunction is at the very heart of the field of 
computers and law. Ve shall argue that there has been much confusion in 
the research field: confusion caused principally by a misunderstanding 
of the nature of logic. There is also confusion because current 
jurisprudence has offered us an unsound epistemology. This unsoundness 
is particularly relevant to those who wish to build rule-based lKBS 
systems since it has tended to imply that we are "bound by legal rules". 
Vhy was it not possible to concentrate only upon the computing? Vhy not 
simply theorise without coding? There are two reasons. First, it is 
not enough to simply describe a "planned" program, because in the 
discipline of computer science no matter how theoretical we might wish 
to be, the results of our theories must always appear in the form of a 
coded program. It is a case of, "the proof of the pudding " . .. . 
Therefore, in parallel with the jurisprudential research, effort has 
gone into the production of a program - the ELl program - to both test 
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ideas and develop techniques and methods for the representing of legal 
knowledge. 
Second, we should point out that it was upon examination of the finished 
program that our disappointment with the rule-based approach came to 
light; without the coding - "eating the pudding" - this disappointment 
might not have occurred. The computer system, therefore, acted as a 
model of a theory - a theory which when found wanting could be 
understood only within the differing jurisprudential framework. 
It is perhaps beyond the scope of this thesis to suggest that this 
inter-reaction and inter-utility of computer science and jurisprudence 
is further useful, since some might believe that the two disciplines are 
unconnected. I would argue, to the contrary, that many of the problems 
of computing (for example, the attempts to find artificial intelligence 
or to prove programs correct) have been mirrored in the philosophy of 
law (for example, formalism in law or the attempt to fully define 
legislation in logical terms) each subject does not have its own 
epistemology: a proper understanding of knowledge about the world is a 
need which is common to both. 
However, we leave these discussions to elsewhere, and simply give an 
outline of the ELl program. We shall be relatively uncritical of the 
program until the final sections of the thesis; then, no holds will be 
barred. 
1.2 THE ELl PROGRAM 
Briefly, the program utilizes IKBS techniques to handle welfare rights 
legislation; that is, it operates in Mehl's [Mehl, 1958] consultation 
mode. The program is seen as a test bed which can usefully be used to 
handle a variety of areas of the law. 
- 2 -
The program accepts input from an expert in the form of if-then rules 
where the antecedent contains one or more conditions which must be true 
before the consequent can be proven (for an introduction to the use of 
these rules see [Vaterman, 1978b]). These rules were extracted from 
relevant Acts of Parliament (that is those dealing with Supplementary 
Benefit, Housing Benefit etc.) and guides to those Acts (for example 
[Allbeson, 1984]). This process of extracting rules from legislation is 
termed "normalization", and requires a high degree of legal skill in 
most domains. The lack of this legal skill on the author's part 
(HacCormick in a private note referred to some of our normalization as 
"dodgy" which points to the fact that interpretation of legislation is 
encouraged by, if not requiring, legal training) is one reason why the 
program does not attempt to handle other more complex areas. 
As an example of a program rule, the following is one of the rules which 
define how a client (that is the person who is to be the recipient of 
the advice) can be eligible for Supplementary Benefit: 
IF (applicant is available for work) 
(applicant is a British Citizen) 
THEN 
(applicant satisfies the rules of entitlement to 
Supplementary Benefit) 
This can be read as: 
If the client is available for work and is a British Citizen, then 
the client can apply for Supplementary Benefit. 
There are several other rules which have the same consequent. 
these rules is: 
IF (applicant is available for work) 
(applicant has been granted foreign husband status, 
- 3 -
One of 
refugee status or political asylum) 
THEN 
(applicant satisfies the rules of entitlement to 
Supplementary Benefit) 
These rules only designate the basic right of application to 
Supplementary Benefit further rules determine whether the client is 
actually able to receive assistance from the Department of Health and 
Social Security. The program, among its rules, also includes rules 
which determine access to and, if relevant, amount of housing benefit 
and other welfare benefits (e.g. free health, transport to hospitals 
etc). One aspect of EL! is of importance to both the manner of the 
program's execution and the easy means of rule input, is the use of 
negation of individual rule elements and entire rules. 
The rules are in a format which can be best described as "legal 
language"; there are no atomic "legal objects" or atomic "legal 
relationships" used in the program (such as "study-status-OK" or 
"is-owned-by"). Ve discuss the advantages of this later in detail, but 
would argue that the principal advantage is of ease of use to the legal 
expert inputting rules from other legislative areas, and that there are 
areas of legal knowledge which are not amenable to the atomic approach 
anyway. 
Further to this ease, the program is robust enough to attempt to 
recognize "conceptual matching" between input conditions and goals. 
This is important where large numbers of rules are being input into the 
program; in such a case the program will attempt to resolve spelling 
mistakes and slightly varying wording - "applicant is unemployed" and 
"client is not in employment" etc. This information then remains with 
the program so that when future rules are being input, such matches are 
noticed. 
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A large number of other tools are available to the person who inputs the 
rules - searching, deletion, etc. 
The architecture of the program is interesting, using a complex data 
structure to hold these rules. The advantages of this structure arise 
mainly because the rule elements rather then the rule is the primary 
element in the knowledge base. The rules can inhibit each other's 
firing a form of "meta-Ievel" knowledge and, self organize 
themselves in this structure. 
The ELl program is a large INTERLISP program which occupies some 90 
pages of storage on a DEC-20 mainframe. The necessary "legal" rules 
(held in the knowledge base) which provide advice covering various Acts 
of Parliament and case precedent occupy 70 pages of storage. 
1.3 EXTENSIONS AND CRITIQUE 
The program should be seen as a 'test bed' for ideas and methods; we do 
not see its present form as by any means final, and we have not tested 
the program in situ (apart from that testing by Belene Bauer-Bernet 
discussed in the Appendix) since - we are certain - that the current ELl 
program is not the final system which we would wish. In fact, later in 
this text we try to analyze how and if it might be practically extended 
in terms of both the legal area handled and also in terms of 
incorporating other non rule-based information. 
The computer scientist who looks for timing benchmarks and discussion of 
efficiency will be disappointed with this thesis: it does not contain 
them. Our justification is quite simple computational aspects are 
important when we are near implementing a system in-situ, but thinking 
about those matters in legal IKBS research is rather like the researcher 
described in [Catt, 1973] who tried to model the pattern of the brain 
synapses and suchlike in a computer; that, we would suggest, is task 
enough without that researcher's concurrent (but also unsuccessful) 
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attempt to model this system within a head shaped piece of hardware (it, 
of course, kept overheating), First, catch your intelligence, we might 
say, then concern yourself with making it computationally efficient (or 
head shaped), 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 2 
COMPUTING, LOGIC AND LAY 
Ye here briefly glance at the general and historical position of the 
conjunction of the disciplines of computing, logic and law; such a brief 
glance will give a general impression of the questions which each area 
has taken as its domain of study. Such a view is necessary as a 
starting point for understanding this thesis. 
2.2 LOGIC AND THE LAY 
If Ramist logic (from the frenchman, Pierre Ramus) is accepted as a 
useful logic (which many would not accept - for example, lOng, 1958]), 
then perhaps Abraham Fraunce was the earliest proponent of the link 
between logic and the law: 
"If Lawes by reason framed were, and grounded on the same; 
If Logike also reason bee, and thereof had this name; 
I see no reason, why that Law and Logike should not bee 
The nearest and the dearest freends, and therefore best agree." 
[Fraunce, 1588] 
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Fraunce's research (although 'spleen' might be a more appropriate term) 
was directed against the medieval scholastic interpretation of 
Aristotelian logic and utilized the Ramist view of logic as a means of 
explicating what he saw as the dichotomous nature of the law (a 
precursor, perhaps, to structural anthropolgy as in [Levi-Strauss, 
1966]). His thesis was that the manner in which the law operates is 
intrinsically logical: 
" I then perceaved, the practise of Law to bee the use of 
Logike, and the methode of Logike to lighten the Lawe. So that 
after application of Logike to Lawe, and examination of Lawe by 
Logike I made playne the precepts of the one by the practice of the 
other, and called my booke, The Lawyers Logike .•. " 
[Fraunce, 1588] 
It must be said, though, that Ramist logic is little studied now, and 
perhaps - apart from its anti-scholastic temperament which as Styazhkin 
[Styazhkin, p50, 1969] notes, influenced Leibniz is treated as an 
aberration in the progression of Aristotelian and Stoic logic. Ong most 
certainly considers it so: 
"Ramus was not a great intellectual but a savant with wide-ranging 
interests whose most distinctive attitudes were superficially 
revolutionary but at root highly derivative. His way of attacking 
the genuine weaknesses of the scholastic heritage while preserving 
unwittingly the basic presuppositions responsible for these 
weaknesses (and for much strength) made his views congenial to the 
vast numbers of impatient but not too profound thinkers who became 
his followers, and it gives both him and them tremendous historical 
value today." 
lOng, 1958] 
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Yhile Fraunce was a lawyer with an interest in logic, a logician with an 
interest in the law was George Boole. Boole, in "The Laws of Thought" 
used a legal example in much the same way that Fraunce had analyzed the 
case of Lord Northumberland. Boole though, instead of analyzing a 
specific case, set out in logical symbolism part of the Jewish dietary 
laws: 
"Here, as before, x standing for "clean beasts", y for "beasts 
dividing the hoof", z for "beasts chewing the cud," we have 
x = yx; 
whence 
1 - x = 1 - yz; 
and developing the second member, 
1 - x = y(l-z)+z(l-y)+(l-y)(l-z) 
which is interpreted into the following Proposition: Unclean 
beasts are all which divide the hoof without chewing the cud, all 
which chew the cud without dividing the hoof, and all which neither 
divide the hoof nor chew the cud." 
[Boole, p93/4, 1854] 
This interest in the connection between logic and the law has grown 
since Boole's logical work became generally available. One reason for 
this is simply because of the utility that such a connection might have. 
Logic is seen to be well formalized, accessible to those who might shy 
away from more advanced mathematical theory and has proven its 
in much of mathematics (one mathematician has informed 
capacity 
me in 
conversation - that he could not envisage the discipline without its set 
theoretic aspect, though its introduction is relatively recent); if 
these advantages could be carried over to the study of law, then the 
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lawyer, jurisprudentialist and client might all benefit. Notice that 
this argument of mathematical formality's utility is similar to that 
used by computer scientists interested in the formal specification of 
programs, for example, Milne and Strachey [Milne, 1976]. 
It is also the case that logic has been seen as the realization of 
"correct reasoning". As MacCormick, for example, has said: 
"we are concerned not with the demonstration of logical truths but 
with their application, that is with the application of logically 
valid forms of argument in legal contexts. It is important 
therefore to emphasize that the logical validity of an argument 
does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion; that the argument 
is valid entails that if the premisses are true, the conclusion 
must be true; but logic itself cannot establish or guarantee the 
truth of the premisses." 
[MacCormick, p25, 1978] 
and also from computer science: 
"The principal application of formal methods lies in the area of 
verification, where mathematical techniques are used to argue that 
a given program is correct." 
[Berg, 1982] 
The interest in this legal/logical connection is still high - perhaps 
one contemporary reason is that it easily integrates itself with the 
normative schools of Jurisprudence (i.e. those who see the law as being 
rule based, for example Hart [Hart, 1961]); these legal norms 
conveniently act as propositions of Modus Ponens. MacCormick 
[MacCormick, 1978] is one who currently argues the importance of seeing 
the law, or at least one part of the legal process (the judicial 
justification), as following the method of Modus Ponens. 
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Apart from HacCormick's analytical approach there are many prescriptive 
researches taking place (by which we mean that the researcher is 
attempting to change the legal method, as opposed to analyzing it). One 
of them is directed towards the very difficult problem of legal drafting 
(see for example the Renton Report [Renton, 1975]) - a problem which has 
much in common with the definition of programming languages (see for 
instance, [HcGettrick, 1980]). Layman E. AlIen has argued that the use 
of logical drafting techniques may overcome many of the purely semantic 
difficulties of writing legislation in a non-ambiguous way: 
"This imprecision can be categorized into two types of uncertainty: 
the uncertainty that results from what is omitted from the writing 
and the uncertainty that results from what is written. Both of 
these types of uncertainty may be deliberate by the drafter of the 
document, or they may occur inadvertently. Here, attention is 
being focused on the inadvertent uncertainties." 
[AlIen, p75, 1980] 
To do this, a logical formalism might be incorporated into the drafting 
process (thus, he claims, logical operators - AND, OR - would add a 
non-ambiguous structure to legislation). Note, though, that AlIen does 
not claim that "law should become logic". It is interesting to note 
that Allen has also shown that not only the normative view of 
legislation can integrate logic into its theoretical position, but also 
that view of law as concept directed, for example Hohfeldian Analysis 
[AlIen, 1974]. There are some criticisms of this use of logic in the 
law, though, Summers for example [Summers, 1961]. 
criticism later. 
Ve add to this 
We look at some of these aspects in more detail in Chapter 4, but some 
workers in the field are: Del Vecchio [Del Vecchio, 1914J with an 
interest in 'the formal bases of law', Guest [Guest, 1961J who usefully 
draws attention to the variety of logical systems and Tammelo [Tammelo, 
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1969] who utilizes Polish logic as a description of the law. Another 
approach is de Mulder's et al "Sentencing by Computer" which approaches 
the subject from a slightly different tack [Mulder, 1982]. 
There is a divide between those who are interested in "law and logic" 
which might be distinguished as a Platonic/non Platonic divide. The 
view that logic is intrinsic to "the law" might be considered Platonic. 
Ye take the opposing view and would claim that logic can only model the 
law, never describe it. Such is the perspective taken in Chapter 4 
where we describe our relativist position on logic. 
The existence of a machine which can represent logical processes has, as 
might be expected, done much to increase research interest in logic and 
the law. This has sometimes led to there being a very fine dividing 
line between research into logic and the law and research into legal 
computing. The LEGOL project is an example of this overlapping of 
research borders where the aims of the project have been stated as: 
"The ultimate goal of this research is to specify a formal 
language, supported by a computer system to interpret it, capable 
of expressing rules of organizations. The rules we are studying 
are those in legislation. If LEGOL can be developed to handle 
legal norms then the range of applications will be very wide 
indeed." 
[LEGOL project handout, undated] 
Next we examine some research which has arisen from the computer science 
field. 
2.3 LEGAL COMPUTING 
Precursors to the idea that electronic computers could be used to aid 
the legal process have been pointed out by Bing and Harvold: 
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"The first modern electronic computer - ENIAC - was operational in 
the summer of 1946. That same year Lewis o. Kelso pointed out: 
'Today the lawyer works substantially as he worked before the 
industrial revolution. Only automated legal research will 
save him from playing one of the most confused, ill-paid and 
unsatisfactory professions in the world of tomorrow.' 
Kelso's proposal is believed to be the earliest suggestion for 
creating automatic retrieval systems to assist legal research. His 
suggestion was stimulated by the work of Dr. Vannevar Bush, who 
had advocated mechanical searching methods in scientific fields, 
and Kelso suggested a "Law-dex"-system based on the use of punched 
cards. 
Another suggestion was made in 1955 by Vincent P. Biunno of the 
New Jersey Law Institute. He proposed to enter l~gal information 
on a tape which was to be moving continuously past a number of 
read-out stations. The information might then be retrieved by 
different lawyers more or less at the same time." 
[Bing, p60, 1977J. 
The first researcher to actually propose the use of a computer was 
Lucien Hehl [Hehl, 1958]. Yhile Hehl continued to describe what we 
might now think of as quaint computing techniques (for example, 
translation of legal arguments directly into binary format) he did make 
a fundamental divide between two types of "law machine". The first type 
he described as the "documentary machine" and the second the 
"consultation machine": 
"One may imagine two basic types of law machine: 
(1) the documentary or information machine, or - in more familiar 
terms - the machine for finding the precedent (or relevant text), 
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(2) the consultation machine; less properly, the 
machine". 
"judgement 
There is no fundamental difference between these two types of 
machine; the difference is one of degree rather than essence. The 
consultation machine will give an exact answer to any put to it, 
whereas the information machine will only supply a set of items of 
information bearing on he problem. Conceptual and relational 
analysis is more acute in the consultation machine; its structure 
is more delicate, the network of information is more finely woven." 
[Hehl, p759, 1958] 
It is proposed in this thesis that there is, in fact, a fundamental 
difference between the two types of law machine; that, however, should 
not detract from the importance of Hehl's other insights. 
The computerized legal information retrieval system has developed 
quickly and successfully since Hehl's paper - for example, the LEXIS 
system [Rubin, 1976] and JURIS [Kondos, 1974] system are now available 
to most legal researchers. The history of the development of these 
systems is interesting because of the lessons it might offer to the 
consultation type machines. 
The development of LEXIS type systems was initially ad hoc using a 
variety of computing techniques - the full text approach, the concept 
indexed approach etc. It was only with Tapper's research into the 
elegance and usefulness of these different techniques that real progress 
was made. Bing and Harvold noted Colin Tapper's contribution to 
analyzing these approaches: 
"The value of Tapper's experiments lies in two dimensions: 
firstly, the results he arrived at are of importance in themselves. 
Secondly - and in retrospect more important - the attitude Tapper 
brought to the field: the attitude of a critical and scientific 
- 14 -
inquirer who examined the basic problems of designing reliable 
tests for information system performance." 
[Bing, p67, 1977] 
Using these quantitative methods, the field of legal information 
retrieval has progressed substantially. Of course, the problems are 
much simpler that those met in consultation systems there is no 
normalization, analysis of concepts etc., only string processing and 
indexing techniques are used, (but see the proposal for "conceptual 
information retrieval" in [Schank, 1981] and also [Council of Europe, 
1982]) • 
Hehl's second type of law machine has not been quite so successful or as 
easy to achieve as he imagined. It is, some might claim, useful to see 
the area in that same initial state as legal retrieval systems were 
before Tapper's quantification work - there are several approaches 
currently being taken, each working with different basic assumptions and 
techniques. Vhether any approach currently being taken will be 
successful, though, is a matter for time and debate. None of the 
approaches are anyhow yet close to useful commercial implementation, 
apart, perhaps, from the "algorithmic" approach taken by the Inverclyde 
project [Addler, 1975] which is applicable to only a very small area of 
legislation (i.e. administrative law which, to a high degree, has been 
designed to be handled by rote, without recourse - normally that is - to 
the common law and which can be represented by simple data processing 
programming techniques). This thesis discusses the problem of 
representing general legislation and also the essentially computing 
problems which have been met by researchers in this area; also we 
describe the ELl program, which - when analyzed in terms of success and 
failure - is one source of information on possible routes for future 
expansion and research. As a brief introduction to some of the other 
work which has been done in the area though, we might think of HcCarty's 
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TAXHAN project [HcCarty, 1980a] a project which has been running for 
some considerable time using "semantic" or associative networks to 
represent legal objects and relationships; Stamper's LEGOL project has 
been mentioned above; JUDITH [Popp, 1975] which uses a hierarchical 
representation of law; and another researcher who uses associative 
networks is Heldman. Heldman's system attempted to match the user's 
input with models of assault and battery held in the network data 
structure. 
We hold that some of the projects which we describe have approached the 
problem of legal knowledge engineering without a true appreciation of 
the jurisprudential and logical/legal problems involved. In this text 
we try 
pitfalls 
to right this 
which might 
consultative system. 
fault by laying an appreciation of some of the 
affect the successful design of any legal 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE KNOWLEDGE BASED FRAMEWORK 
3.1 LEGAL KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 
The development of computing techniques, described as Knowledge Based, 
which allow programs to encapsulate the "expertise" of a professional -
say a doctor, or geologist - has given rise to the hope that such 
techniques may be capable of handling legal expertise in a manner which 
will allow the construction of high quality legal advisory systems. It 
is to this general goal that this thesis is directed and, in part, the 
thesis describes a program which gives advice on welfare rights 
legislation. Notwithstanding the various projects which are currently 
underway, in this early stage of the research field there are still many 
problems and many confusions. Broadly these problems can be divided 
into two categories. The first is the problem of legal knowledge 
engineering - that problem of ascertaining 
(i) just what it is in "law" that we wish to represent and 
(ii) how it can best be represented in terms of software. 
Of these two 
philosophical 
knowledge engineering subdivisions, the first 
(or rather, in legal knowledge engineering it 
is 
is 
jurisprudential) and the second is the concern of computer science; 
these two subdivisions are the mainstay of this thesis. I argue for the 
need to see "law" as more than a formal logical system and also describe 
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the first tentative steps in building a useful knowledge engineered 
system. 
The second major problem is that of man/machine interaction; this can be 
described as determining just how these systems will be used and by whom 
they will be used. These problems are briefly examined in Chapter 8; 
but although relegated to a later part of this thesis, it should not be 
assumed that this area is less important than the legal knowledge 
engineering aspects. In fact, our view (explained later) is that no 
successful legal or commercial implementation of these systems will be 
possible until the problem of the correct design for man/machine 
interface is properly solved. 
The power of knowledge based programs is to be found in their ability to 
provide consultative advice to users. Simplistically, they encapsulate 
the "commonsense" but specialized expertise of "an expert". Thus, 
ideally, non-experts can access advice from the program at will. These 
knowledge based programs have, so far, been developed in areas where 
human expertise is scarce and expensive; it is in these areas that the 
prime motivation is perceived for the implementation of computer systems 
the financial cost of consultation can be much reduced. Hopefully as 
well, if the cost of good professional advice is substantially reduced, 
then the professional users of such systems can increase the level of 
proficiency in their service to the client. These pressures of cost and 
quality of service have so far been mainly seen in the area of medical 
applications; for example, there has been a substantial amount of both 
statistical and technical input to the medical profession to achieve 
reductions in cost (more specifically, in terms other than the simply 
short-term) by more proficient health care. These same pressures exist 
upon the lawyer. In order to improve the efficiency of what has been 
called the "lawyering process" [Slay ton, 1974J the lawyer, some have 
stated, has had to revise his or her research methods: 
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"The exponential growth in the volume of legal materials has 
dramatic consequences. First of all, it becomes extremely 
difficult to find all or even most of the materials relevant to a 
given problem, simply because so much may be relevant; accordingly 
lawyers have increasingly come to have an inadequate grasp of what 
they need to know properly to deal with the issue before them. The 
result is a 'deprofessionalization' of law." 
[Slay ton, p7, 1974] 
As an example of this, few lawyers today can successfully handle any 
court case outside of their own speciality which requires searching of 
legal texts for potentially useful precedents (rather than those which 
are currently held to be useful) without recourse to a computerized 
retrieval system. Before the introduction of these legal information 
retrieval systems, the legal search process was described, as mentioned 
above by Kelso. 
Since one of the weaknesses of these retrieval systems ([Slay ton, p25, 
1974] lists other reservations he has about them) is their inability to 
interpret the discovered texts, it would seem that the next logical step 
in the provision of computerized tools to the legal profession is the 
provision of knowledge based systems, which could provide some 
interpretation of legal texts and case precedents. Ve hold that the 
extraction of legal rules from the legislation i.e. the 
interpretation of legal texts - is the primary legal task. As Twining 
and Hiers state: 
"Rule-handling is only one aspect of the crafts of law. 
Furthermore, interpretation is only one aspect of rule-handling. 
But it is basic - first, because most rule-handling activities 
involve or presuppose 
understanding of what is 
it, and, 
involved 
secondly, because a clear 
in interpretation inevitable 
throws light on a number of other matters as well." 
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[Twining, pxvi, 1982] 
The knowledge which we expect a legal knowledge based system to contain 
is the output from the expert's interpretation of legislation and 
precedent combined with his or her own "expert" view of the area. 
A knowledge based system in the legal field could, at the most 
optimistic, be expected to aid the lawyer in understanding the relevant 
legal sources which the information retrieval system might point to. 
Alternatively, the knowledge based system could operate without contact 
with a retrieval system advising the lawyer on how to present a given 
defendant's, appellant's or prosecutor's case. In both cases, it would 
do so by some process of rule-handling; but, we emphasize and argue 
later Chapter 9 - that rule-handling is not as simple a task in the 
legal world as it might at first seem. 
Given the potential power and advantages of such systems (for instance, 
their use by advisors with limited legal expertise or in remote legal 
offices for handling slightly exotic problems), why are no such systems 
currently operating? 
The reason for 
complexity of 
the non-existence of such systems is due to the 
the legal process; and it is to this problem that legal 
knowledge engineering must turn its attention. 
Sections of this text examine "the law" to try and discover what the 
legal knowledge that we must handle actually is. As the ever continuing 
arguments in jurisprudence show, what this is is a moot point. Vhat is 
accepted though is that the judicial decision is at the heart of the 
legal process; even in those cases which never come to court, the police 
(or in Scotland the procurator fiscal's) decision whether to 
prosecute, all assume that the judicial decision is the final arbiter of 
"the law" and that it overshadows all other aspects of the law. Levi 
pointed to the power of the judicial decision (albeit within the 
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framework of government): 
"Yhat a court says is dictum, but what a legislature says is a 
statute." 
[Levi, p6, 1949] 
and Hart spoke of the rules of adjudication which give the judge his 
power: 
" have conferred upon judges, where they have ascertained the 
fact of violation, the exclusive power to direct the application of 
penalties by other officials." 
[Hart, p95, 1961] 
Ye therefore examine the judicial decision and assess how we might be 
able to capture the essence of the legal process through the judicial 
process. The theoretical position which we shall take upon just what 
the judicial process is, is described later; for now it is sufficient to 
say that we lie at neither end of the continuum which says "law is 
logical", 
view that 
evidenced 
nor "law is classificatory". Ye rather take the Austinian 
problems of "law" are problems of power relationships 
in the language of judicial and social interaction: legal 
rules are the "language" of law, not its substance. 
Ye accept that we (and other researchers) are some distance from the 
final and commercially implementable results of this legal knowledge 
engineering process, but we do believe that it is an achievable goal 
towards which to work; the hope is of advice easily accessible to even 
the smallest legal office allowing even the esoteric case to be 
competently handled in the most efficient manner with the maximum client 
satisfaction. Of course, good advice may simply be to tell the client 
that he has no hope of winning his case - good advice does not 
necessarily mean advice which always wins. 
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3.2 INTELLIGENT KNOVLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS 
During the last decade or so there has been a dramatic shift in emphasis 
in research being undertaken by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
community. This shift is best seen as a move from abstract research 
dealing with the relationship between human cognitive processes and 
machine intelligence which we might describe as "machine learning" or 
"machine intelligence"; that latter described by Minsky as: 
"The science of making machines do things that would require 
intelligence if done by men" 
[Minsky, 1968J. 
The early AI research problems, usually based on game playing, were 
attractive for research: the rules of games could be clearly defined, 
success be measured (e.g. the chess program to beat a grand master) 
against a standard, heuristic solutions to combinatorial explosions can 
be compared. They were seen as problem areas which simulated problems 
in the real world. By solving these in "human like" ways, it would be 
possible to discover how these human problem solving processes operated. 
The ultimate goal, certainly of the early research workers, was to be 
the General Problem Solver (GPS) - a device which by following defined 
"thinking procedures" could be applied to problems of all sorts the 
general problem. The GPS programs developed (for example [Newell, 
1972J) were based upon goal directed plans and operations; however, as 
Raphael notes: 
"The fact that the GPS program successfully solved problems from 
several difficult task domains is at least as much a tribute to the 
cleverness of the programmers who encoded those tasks into GPS's 
object, operation and difference terminology, as it is a tribute to 
GPS's true generality." 
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[Raphael, p145, 1976J 
The translation of these programming techniques to descriptions of how 
human cognition operates, though, has been adjudged unsuccessful, both 
by critics of AI: 
"On my view the organization of world knowledge provides the 
largest stumbling block to AI precisely because the programmer is 
forced to treat the world as an object and our know-how as 
knowledge. 
Looking back over the past ten years of AI research we might say 
that the basic point which has emerged is that since intelligence 
must be situated it cannot be separated from the rest of human 
life. " 
[Dreyfus, p203, 1981J (author's own emphasis) 
and also members of the AI community: 
" 
... general problem solvers are too weak to be used as the basis 
for building high performance systems. The behaviour of the best 
general problem-solvers, is observed to be weak and shallow, except 
in areas in which the human problem-solver is a specialist." 
[Feigenbaum, p187, 1971] 
The new research effort is directed into how techniques gleaned from 
earlier research (for example, work into heuristic control of search 
strategies) can be utilized in practical systems. One example of this 
shift is in the application of "expert system" techniques [Michie, 1979J 
to real world situations, rather than the emphasis on "micro-world" 
problems, whose toy-like aspect has been described by their proponents: 
"Each model - or "micro-world" as we shall call it is very 
schematic; it talks about a fairyland in which things are so 
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simplified that almost every statement about them would be 
li terally false if asserted about the real world." 
[Hinsky and Papert, p39, 1970] 
These expert systems have, after the Alvey committee [Alvey, 1982] 
become known as Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems (IKBS). We shall 
use this term here, except where use of "expert system" is more 
illustrative. 
There are, it is claimed, a growing number of these IKBS programs in 
operation at present (leaving until later just what is meant by 'in 
operation'). For examples see DENDRAL [Buchanan, 1969]), PROSPECTOR 
[Duda, 1979]. 
Research into IKBS is currently at a high pitch, and much is being 
expected of it - for example one book review has recently stated "A New 
York market research firm has recently announced that the artificial 
intelligence market in the United States will rise slightly over $155 
million in sales to $2 billion by 1989". We can see this research 
interest from looking at one of the most discussed IKBS programs - HYCIN 
[Shortliffe, 1975]. Interest in this system is due in part to the fact 
that it has been extended to allow teaching with NEOMYCIN [Clancey, 
1981], easy debugging of the knowledge base with the TIERESAS system 
[Davis, 1977a]; is has also been stripped to provide an expert system 
"shell" in the EHYCIN system [Van Melle, 1981]. A "shell" consists of a 
rule interpreter and any other data/processing structures which might be 
used to interpret a rule corpus. The rule corpus is supplied by the 
user of the shell. The shell is thus a means of allowing one program to 
give consultative advice in more than one domain. It has been found, 
though, that such a shell is not always sufficient; Rooney has noted 
that many researchers consider currently available shells to be the: 
"lowest common denominator of the expert systems work over the last 
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10 years." 
[Rooney, 1984] 
TIERESAS has also been used to test knowledge structuring techniques 
(Le. "me ta-knowledge" that is knowledge that the program posseses 
about its own problem solving knowledge [Davis, 1980a] [Davis, 1980b]). 
Although most IKBS programs utilize a variety of data structures (for 
example, MYCIN uses rules and a tree structure - the "context tree" - as 
its prime data structures), there has been a tendency to use a 
production system methodology as the basic data driven processor. There 
are a variety of early applications of this formalism; Post [Post, 1943] 
was perhaps one of the earliest, but, due to their usefulness, 
production systems have appeared in other applications Chomsky's 
'Syntactic Structures' [Chomsky, 1957] illustrated how a grammatical 
theory could be based upon them (most computer languages now have their 
syntax specified by means of a production system - for example see the 
Pascal Report and User Manual [Jensen, 1975]). 
As an indication of how the AI community has seen these new IKBS 
techniques as a radical alteration in their technical framework, we 
might note Newell and Simon's heady description of the production system 
formalism as: 
"One of those happy events, though in minor key, that historians of 
science often talk about: a rather well-prepared formulation 
sitting in wait for a scientific mission." 
[Newell, 1972] 
Ve do not closely examine the production system formalism (but see, for 
an introduction to the "traditional" production system architecture 
[Davis, 1976]), but in Chapter 4 we see how it might be used to model a 
judicial justification. 
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3.3 PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF IKBS TECHNIQUES 
It is useful to uncritically view IKBS techniques, to see why their 
perceived advantages have been considered useful to so many 
applications, including the commercial and industrial: 
"The development of such knowledge based systems is widely regarded 
as the best means of expanding the application of IT to activities 
which today's computing technologies cannot approach." 
[Alvey, 1982] 
Our position relating to these claims will become clear throughout this 
text; for the moment is out to be stated that we are sceptical about 
many of the claims made for IKBS techniques and completely sceptical 
about all the claims made for artificial intelligence. 
An IKBS system can be thought of as a black box which accepts knowledge 
from one or more expert and "intelligently" offers advice to a 
non-expert. Thus the alternative descriptor, expert system, is 
explained by the fact that the system contains an expert's expertise. 
There are certain areas where these IKBS systems are effective 
primarily areas where problems to be solved rely heavily on abstract, 
"commonsense" knowledge, rather than well defined "algorithmic" 
solutions. For example, note the following interaction which one 
researcher has proposed as a goal to arrive at between expert system and 
man: 
Expert: The pump pulley should be next. 
Novice: Yes--uh, does the side of the pump pulley with the holes 
face away from the pump or towards it? 
Expert: Away from the pump. 
Novice: All right. 
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Expert: Did you insert the key -- that is, the half-moon shaped 
piece? 
Novice: Yes, I did. 
Expert: Be sure you check the alignment of the two pulleys before 
you tighten the set screws. 
[Hart, p832, 1975J 
Of this dialogue, the author writes: 
"This fragment illustrates several important abilities of 
consultants that contrast sharply with a static information source 
like a manual. First, notice that a question from the novice is 
answered directly and in his terms. There is no need for him to 
search through a mass of information, or to convert information 
from an abstract or "standard" form into a directly usable form. 
Notice that the expert is checking on progress by offering warnings 
and reminders about critical steps. This has the function of not 
only minimizing errors, but also of allowing the expert to keep 
track of the progress of the work. The latter function is the 
basis of the expert's ability to present relevant advice, and to 
put it in a context that is familiar to the novice." 
[Hart, 1975J 
IKBS systems claim their effectiveness from the fact that they can 
embody the expert's knowledge produced by interaction between the system 
and expert (ie they are "taught"). 
explicit as opposed to implicit 
This knowledge once embodied becomes 
- ie hidden - within an algorithmic 
program's coding, and can be used to "explain" its reasoning. For 
example: 
"A consultative production system need not be a psychological 
model, imitating a human's reasoning process. The important point 
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is that the system and a human expert use the same (or similar) 
knowledge about the domain to arrive at the same answer to a given 
problem. The process of trying rules and taking actions can 
be thought of as "reasoning", and explanations consist of showing 
how rules used information provided by the user to make various 
intermediate deductions and finally to arrive at the answer." 
[Scott, 1977J 
and other writers have also shown the importance of self-explanation: 
"Computers can be inscrutable. To the layman, the computer is 
often regarded as either an omniscient, fathomless device or a 
convenient scapegoat. In part, this situation has arisen because 
computer systems are designed with little provision for 
self-description. That is, programs cannot explain or justify what 
they do. Trust in a system is developed not only by the 
quality of its results, but also by clear description of how they 
were derived." 
[Swartout, 1983J 
The explanatory abilities of these IKBS programs has also led Duda et a1 
to suggest Prospector's role in tutoring: 
"In addition, most of the geologists we know who have had any 
experience with Prospector have remarked about its potential value 
as an educational tool. In this regard, the models in the system 
contain explicit, detailed information synthezised from the 
literature and the experience of expert exp10rationists, together 
with explanatory text that can be obtained upon request. 
Furthermore, a typical consultation session with Prospector costs 
only about $10 at current commercial computer rates." 
[Duda, 1979] 
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The expert builds up a Knowledge Base (KB) within the system; as the KB 
is being developed the expert can test the validity of the input 
information. In effect he asks the system questions (as a teacher asks 
a pupil) to test its understanding of the given problem (although - we 
believe - this is more akin to the debugging process in 'traditional' 
programming). Eventually (or hopefully so) the system will have 
'learnt' from the expert enough knowledge to allow it to intelligently 
react to problems which it is set in its knowledge sphere. At this 
point it is possible to use another expert (from the same field) to 
interact with the system and further verify and expand, if possible, the 
system's understanding, allowing a higher level of machine competence 
than that provided by the individual experts. This knowledge, held in 
the KB, can then be the basis for consultation between the system and 
the non-expert. Thus the expert's advice is readily available in 
his/her absence. 
Such then is the perceived position of expert systems: it is, we 
believe, a naive view of what can be achieved from contact with a 
computer. Hopefully the results of analyzing the ELl program will bring 
some of this hyperbole to ground. 
3.4 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEARNING AND KNOVLEDGE 
So far, terms like "artificial intelligence", "learning" and "knowledge" 
have been used without proper definition of just what is meant. Such 
value loaded terms might cause an undesired interpretation to take 
place. How, in this text, should we approach such use? 
The problem arises because the IKBS research field has, at least until 
now, been developed by workers from the AI and cognitive psychology 
fields (for example, Stanford's Heuristic Programming Project and HIT's 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory) and has taken the terminology of 
psychology rather than that of computer science. 
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From the framework of this research, perhaps the best (critical) 
introduction to the fields of AI, machine learning and psychological 
modelling is the Lighthill Report [Lighthill, 1973], incorporating as it 
does, Sir James Lighthill's views and retorts from AI researchers (for 
example Prof. Donald Hichie). The perspective we have taken in this 
research is akin to Lighthill's, that is scepticism about the "learning" 
or "intelligent" abilities of computer programs (see, for example, the 
effective critique of AM's learning ability by [Ritchie, 1984]). 
Lighthill wrote: 
"To sum up, this evidence and all the rest studied by the present 
author on AI work within category B during the past twenty-five 
years is to some extent encouraging about programs written to 
perform in highly specialized problem domains, when the programming 
takes very full account of the results of human experience and 
human intelligence within the relevant domain, but is wholly 
discouraging about general-purpose programs seeking to mimic the 
problem-solving aspects of human eNS [central nervous system] over 
a rather wide field. Such a general-purpose program, the coveted 
long-term goal of AI activity, seems to be as remote as ever." 
[Lighthill, p15, 1973] 
Ye would argue that this statement still holds true. 
Taking this view and extending it into the IKBS field, we would say that 
IKBS systems do not exhibit "intelligent behaviour" - rather that they 
are clerical systems which operate upon data which they do not 
"understand". Ye might call the data "knowledge" but the case that 
machine representations of knowledge are human-like is unproven, 
although many use descriptive language which suggests the machine 
'reasons'; for example: 
"Prom its beginnings, artificial intelligence has borrowed freely 
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from the vocabulary of psychology. The use of the word 
"intelligence" to label our area of research a case in point. 
Other terms referring originally to human mental processes that 
have currency in AI are "thinking," "comprehending," and, with 
increasing frequency in the past five years, "understanding." In 
fact, these terms are probably used more freely in AI than in 
experimental psychology, where a deep suspicion of "mentalistic" 
terminology still lingers as a heritage of behaviourism." 
[Simon, 1977] 
The links between the disciplines of AI and cognitive psychology are and 
have been strong (for example, much work in Artificial Intelligence done 
at the Open University is carried out under the auspices of the 
psychology discipline rather than within the computing discipline). Yet 
another example of the strength of the links between the two disciplines 
has been the historically important question: "How closely related is 
machine intelligence to the human thinking mechanism?" This relationship 
has been set for almost all early AI programs, for example: 
"Simulation of human intelligence is not a primary goal of this 
work. Yet for the most part I have designed programs that see the 
world in terms conforming to human usage and taste." 
[Vinston, 1975] 
But the question is complex - if a chess program consistently beats a 
grand master (or, in fact, novice) does this mean that the machine 
"thinks" about the game in a better way than the grand master? It seems 
to us that no commonality between machine and thought has yet been 
proven. 
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Ades has noted another problem: 
"Everyone knows that for people who are trying to build computer 
models, to refrain from adding a few kludges to the program to make 
it 'work' is more than most mortals can do. Even more obvious is 
the distinction between an effort to understand a natural 
phenomenon and a program that mimics without trying to model the 
natural processes themselves. Vhat is less to be expected is that 
psychologists should take these programs seriously as insights into 
the workings of the human mind." 
[Ades, 1981J 
As well as analytical comparisons between psychological theories and 
coded programs, programs have also been developed as a direct 
implementation of aspects of psychological theory. For example, in the 
majority of AI programs (including IKBS programs) a major element of the 
design has originated in intuitive or introspective models of the human 
thinking mechanism. Hinsky's frames are used by many researchers; note 
how Hinsky inter-relates the human "mental" action with the computing 
idea of "data structure" when outlining his frame theory: 
"Here is the essence of the theory: Vhen one encounters a new 
situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of the 
present problem) one selects from memory a substantial structure 
called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to 
fit reality by changing details as necessary. 
A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotyped 
situation, like being in a certain kind of living room or going to 
a child's birthday party." 
[Hinsky, p212, 1975J 
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The ELl program described in this text is based upon the production 
system formalism used by Newell and Simon [Newell, 1972) as a method of 
human problem solving. By examining the way in which subjects solved 
certain problems Newell and Simon were able to provide production models 
which explained their explicit actions. O'Shea and Young [O'Shea, 1978) 
have similarly researched errors made by children when learning 
arithmetic. 
Newell and Simon saw a close inter-relationship between the production 
formalism and human cognitive processes: 
"Ve confess to a strong premonition that the actual organization of 
human programs [sic) closely resembles the production system 
organization. Ve cannot yet prove the correctness of this 
judgement, and we suspect that the ultimate verification may depend 
on this organization's proving relatively satisfactory in many 
different small ways, no one of them decisive." 
[Newell, p803/4, 1972) 
Ve are sceptical about, at any rate, the traditional production system 
being a satisfactory or sufficient model of behaviour. It is a suitable 
model of problem reduction (as noted for Prolog - an "extended" version 
of the production system architecture - by [Kowalski, 1979) but cannot 
handle a variety of other kinds of problems, for instance the use of 
negative knowledge (that knowledge where we say, such-and-such is not a 
form of the other such-and-such). Also, as noted by Goldstein and 
Grimson in their work on flight control, the production system formalism 
is incapable of encapsulating all desired information: 
"The assumption that all rules are independent carries with it the 
additional assumption that all rules are equally likely to be used 
at any stage of operation. In this case, since all rules are 
sensitive to context, such an assumption is not valid. 
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"Another common problem associated with production systems is the 
'implicit context problem'. This is the fact that the rule base 
has a total ordering associated with it and the position of the 
rule in this ordering becomes an important factor. Thus, since a 
rule ordinarily won't be called unless the rules preceeding it in 
the total order have failed, there are in essence extra conditions 
on the application of the rule. This may affect the performance of 
the system." 
[Goldstein, p313, 1977] 
To handle the information we might wish, 
"bastard" - production systems are essential. 
other more complex or 
The ELl program therefore 
tried to extend the traditional production system architecture by, for 
example, incorporating annotations. 
Some scepticism about "mental modes" and their relationship to computer 
science is needed our intuitive insights into these models and 
theories are often wanting and misleading. Psychology itself being less 
than clear on its subject matter, we would do well to agree with 
Vi ttgenstein: 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained 
by calling it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with 
that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with 
that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in 
psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. 
As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and 
method pass one another by." 
[Vittgenstein, p232e, 1958] 
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Therefore, this text does not try to relate "program" to "mind" - it is 
not a work on cognitive (or other) psychologies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LOGIC, FORMAL MODELS AND LEGAL REASONING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
If logic has no place within the law then it must be assumed that any 
attempt to produce a computerized legal consultative system, that is a 
system which can present legal advice rather than textual information, 
must be doomed to fail. \le mean, of course, by "legal advice" the sort 
requiring the intelligence which researchers in AI are working towards: 
clerical advice (advice by rote) is much less than that since it does 
not have the ability to deal with "new" legal situations and we hold 
that most non-trivial legal enquiries have some "new" aspect to them. 
Such an advisory system was proposed, perhaps rather optimistically, by 
Mehl with the statement: 
"One may also conceive - more ambitiously - a consultation machine 
which will answer any questions put to it over a vast field of 
law. " 
[Hehl, p768, 1958J 
Hehl's proposition is untenable if logic has no place within the law 
because a computer is basically a machine for explicating a logical 
system. Thus any formalized logical system can be computerized, and 
only such logical systems can be computerized. 
have a place within the law (by which we mean 
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However, if logic does 
that some deductive 
process operates in the judgement of a particular case) then Hehl's 
conjecture may well be realizable. 
In this chapter, we attempt to show that there does exist a logical 
system which illustrates what might be the deductive process whereby a 
judge uses logic to arrive at a judicial pronouncement; that is, that 
legal reasoning may be deductive, rather than inductive as proposed by 
several researchers. To carry out this logical modelling it is 
necessary to: 
(i) have a correct understanding of the problems of discussing "logic", 
(ii) have an understanding of how 'logic' can relate to 'law', 
(iii) present a logical model which mirrors - in part - legal reasoning, 
(iv) discuss how close an affinity might exist between the presented 
logical system and a judge's actual decision process. 
Ye shall propose, in fact, that our deductive model falls some distance 
from our desired goal. In this chapter that failure will be shown by 
recourse to logical problems; later, it will be shown by Realist 
arguments. 
4.2 THE NATURE AND ROLE OF LOGIC. 
It is regretful that, in a discipline which deals with the philosophy of 
law, when discussing the role of logic within the law researchers have 
tended to assume that logic is a relatively simple (if diverse) subject. 
But as Guest states: 
"Yhat do we mean by logic? Too often discussion of this subject 
has centred around the rather barren controversy whether legal 
reasoning is deductive or inductive in form. In this dispute, both 
sides have assumed that by deductive logic is meant the most simple 
form of Aristotelian syllogism: All S is P; x is an instance of S; 
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therefore x is an instance of P." 
[Guest, p181, 1961] 
In the following sections, we try to illustrate the more subtle aspects 
of logic. For instance, one of the principle confusions in discussions 
about logic's role with regard to the law, is just what relationship 
"logic" has to notions of 'correct argument'. Before dealing with 
formal logic, though - that is both the syllogism and its extensions and 
second order systems - it is essential to clarify what HacCormick [1978, 
p38] has called the 'everyday' form or usage. 
4.3 EVERYDAY LOGIC 
A term which is used both colloquially and with such deep philosophical 
dimensions as "logic" is bound to confuse its users, especially if both 
conceptions are being employed at the same time. In the following 
sections we attempt to clarify the technical perspective with which 
logic is applied, divorcing it from extra-systematic conceptions of 
truth and validity, and ignoring the colloquial aspects. By 
extra-systematic is meant the relationship which a logical system has to 
what is, technically, outside its formalism; thus "thought" stands in an 
extra-systematic relationship to the syllogism. In many ways the real 
problem in discussing logic and the law is caused by such colloquial and 
technical confusions. HacCormick noted a distinction between formal 
logic (or in his case modus ponens) and everyday logic: 
"But is it really logical that a decision should be given against 
Hrs. Tarbard? somebody might object: 'It's not logical at all to 
hold the publican liable, when she is in no way responsible for the 
contents of a sealed bottle of lemonade, and especially not when 
the manufacturer is, as in the present case, absolved from 
liability since he after all is the only person who has any 
control over what gets into the lemonade bottle before it is 
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sealed.' It will be observed that such an objection echoes the 
regret expressed by Lewis. J in granting judgement against Hrs. 
Tarbard who was, as he said 'entirely innocent and blameless in the 
matter'." 
[HacCormick, p37, 1978J 
Thus the question which HacCormick raises is: 
non-logical. How can (what MacCormick believes 
how can logic be 
to be) a logically 
justified legal decision be illogical? He answers the question by 
stating that there are at least two different senses to the word logic. 
The first of these is where, 
"an argument is logical if it complies with the requirement of 
logic, that is to say, if its conclusion follows necessarily from 
the premisses" 
[HacCormick, p38, 1978]. 
And the second is the "everyday usage": 
"some action or state of affairs can be said to be "illogical" in 
that it "doesn't make sense" 
These two different senses are 
"only partially overlapping." 
[1978,p38] 
The essence of "everyday logic", to HacCormick is that within its scope 
an argument, if it is called illogical, has the quality that it does not 
make sense. Another view is that everyday logic can be seen in a much 
stronger light; it is prescriptive in that rather than simply not making 
sense, such a description as illogical implies an "ought" or a "should"; 
that the logical resultant should or ought to be something else. Thus 
that it is illogical that a decision should be given against Hrs. 
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Tarbard, carries the implicit assumption that another result (i.e. that 
a decision should not be given against Hrs. Tarbard) ought or should be 
found. 
In this view then, "everyday logic" involves patterns of belief both 
individual and social (because it is possible that only Hrs. Tarbard 
could have thought the decision against her illogical, or that 
'everybody' thought it illogical). Vhen our expectation of the 
operation of the real world (or the legal world) is contrasted with 
actions which occur, we necessarily have a view of what the results 
"ought to be". 
The wider consequences of such a perspective of everyday logic are that, 
in effect, it has little to do with formal logic at all. Rather it is a 
social process which has a tendency to state expectations of normative 
behaviour. 
4.4 LOGIC AND TRUTH 
The basis of Aristotle's logic was the assumption that valid argument 
could be based upon one elemental form - that of the proposition where a 
subject and a predicate are joined by a connective. An example of such 
a proposition is, "a dog is chewing". To Aristotle, this proposition's 
usefulness is that it can be proven or disproven - either the dog is 
chewing or it is not; the proposition is either true or false - due to 
the law of the excluded middle. The law of the excluded middle simply 
states that no "middle" possibility can be encountered; for example, 
there cannot be True, False, and Possibly True. 
The format of valid Aristotelian propositions can be seen as (where s is 
the subject and p the predicate): 
(i) all s is p 
(ii) no s is p 
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(iii) some s is p 
(iv) some s is not p 
By combining two of these propositional forms, a valid conclusion can be 
reached: 
(a) all s is p 
(b) all x is s 
(c) all x is p 
But not the following: 
(a) some s is p 
(b) some x is s 
(c) some x is p 
The discovery of just which combinations of propositions can provide a 
valid syllogism is one of Aristotle's achievements. That it was an 
achievement can be realised by the fact that for two thousand years 
Aristotle's codification of valid forms of deduction was regarded as 
complete and incapable of essential improvement. As late as 1787, Kant 
was able to say that since Aristotle formal logic 
"has not been able to advance a single step, and is to all 
appearances a closed and complete body of doctrine". 
Kant, was wrong as we now know; Nagel and Newman state: 
"The fact is that traditional logic is seriously incomplete, and 
even fails to give an account of many principles of inference 
employed in quite elementary mathematical reasoning. For example, 
of the principles involved in the inference: 5 is greater than 3; 
therefore, the square of 5 is greater than the square of 3". 
[Nagel, p40, 1971] 
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Aristotle's syllogism was not a dry and abstract formal theory; it is 
important to realize that Aristotle was attempting to describe "correct 
argument" in much the same way that the Platonic School believed that 
their geometrical discoveries were discoveries of absolute truth. Kline 
states: 
"Plato said, further, that by using complicated instruments 'the 
good of geometry is set aside and destroyed, for we again reduce it 
to the world of sense, instead of elevating and imbuing it with 
eternal and incorporeal images of thought, even as it is employed 
by God, for which reason He always is God.' 
[Kline, p70, 1972J 
Such an attempt to discover "true reasoning processes" involves 
distilling the essential nature of discourse into a formalism so that 
its truth or falsity may be ascertained. Such a view of logic is still 
consistently found today. One example is Ilmar Tammelo: 
"Explicit and sound knowledge of logic brings many benefits to the 
lawyer. Above all it helps the reasoner to acquire proficiency and 
self-confidence in reasoning. For logic charts the practicable 
roads of reasoning and the pitfalls which await those who diverge 
from these roads. Those who master the principles and methods of 
logic are capable of quickly discovering valid arguments, defects 
in the reasoning of their own as well as their opponents, to 
disclose flaws in any discourse and to dispose of or overcome them 
efficiently. This gives poise to the reasoner in all argumentative 
situations." 
[Tammelo, pIV, 1969] 
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Another is MacCormick who states: 
"It should not be forgotten that the main and perhaps the only 
point of technical symbolisms and notations is to exhibit and make 
plain possible forms of argument and conditions of valid 
argument ..• " 
[MacCormick, p286, 1982] 
And Boole spoke of the "science of the intellectual powers": 
"Let the assumption be granted, that a science of the intellectual 
powers is possible 
" 
[Boole, 1854] 
where logic was to be the form of these intellectual powers. 
Today, Aristotle's conception of logic is thus contentious, necessarily 
subsuming within its definition notions of logical systems as "correct" 
or "incorrect" with respect to notions of absolute truth. Such notions 
are to do with the relationship of a logical system to the extra-logical 
world. Haack summarizes the issues as: 
"Does it make sense to speak of a logical system as correct or 
incorrect? Are there extra-systematic conceptions of 
validity/logical truth by means of which to characterize what it is 
for a logic to be correct? Must a logical system aspire to 
global application, i.e. to represent reasoning irrespective of 
subject matter, or may a logic be locally correct, i.e. correct 
within a limited area of discourse?" 
[Haack, p225, 1978] 
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Haack clarifies the theoretical positions with the following diagram: 
can a logical system be correct or incorrect? 
~ '" NO YES 
I 
INSTRUMENTALISM Is there one correct logic? 
/ '\ 
NO YES 
I I 
PLURALISM MONISH 
global or local? 
/ "'-
GLOBAL PLURALISM LOCAL PLURALISM 
Briefly, the instrumentalist believes that it is unimportant if a 
logical system has extra-systematic validity; rather that a logical 
system is a guide which refines predictive abilities, just as the laws 
of physics are not "correct" - only principles of inference. (Although, 
of course, there are various positions of instrumentalism - one view 
allows intra-systematic truth ("logical-truth-in-L"); another that logic 
is not a set of statements, rather a corpus of procedures). From this 
view, logic is a "model" of the discourse it deals with - it may be a 
'good' model, in which case it reflects well that which it models, or it 
may be a 'bad' model in which case it reflects poorly that which it 
models. The opposing view (taken by both the monist and pluralist) is 
that logic can be much more than a model; that a logical system has 
extra-systematic validity and is somehow an intrinsic element of the 
real world. Thus the modus ponens: 
s then p 
s 
••• p 
contains the essence of a good (i.e. valid) argument, unlike 
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s then p 
q 
. '. s 
which contains the essence of a bad (i.e. invalid) argument. Since 
instrumentalists must be expected to see the latter as bad or an example 
of false reasoning, they argue against extra-systematic validity by 
reference to other aspects of the syllogism and its extensions. A 
primary fault is found in the scope of the variables i.e. what can be 
incorporated within the class s or the class p. The idea of the 
syllogism dealing with classes arose with Boole's work in the 19th 
century. As mentioned later, there are arguments against such a view. 
The problem has been stated in one criticism of the application of modus 
ponens to legal argument as: 
"with some purportedly syllogistic arguments about 'objects' we are 
confronted with the question whether genuine propositions are 
conveyed in the words used" 
[Vilson,1982,p274]. 
Such an argument can be seen by recourse to the following example. 
Assuming for the moment, that the modus ponens form: 
if s then p 
s 
:.p 
is a valid reasoning process, i.e. that it explicates extra-systematic 
reasoning, we might try to argue that if the variable s is given the 
value (or make it refer to the proposition) "dogs bark" and p the value 
(or make it refer to the proposition) "cows moo". Vhen the form is 
restated, it becomes a nonsensical: 
If dogs bark then cows moo 
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dogs bark 
• cows moo 
. . 
This is not nonsensical because of the inherent logical form - only 
because we know that there is no implicative link (as suggested by the 
proposition) between dogs barking and cows mooing in 'real life'. 
However, the propositions in the above argument are easily related to 
the real world - everyone knows that dogs bark and cows moo but 
replace s by "sold by description" and p by "goods should be of 
merchantable quality" and the inherent problems of such logical form are 
focussed: 
If sold by description then goods shall be of merchantable 
quali ty 
Sold by description 
• goods shall be of merchantable quality 
. . 
The modus ponens does not clarify the concept "sold by description" nor 
"merchantable quality"; neither does it prove any implicative link 
between the two - so how can we be sure that the argument has "any real 
world validity". Such faults and weaknesses of the syllogistic form and 
its extensions caused it to fall into disrepute in the medieval period. 
Kilminster described this medieval scepticism over the syllogism and 
also one reason for its survival: 
"The whole matter is trivial and the reader may wonder ••• why it 
has survived for so long we find in the statutes of the 
University of Oxford in the 14th century the rule "Bachelors and 
Masters of Arts who do not follow Aristotle's philosophy are 
subject to a fine of Ss. for each point of divergence, as well as 
for infractions of the rules of the Organon". More generally, 
academic authority has had a great deal to do with the survival of 
this archaic structure." 
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[Kilminster, p1s, 1967] 
4.5 CONSISTENCY OF LOGICS 
The syllogism and associated forms are but one type of formal logical 
system. They do, however, along with all first order systems (e.g. 
predicate calculus) have internal validity they are consistent. 
Consistency is a mathematical concept which is related to the existence 
of paradoxes. Nagel and Newman [Nagel, 1971] present one of the best 
non-mathematical introductions to the idea of consistency and its 
importance for applications where extra-systematic validity is essential 
e.g. logical positivism's need for a logically secure basis, as in 
[Vittgenstein, 1981]. A claim for a logic to have extra-systematic 
validity necessitates that that logic is free from paradoxes - e.g. 
that it cannot produce the formulae "p or not p" and "not(p or not p)" 
at the same time; if it can, then the system is inconsistent. Since the 
rationale behind such introduction of logic as a "correct form of 
thought" utilized the assumption that logic was a consistent body of 
knowledge, the proof that a logical system is consistent supports the 
'logic as correct thought' proposition. This consistency of first order 
logics was established by Kurt Godel [Godel, 1930] and while not proving 
the validity of the logic as thought thesis, consistency does add weight 
to such a psychological theory. Haack's "monists" would stop at this 
point in their discourse of logic, there being they claim one correct 
logic. However "pluralists" (and most instrumentalists) would include 
other formal logical systems within their definition of logic. Such 
other systems are modal logic (which tries to escape from classical 
logic's two truth values - true and false - and include notions of true, 
might be true, etc.) and production systems (which deal with strings of 
variables) dealt with later in this paper. These systems, though, are 
not provable as consistent. Godel proved [Godel, 1931] that such 
systems require meta-systems to prove their validity; unfortunately such 
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meta-systems also require meta-systems to prove their validity and these 
systems, etc. It was in this paper that Godel undermined the 
philosophical basis of Vhitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematicia 
[Vhitehead, 1910-13]. 
Such problems concerning the consistency of such second order systems 
tend to support the instrumentalist point that logical systems should be 
seen as models of the world rather than intrinsic aspects of the world. 
4.6 THE NOTION OF CLASSES 
Another complex area for those wishing to apply logic to the law is the 
notion of a "class". Thus the syllogism: 
All men are Mortal 
Socrates is a Man 
:. Socrates is Mortal 
can be seen in terms of classes (which is why logic is sometimes called 
the Calculus of Classes) or sets (as in Venn diagrams) of objects - thus 
'Socrates is a man' does not apply simply to the individual "Socrates" 
but rather to that class or set of people known as "Socrates". 
The proposition that modus ponens could be seen in such terms was first 
made in "The Laws of Thought" [Boole, 1854]. This view caused Boole to 
become known as the founder of modern logic, since such a perspective of 
logical systems is the predominating one at present. The notion of a 
"class" has also been utilized by those who claim that legal reasoning 
is not logical at all. For instance Jensen states: 
"thus if a caretaker of a block of flats refuses to allow the 
residents to keep dogs on the grounds that they are a nuisance, the 
other residents would probably think it illogical if he refused to 
regard the dog of a blind resident as a nuisance. Suppose, 
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however, that the caretaker's reasons were that the dog enabled the 
blind man to find his way in and out of the building without his 
having to trouble others to help him. ~ould the caretaker be 
illogical? It is not logic - nor even abuse of logic - to insist 
on placing something in a certain class because of its resemblance 
in some respects to other members of the class when the basis of 
classification has not been explicitly formulated, and when so to 
place it would defeat the aims or the attainment of which the 
classification was made. There is no rule of logic against 
substantially contracting, or stretching a term." 
[Jensen,p9,1957] 
Is this action by the caretaker illogical in the formal sense? It does 
seem so at first impressions. However, when different assumptions are 
taken (e.g. that guide dogs provide a necessary service to the blind) 
it then seems reasonable (logical, in the colloquial sense) that such 
dogs are not forbidden from the premises. Might one not argue that this 
"classification" is the result of different assumptions; that the 
assumptions can be seen as propositions and that: 
If a dog then precluded from flats 
a dog 
precluded from flats 
• • 
is very different from: 
If dog is not a guide dog then precluded from flats 
not a guide dog 
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precluded from flats 
. . 
• 
~hile this does show that Jensen's example can be reformulated in terms 
of modus ponens, (although, note that HacCormick [1982,p289] suggests 
that the delineation of the class can be built up by a hierarchy of 
properly quantified steps. Ye tend to support this, if not the utility 
of quantification; and mention it later when proposing that Russell's 
conception of induction as guesswork and deductive justification for 
these guesses might be correct) there is another point about Jensen's 
contention of class which overtly permeates thinking and writing. The 
essence of the point is that it is wrong to build imaginary "sets" or 
"classes" which are delimited before they are filled - (e.g. Cantor's 
work with infinite sets) - such an attempt is tautologous in that the 
sets are recursively defined; they are what they are because we define 
what they are filled with because of what they are. Yhile 
mathematically useful, they are philosophically unsound and confusing. 
Yhile really outside the scope of this paper, those dealing with logic 
and the law should be aware of such criticisms; especially when such 
criticisms are often virulently made Yittgenstein, for example, 
described set theory as a cancer pervading mathematics and thought. 
One result of this concept of logic as class or set based is the need, 
as some see it, to formalize the set within either existential or 
universal quantifiers - to create a world of possible members which can 
be incorporated within an encompassing universal set; for example: 
" "For all people, if one person transfers the property etc., then 
a contract of sale exists" or symbolically, (x)(If Fx then Gx»." 
[Yhite, p742, 1980] 
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Such requirements when demanded of all logical systems strike us as 
being unnecessarily pedantic, if not erroneous; below, we detail a 
logical system which advantageously omits such quantification. 
4.7 APPLICATION OF LOGIC TO THE LAY 
4.7.1 Previous Applications 
Given the very confusing and diverse views about logic, from both 
logicians and laymen, there might well be a tendency to hesitate 
conjoining logic with jurisprudence. Blatantly though, this is not so -
all that has happened is that each writer on the subject has brought his 
own perspectives about logic to the application. For example, Del 
Vecchio hoped for a scientific formalism of legal theory using logic: 
"Every educated man, it would seem, should be able to answer the 
question, "Vhat is law?" with facile certainty, and his thoughts 
and acts should be controlled by its concept. But this is far from 
true; many of those who have given special study to legal 
principles and institutions would hesitate to offer an answer. 
Vhoever considers the diversity and incongruity of its definitions 
cannot fail to see that, notwithstanding the labor expended on the 
science and philosophy of law and the number of special researches 
recently instituted, the concept of law has not yet assumed 
definite shape in a truly logical sense." 
[Del Vecchio, 1914, p1-2) 
Such a concept of law assuming an inviolate base is similar to the 
logical positivist view of logic as a methodology for understanding the 
underlying meaning of language; that is, an ideal language. Both are 
attempts to apply 'logic and the scientific method' to the social 
sciences. Such an approach was also taken by Kelsen in the proposal for 
a "pure theory of law". Be stated: 
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"It is called a "pure" theory of law, because it only describes the 
law and attempts to eliminate from the object of this description 
everything that is not strictly law: Its aim is to free the 
science of law from alien elements. This is the methodological 
basis of the theory." 
[Kelsen, p1, 1967] 
Stone has mentioned that because Kelsen sometimes uses the concepts of 
logic in a loose manner does not mean that he did not try to aim for a 
logically consistent theory: 
"It has to be said, indeed, that though many of Kelsen's basic 
positions are dependant on the cogency of inferences, his use of 
even basic terms of formal logic such as "contradiction" and 
defini tion is 
work is simply 
often loose. This, no doubt, explains why Kelsen's 
omitted from a recent competent and extensive 
bibliography of juristic logic." 
[Stone, p135, 1964] 
Other assumptions of what logic is, have centred around its usefulness 
as a tool to formalize jurisprudential concepts, clarifying the problems 
caused by "chameleon-hued words" as Hohfeld described them. For 
example, Layman E. Allen used formal logic to refine Hohfelds' "Rights" 
theory: 
"Vith the advent of the digital computer and the power of 
electronic information retrieval systems, the precise usage and 
definition of words rises from the level of merely aiding the 
efficiency of a transaction between legal entities to that of being 
virtually essential, where computers are involved, if the 
transaction is to take place at all. Han learns by example and 
possesses the creativity to resolve ambiguities; ••. In general, a 
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computer requires a clearer and more precise statement of the 
question to be resolved. The purpose of this Article is to examine 
one phase of the legal communication process - that of defining a 
legal relationship between parties - with a view toward expressing 
that definition in a manner that will facilitate careful and 
precise communication wherever that is deemed desirable". 
[AlIen, p429, 1974] 
Others have combined the two perspectives (that of analysis and of 
theorizing); for example Reed C. Lawlor wrote: 
"On the one hand the author is testing methods for analyzing and 
predicting judicial decisions. On the other hand he is testing a 
computerized theory of stare decisis including a theory of personal 
stare decisis." 
[Lawlor, p219, 1980] 
Such a dualistic approach is not uncommon, Abraham Fraunce proposed that 
logic underlay proper application of the law, and he also used logic to 
analyze a case concerning the Earl of Northumberland. 
law; 
Our 
Our own work does not attempt to prove that logic underpins the 
neither does it attempt to produce a logical theory of the law. 
goals, in this chapter, are much more limited than either of these 
namely to show that legal reasoning can, in some cases, be modelled by a 
logical system with the goal of translating this logical model into a 
computer system. That this attempt has usefully illustrated some 
contentious aspects of legal reasoning comes only from the general 
utility of such a model, especially when that model is implemented as a 
computer system and must stand on its own resources. 
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4.7.2 A Logical Jurisprudential Model 
There is a distinction between a "theory" and a "model" which makes us 
determine not to speak of a "Logical Jurisprudential Theory". The 
distinction is quite subtle but, we believe, important. A theory is an 
attempt to subsume all disparate facts about the object of study under 
one predictive explanation. A theory can be a precise explication (as 
we see Einstein's theory as) or can be coarsely explicated (as most 
jurisprudential theories are, utilizing arguable assumptions within 
their terms of reference - "right", "grundnorm", "coherence"). It must, 
though, by definition explain and predict in a consistent manner its 
whole area of discourse - however limited that area might be. 
A model, on the other hand, is a tool - it need not necessarily explain 
or predict. Normally though, a model which neither explains nor 
predicts is of little analytical use. A model should, for our purposes, 
be useful; it should give insights into that which it models in much the 
way that a theory tries to give a complete insight. 
A model usually attempts to model a subset of a theory; when it tries to 
model a whole theory the value of distinction between "model" and 
"theory" becomes hard to justify. 
Thus: a theory of legal reasoning must aim to explain 'legal 
reasoning'; and a theory of law must aim to explain "law". But: a 
model of legal reasoning should give insight into legal reasoning 
perha~s by clarifying one issue or proving that a proposition about 
legal reasoning is possible (it does this, of course, by being a 
successful model of that proposition); alternatively, the model might 
try to show strengths and weaknesses of the theory which are not obvious 
in the theory. 
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This approach to the usage of a model is described as a "simplifying 
model" [Enc. of Phil., Vol 5, p355, 1967]. In the next section we 
propose just such a model. 
4.8 A JURISPRUDENTIAL MODEL OF LEGAL REASONING 
4.8.1 Deduction 
A deductive argument has been defined by MacCormick as: 
"an argument which purports to show that one proposition, the 
conclusion of the argument, is implied by some other proposition or 
propositions, the 'premisses' of the argument. A deductive 
argument is valid if, whatever may be the content of the premisses 
and the conclusion, its form is such that its premisses do in fact 
imply (or entail) the conclusion". 
[MacCormick, p21, 1978] 
In essence, a deductive argument is composed of two parts, between which 
there is an implied consequence such that if one part (the antecedent) 
is held to be true, then the other part (the consequent) is caused to 
come about (i.e. loosely, "true"). The actual contents of the parts 
are unimportant; the only requirement is that a truth value can be 
returned by the antecedent. Thus the general inferential format of a 
deductive argument is: 
if antecedent is true then consequent 
or more symbolically (but not more formally): 
p then q. 
Given a deductive argument of this form, it is self contradictory for 
anyone to claim that if "a" then "b" is not implied. As an example, if 
the antecedent (or proposition) is: 
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"his name is Joe" 
and the consequent is: 
"the person named in the antecedent is male" 
then assuming the antecedent to be 
detailing intra-systematic scope 
true (and assuming that we are 
of the referents - as we shall do 
constantly from now), we must accept that Joe is male. 
Note that implication is one of the the most argued about aspects of 
logic, though. For example, deduction is often modelled by A B; but 
this is more correctly read, some claim, as "if B then A" [De Long, 
1970, p98-99]. Ye return to this in the final section of this chapter. 
4.8.2 Production Systems 
Such an antecedent/consequent 
production system [Post,1943]. 
pair is the central element of a 
In a production system the antecedent 
and consequent pair are described as production rules, productions or, 
simply, rules. They are generally but not always, held as a vertical 
list: 
IF a THEN b 
IF c THEN d 
IF e THEN f 
IF x THEN Y 
Such rules are the rules which govern behaviour within the system. Thus 
where the formalism has been utilized in combinatorial work the 
productions represent graphical operations, where they appear as 
Chomsky's 'rewrite rules' they govern linguistic or grammatical 
operations. One of the most important aspects of productions are that, 
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when applied, they produce a change in the environment of the system 
(hence the name production) - for instance a higher level phrase is 
produced with Chomsky's application of a rewrite rule. 
The application of productions is carried out in a deterministic manner 
the productions are said to be "interpreted". Yhile there are a 
variety of particular ways in which productions can be interpreted, 
there is one general axiom - only one production can be applied at any 
one time. This implies a serial ordering of rule application. Usually 
the ordering is from top to bottom; each production is tested to 
ascertain whether its antecedent is true - if it is true then that 
production is triggered, if not triggered the following rule is tested. 
Triggering a rule means effecting the consequent which can be 
considered similar to proving the consequence "true" and then 
returning to the top of the list to restart the testing operation. 
At this point no interconnection has been shown between antecedent and 
consequent apart from a causal link - if the antecedent is true it 
causes the consequent to come into effect. However, it is usual for the 
consequent of one rule to be an element in the antecedent of another 
rule. Thus the productions in this simple example: 
IF a and b THEN c 
IF f and a THEN g 
IF g THEN d 
If c THEN f 
IF a and d THEN e 
are perfectly possible. In order to bring into effect e, it is 
essential that a and b are, within the system, initially true. 
one or neither of a and b are true, then c cannot be effected. 
If only 
If c 
cannot be effected then neither can (by way of f and g) d - which is a 
necessary element of the production whose consequent is e. If a and b 
- 57 -
are true, then the first production can be triggered; this effects c. 
The second production cannot because we do not know that f is true. 
Effectively, the consequent of the third production is debarred from 
effecting because g cannot be proven. Testing the next production, 
because we know that c is true (it was effected by the first production) 
f is effected. Since after each occasion that a consequent is effected 
we return to the top of the list again, we then scan down for an 
untriggered production whose consequent we can effect, etc.. The 
procedure continues in this manner until e is effected. 
This simple example uses only 5 rules, works towards only one highest 
possible effect (i.e. e), and does not request any input from outwith 
the system apart from the intial starting values. In programs using 
this technique, the minimum number of rules is usually about 150, 
various eventual conclusions might be achieved (e.g. with Chomsky's 
rewrite rules, a large number of different, grammatically correct 
sentences can be produced), and much more extra-systematic interaction -
and request for data - is necessary. 
A skeletal outline of the above process is: 
IF a and b THEN e 
but this does not indicate the "reasoning"; while technically correct it 
does not show the flavour of the reasoning steps from initial testing 
through to conclusion: 
(a and b) then c then f then (f and a) then g then 
d then (d and a) then e 
One important point not fully illustrated by this small example is that 
an object produced by a production can be said to be defined by it. 
Thus in: 
IF a and b THEN c 
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c can be said to be defined by a and b. If two productions of the form: 
IF a and b THEN c 
IF d and e THEN c 
c can be said to be defined by a and band/or d and e. 
described as definitional rules. 
These are 
This production system formalism is an example of a second order formal 
logical system [Enc. of Phil.,1967,8,p61/74]. A formal logical system 
is a simple mathematical device. It is a system for explicating the 
notion of consequence. This consequentialist process is shown by the 
use of certain aspects of a formal language: 
(1) a set of transformation rules. 
(2) a set of axioms concerning application of 1. 
(3) formation rules for 1. 
(4) a list of symbols transformable by 1. 
Thus it is possible to see from this definition that a production system 
is a formal system: 
(i) its procedures are its transformation rules. 
(ii) its manner of interpretation is its application axioms. 
(iii) its productions are of a set format, i.e. IF p THEN q. 
(iv) those symbols specified in its productions constitute 
its list. 
While outwardly it may seem that a legal system is similar to a formal 
system, for example that it consists of a body of rules which must be 
interpreted etc, it is not our intention to prove, or our belief that, 
law is a formal system. 
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4.8.3 A Legal Example 
While the original legislative domain used in our research was Welfare 
Rights Legislation (used as test data, we originally considered, because 
of its cohesive and "easy" - rather than "hard" - predictive nature) it 
is useful to discuss another field of legislation at this time. The 
usefulness arises because a current controversy exists over the 
interpretation of a particular judicial judgement as either "deductive" 
or "inductive". The case is that of Daniels and Daniels v R. White & 
Sons and Tarbard ([1938] 4 All E.R. 258). MacCormick provided a 
synopsis of the case: 
"The facts of the matter were as follows. Mr Daniels went to a 
pub, and there bought a bottle of lemonade (R. White's lemonade) 
and a jug of beer. These he took home, and there drank some of the 
lemonade himself and gave a glass of it to his wife, which she 
drank. They both experienced burning sensations and became ill. 
The cause of their sickness was subsequently established as being 
the fact that the lemonade which they had consumed was heavily 
contaminated with carbolic acid. Examination of the remaining 
contents of the lemonade bottle showed the lemonade to contain a 
large admixture of carbolic acid. 
The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, subsequently sued the 
manufacturer of the lemonade and the publican who sold it to them 
for damages in compensation for their illness, treatment expenses, 
and loss of earnings when ill. The defendant manufacturer was 
absolved from liability the defendant publican was held 
liable and ordered to pay them damages." 
[HacCormick, 1978, pI9/20] 
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The reasoning process behind (rather than the reason for) such a 
judgement is the core of contention was the decision arrived at 
"logically" (i.e. deductively) or was it arrived at by "classification" 
(i.e. inductively). Using a corpus of productions it is possible to 
illustrate a deductive process which might (and I deal with this "might" 
later) have caused the judgement to be arrived at. Such a corpus of 
rules does not exist solely within legislation or solely within case 
precedents. Rather it must be extracted from legislation, precedent and 
expertise and tested as to its validity. 
The corpus (or knowledge base in IKBS terms) here consists of only a few 
rules; they are used only to exhibit relevant points since a fuller 
description of the mechanical handling is available elsewhere (Chapter 
6). 
However, the rules are: 
1. IF <a sale has taken place> 
<goods requested by description> 
<seller deals in described goods> 
THEN 
2. IF 
THEN 
3. IF 
THEN 
4. IF 
THEN 
<sale by description> 
<sale by description> 
<defects cannot be observed by examination> 
<goods are not of merchantable quality> 
<object acceptable after examination> 
<object fit for purpose bought> 
<goods are of merchantable quality> 
<person has power over goods> 
<person has power to sell property> 
- 61 -
5. IF 
THEN 
6. IF 
THEN 
7. IF 
THEN 
8. IF 
THEN 
9. IF 
THEN 
<person is a Sheriff> 
<goods seized under writ of execution> 
<person has power over goods> 
<a contract of sale has been made> 
<a sale has taken place> 
<object transferred from seller to buyer> 
<person has power to sell property> 
<transfer completed for monetary consideration> 
<a contract of sale has been made> 
<a written contract prepared> 
<transfer completed for monetary consideration> 
<transfer to take effect at future time> 
<a contract of agreement to sell has been made> 
<goods are not of merchantable quality> 
<a sale has taken place> 
<seller liable for damages to buyer> 
At first sight, and especially to those with contact only with first 
order logical systems, the above may appear to have little relationship 
to "logic". However, they should be seen as rules where the positions 
taken by variables contain strings of meaningless marks between ,,<It and 
">" symbols, and that: 
IF <A><B> THEN <C> 
means 
IF «A> AND <B» THEN <C> 
It is possible, of course, to utilize other logical connectives than 
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"AND" e.g. "OR" etc. \Then initially deciding on the formalism we 
chose to put more effort into simplifying the rules before incorporating 
them within the system because I believe that this will enable the 
corpus to be kept up to date more easily by non-computer scientists. 
The validity of having a logical system which deals with marks was noted 
first by C.I.Lewis and was described as the 'heterodox view of 
mathematics and logic': 
"A mathematical system is any set of strings of recognizable marks 
in which some of the strings are taken initially and the remainder 
derived from them by operations performed according to rules which 
are independent of any meaning assigned to the marks. That a 
system should consist of marks instead of sounds or odors is 
immaterial, but it is convenient to discuss mathematics as written. 
The string-like arrangement is due simply to our habits of 
notation. And there is no theoretical reason why a single mark may 
not, in some cases, be recognized as a "string". 
The distinctive feature of this definition lies in the fact that it 
regards mathematics as dealing, not with certain denoted things -
numbers, triangles, etc. - nor with certain symbolized "concepts" 
or "meanings", but solely with recognizable marks, and dealing with 
them in such wise that it is wholly independent of any Question as 
to what the marks represent. 
The question of logical meaning, like the question of empirical 
denotation, may be regarded as one possible application and not of 
anything internal to the system itself." 
[Lewis, p355/356, 1918] 
Therefore, viewing these marks as non-meaningful within the system 
itself does not preclude assigning an extra-systematic value to them. 
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Such a value is, in effect, built into the basic propositions or axioms 
of the system and, as required by this non-modal system, necessitates 
only the ability to assume the value "true" or the value "false". This 
approach is advantageous because it separates the meaning of the marks 
from the deductive process, the latter relying upon only the similarity 
of the marks, e.g. <sale by description> has the same meaning as <sale 
by description> but not <a contract of sale has been made>. This 
approach allows the marks (or "conditions" or "states" if preferred) to 
be semantic tokens to which annotations, references to law reports and 
legislation etc. can be added to help the person interacting with the 
system determine whether "< ... >,, is "true" or "false". The only logical 
requirement is that for symbols to be equivalent they should have the 
same marks and annotations. Ve simplify. In fact there is no need to 
be quite so pedantic - what is necessary, though, is that the symbols 
should be conceptually identical; which is rather different from having 
identical marks. Thus "monday morning" is conceptually identical (in 
most cases) with "monday between 00.00.01 hrs and 11.59.59 hrs". 
The models interprets its production rules in the following manner. 
Rule 1 is tested first. The first condition of the antecedent is <a 
sale has taken place>, and the system must determine the truth or 
falsity of this. How can it be done? There are three possible 
strategies which can be applied: 
(i) the system might already have determined that the condition is true. 
In this case the strategy is simply to search a list of known facts; if 
the condition is found in the list it is "true", else attempt (ii). 
(ii) by "backchaining", as it is known in computer science. Thus an 
incidence of the condition appearing as consequent of another rule (as 
condition 1 of Rule 1 in Rule 6) allows the system to make use of the 
definitional character of the rules - i.e. it can backchain through the 
antecedents of the "defining rule" to determine whether its consequent 
is effected, and therefore whether the condition in the first rule is 
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true. Vhenever a condition is proven true, it is added to the list of 
conditions which (i) can access. If no incident of the condition as 
consequent is found, or if the backchaining strategy is unsuccessful, 
then strategy (iii) is applied. (iii) The user can be asked whether the 
condition is true or false; which is equivalent to posing the statement 
"in this case Socrates" in the modus ponens. 
In the following, for shorthand purposes each strategy will be 
referenced by (i), (ii) or (iii) as appropriate, and R1 represents Rule 
1, Cl represents condition 1 etc. The example has been chosen more to 
illustrate the definitional (i.e. backchaining) 
interpretation. Interpretation is of the form: 
1 apply (i) to R1C1 - not known 
2 apply (ii) to R1C1 - match found at Rule 6 
3 apply (i) - to R6C1 not known 
4 apply (ii) to R6C1 - match found at Rule 7 
5 apply (i) to R7C1 - not known 
6 apply (ii) to R7C1 - no match found 
7 apply (iii) to R7C1 
aspect of 
at this point, the system must ask the user whether (object transferred 
from seller to buyer> is true. If so (as we shall assume) then the next 
condition is tested: 
9 apply (i) to R7C2 - not known 
10 apply (ii) to R7C2 - match found at Rule 4 
11 apply (i) to R4C1 - not known 
12 apply (ii) to R4Cl - match found at Rule 5 
13 apply (i) to R5Cl - not known 
14 apply (ii) R5Cl - no match found 
15 apply (iii) to R5Cl: 
at this point the user replies 'false' to the system's request for the 
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truth or falsity of <person is a Sheriff>. Therefore Rule 5 cannot be 
triggered, and the interpreter returns to trying to trigger Rule 4, 
continuing the process started at step 12: 
16 apply (ii) to R4C1 - no match found 
17 apply (iii) to R4C1: 
asking the user once again. This process continues, building up the 
list of known conditions, and working through the rules in the system. 
Yhile tedious to follow here, such a repetitive procedure (or algorithm) 
is just how a computer operates. 
During this interpretation, the user may be asked the truth of, for 
example, <person has power over goods>. It may be that other rules 
govern the definition of this concept (as would be necessary in any 
system which might be "expert" in the Sale of Goods legislation) but 
none exist in the example's corpus - therefore the user has recourse to 
only 'common sense'. In a realistic system these cases, where the user 
has no aid from other defining rules, might be at a higher conceptual 
level for those with experience of the legislation, and at a very low 
conceptual level for those with no experience of the law at all. This 
necessity to reduce all concepts to un-confusable english words 
intelligible by persons with no experience of the law is one reason why 
we are sceptical of claims to produce "mechanized justice". 
Concluding, there are several points which this example exhibits: 
(i) the "truth" or "falsity" of the individual antecedents of each 
rule are eventually decided by extra-systematic interaction, in the 
same way that we must interpret the syllogism. 
(ii) as in all deductive systems, only that which is already within 
the system can be concluded from the premisses (i.e. the system 
does not make new legal decisions - it only applies past ones). 
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(iii) the process is inferential, i.e. deductive. 
(iv) a deductive process can allow rules to be used in a 
definitional manner. 
In the next section, we shall see how closely this model might accord 
with legal reasoning as it occurs in court. 
4.9 THE AFFINITY OF THE MODEL TO ACTUAL LEGAL REASONING. 
4.9.1 Introduction. 
There are various problems which arise when an attempt is made to 
compare a model with that which it models. In some circumstances these 
problems are less important than in others. For example, when comparing 
a Treasury model with the financial state of the country, the comparison 
is between a model and abstract economic concepts (e.g. "value of 
international trade") and no attempt is made to ascertain whether the 
model operates in the same way as its object of study. When, however, 
one of the principle goals of the model is to help decide just how its 
object of study operates, the problems are akin to trying to see into a 
black box much can be proposed about the internal operation, but 
little can be proven. 
Another general problem is that of deciding how far any future extension 
of the model might be expanded - thus when does a model become, if not 
reality, at least a precise explanatory copy of reality. 
The first is important in the context of legal reasoning because we are 
attempting to model what happens within a judge's person (or "mind"). 
The second is important because it deals with the possibility of 
"mechanized justice". 
4.9.2 Psychologicalism 
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Any theory of legal reasoning must, at some point, involve notions of 
what passed through the judge's mind when the decision was being made. 
There are problems, though, in deciding just how this mental process 
might be observed. An example of the difficulty an individual has in 
expressing his thought processes, is found in the current research in 
computer science which attempts to incorporate an expert's knowledge 
about his domain within a computer program. This research has 
discovered that frequently an expert cannot express just why, in certain 
situations, he applies one piece of knowledge rather than another; or 
sometimes have difficulty in enunciating knowledge which he has applied. 
One possible way to circumvent mind reading is to use the written 
judge's decision. MacCormick uses these decisions to illustrate the 
decision process of the judge, claiming that the decision was arrived at 
logically. But Yilson refutes that the judge's reasoning had a 
deductive nature: 
" 
to 
there seems to be, in this particular case, no good grounds 
believe that Lewis J reasoned in these three allegedly 
'syllogistic' stages " 
[Yilson, p280, 1982] 
The sceptic, of course, might helpfully agree with Vilson and posit that 
no sane judge is to be expected to present an argument in a 
"non-logical" way: whether the reasoning was logical differs from 
whether the presentation is logical. 
Surprisingly, even the production system formalism has been seen by 
cognitive psychologists as possibly how the "human program" operates as 
noted above by [Newell, p806, 1972]. 
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It seems that such propositions concerning actual mental actions can 
never be proven; the debate therefore seems empty. Therefore, I will 
make no claims for judges actually thinking deductively - only, in the 
next part, that they it is possible to model them as exhibiting 
deductive behaviour. The usefulness of the model lies in the analytical 
insights it helps provide: these insights we return to later. 
4.9.3 Deduction Or Induction 
Vilson puts forward the inductive argument as: 
"Thus the process whereby the judge decides that the object, action 
or transaction facing him is to be classified under a particular 
legal category - such as 'contract' or 'delict' will constitute the 
central element in his reasoning. In this process the judge 
performs the mental operations of 'identification' and 
'classification': identification of the empirical data - be it a 
present object or evidence of past actions - and its classification 
under a relevant legal figure whence legal consequences will 
follow. This crucial operation is not deductive. In deduction, 
the data are presented to the reasoner already identified and 
classified. " 
[Vilson, p278/279, 1982] 
Ve shall omit one of the common arguments against this perspective 
i.e. that the judge has a case presented to him, he does not 'classify' 
and 'identify' like some legal ghost in the machine - and concentrate on 
the proposition that induction may be viewed as a process of guesswork 
and deductive justification as proposed by Russell. Such a view would 
see the judge taking a tentative position of what "class" a certain 
object or occurrence might be contained within, and then testing 
deductively whether there is some chain or reasoning which might support 
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such a position. If not, another position is taken, else that first 
position is accepted as justified. 
Such a possibility has been ignored by researchers in legal reasoning. 
For example ~asserstrom believes that this process of classification is 
not deductive even though he does see legal reasoning as primarily 
deductive: 
" it would still be true 
interpretations of terms; it 
that "logic does 
dictates neither 
not 
the 
prescribe 
stupid nor 
intelligent interpretation of any expression". One cannot appeal 
to the canons of logic to decide whether a given classification is 
necessarily the correct one" 
[~asserstrom, p32/33, 1961]. 
Russell's argument is expressed succinctly as: 
"You observe that 1 + 3 = 2 , 1 + 3 + 5 = 3 , 1 + 3 + 5 + 7 = 4 
and you say to yourself: "in some cases, the sum of the first n 
odd numbers is n ; perhaps this is true in all cases." As soon as 
this hypothesis has occurred to you, it is easy to prove that it is 
correct. In empirical material, a complete enumeration may 
sometimes be possible." 
[Russell, p89, 1980] 
Just as a mathematician is much more likely to intuitively notice the 
connection between sums of odd numbers and the square of the number of 
those, it is surely reasonable to expect that a judge, with training and 
expertise in the law, is capable of formulating questions of the sort, 
"Given that many persons, having been found without authority on private 
property carrying bags marked "swag", have been found guilty of theft; 
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perhaps this present person should be so found as well." Such an 
inductive (or perhaps "intuitive") proposition needs recourse to some 
sort of justification for its belief. The justification will probably 
be both recourse to the usage of the term "without authority", probably 
evidence to the contents of the sack etc. But there must be 
justification; and that justification must be legally relevant. 
Similarly, the assumption that an incidence of "sale by description" has 
occurred also requires justification. How might this process of 
justification be arrived at? 
One possibility is that some process similar to that occurring within 
the interpreting section of the model is being put into effect - i.e. 
that inferences (i.e. a deductive process is occurring) are being made 
from the basic propositions of the system, and that those propositions 
(i.e. legal rules) are being used in a definitional manner. 
4.9.4 Law As A Formal System 
The notion that law is formal system might appeal to some within 
computer science implying the possibility of building automated 
purveyors of justice. But to see whether such a vision is possible, it 
is necessary to determine whether the law is, or could be, a formal 
system, since as mentioned earlier this explication is necessary in 
order that it can be computerized. 
Earlier, we noted that our research was not directed towards proving 
that the law was a formal system i.e. that is consists of an 
axiomatic basis and an inflexible procedure for deducing conclusions. 
If the law were a formal system the relationship between it and life 
would not be in doubt - the law would stand in a directive relationship 
to the world; that is a one way relationship. But this is obviously not 
the case. It stands, not solely in a directive relationship to the 
world (e.g. as a command theory would have us believe), but in a two 
- 71 -
way relationship. Thus the law (and by that we mean the application of 
the law) can be affected by external influence. A formal system by 
definition, some claim, cannot be so affected its axioms of 
interpretation are precise and constant over time; and cannot be 
affected by such considerations as might influence the decision of a 
judge. (Ve disagree that these systems are "set in concrete", but agree 
that it is difficult to have them affected by ad-hoc judicial 
behaviour.) For example how might a formal system cope with MacCormick's 
contention that it is possible that Mrs. McTavish was granted her a 
divorce 
"just because she has a ravishingly pert retrousse nose" 
[MacCormick, piS, 1978] 
Other work by Griffiths [1977] has shown that innate conservatism of the 
judiciary has effect upon judicial decision. Griffith denotes the cause 
of this application of conservatism as "judicial creativity" and points 
to its powerful effect: 
"I have said that judges look to what they regard as the interests 
of the whole society. That, in itself, makes political assumptions 
of some magnitude. It has long been argued that the concept of the 
whole society suggests a homogeneity of interest amongst the 
different classes within that society which is false. And that 
this concept is used to persuade the governed that not the 
Government but the 'State' is the highest organization and 
transcends conflicts in society. It is a short step to say that it 
is the State which makes the laws, thus enabling those in political 
power to promote their own interests in the name of the whole 
abstracted society." 
[Griffiths, p204, 1977] 
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Reed C. 
(that 
law is 
Lawlor [1980] has also provided evidence of a strong personal 
is individual) element in application of stare decisis. If the 
a formal system, blatantly these occurrences would be 
unobservable; the fact that they are observable illuminates only the 
fact that the law is not a formal system. 
On the other hand if such "alien elements" could be eliminated from the 
law, would the law be akin to a formal system? Ye suspect not; for a 
formal system can only treat its variables as marks upon paper, and when 
such marks are transliterated into english text the semantic problems of 
interpretation still arise. The application of law is a social 
activity, necessarily dependant upon the use of language, not something 
which can occur outside of social activity. Thus if we ever do provide 
computerized justice, there must still be people capable of interpreting 
the computer's decisions; either that or the computer must have the 
ability to precisely specify every legal concept by application of 
simple english words which can never be mis-understood. But such words 
are, of course, in short supply. 
A third point is that a formal system can only conclude from that which 
is already within its propositions (i.e. its rules if it is a 
production system formalism). Any attempt to produce a computerized 
system which can deal with every eventuality is, I feel, difficult to 
accept as feasible. Judges, with their abilities to reason by "analogy" 
and "principle" are quite safe from computerization. 
4.9.5 Conclusion: The Myth Of Logical Compulsion 
There has been an implicit position which we have hinted at throughout 
this chapter, a position is far from usual in discussion of logic. Our 
position is relativist, viewing logical systems as tools while 
discarding any notion of extra-systematic validity they might have. 
This means that we see logic as useful, but not something which offers 
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us a stable platform to argue from; put simply, logic is too 
problematical to be any platform except, perhaps, a leaky raft in the 
North Sea. We have called into question logic's relationship to the law 
by noting the complexities of logic (later we shall do so by noting the 
complexities of law), but also our argument has been against the notion 
of logical compulsion - that logic compels us to do anything. In this 
concluding section we bring out this aspect of logic. Our argument is, 
of course, that logic cannot be a foundation for law. 
We have dealt with MacCormick's belief in the special validity of 
logical form: we can see that he believes, for reasons of the desire to 
be non-contradictory, that a deductive argument has a special force: 
"A deductive argument is valid if, whatever may be the content of 
the premisses and the conclusion, its form is such that its 
premisses do in fact imply (or entail) the conclusion. By that is 
meant that it would be self-contradictory for anyone to assert the 
premisses and at the same time to deny the conclusion." 
[MacCormick, p21/22, 1978J 
It is the abstraction of logical form which is important to MacCormick 
since that abstraction can offer itself as a guide to any contradiction 
in an argument. Such a belief is one which can be termed, the belief of 
logical compulsion, since it allows us no respite from its 
compulsiveness; it would be as MacCormick states, "self-contradictory 
for anyone to assert" against its compulsiveness. The belief in this 
compulsion is a powerful tool (if valid) to have in the toolbox of the 
philosopher (and the judiciary) because it allows the philosopher to 
resort to an external and stable reasoning mechanism; it is a tool which 
is central to MacCormick's position. 
which is essentially Platonist, and not 
historical evidence. 
- 74 -
We argue that it is a position 
supported by empirical and 
Maurice Kline [Kline, p4, 1980] has stated that, "The most fertile 
source of insight is hindsight", and indeed, most of the arguments and 
facts against the perceived power of logical compulsion are historical 
and empirical, viewing logic as a developing element of mathematics. It 
is just this empirical examination which will provide important evidence 
in our argument against logical compulsion and pure deductive reason, 
just as empirical evidence provides the best argument against a belief 
in clear legal rules (Chapter 9). 
A primary element of the positivist legal theorist is that there is a 
certainty associated with logic (for example, MacCormick's quote above 
about the necessity to accept the power of argument which uses logical 
compulsion - we cannot argue, we can do nothing but accept the certainty 
of the logically formulated argument). Unfortunately, examination of 
the conceptions of logic and mathematics illustrate that there are 
problematic aspects about seeing certainty as one of their attributes. 
One instance of the development of logic and mathematics is the "loss of 
certainty" which has occurred in the 20th century, demonstrated by these 
two quotations from Bertrand Russell in two periods from his life, the 
first from that early period when logic (or, more particulary to 
Russell, mathematics to which logic was inextricably bound) was seen as 
a fount of certainty: 
"Of such scepticism mathematics is a perpetual reproof; for its 
edifice of truths stands unshakable and inexpungable to all the 
weapons of doubting scepticism." 
[Russell, 1903] 
and the second, when that certainty had passed away like sand through 
the fingers, looking back on his attempts to give arithmetic a sound 
logical foundation in the Principia Mathematica project: 
"I wanted certainty in the kind of way in which people want 
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religious faith. I thought that certainty is more likely to be 
found in mathematics than elsewhere. But I discovered that many 
mathematical demonstrations, which my teachers expected me to 
accept, were full of fallacies, and that, if certainty were indeed 
discoverable in mathematics, it would be in a new field of 
mathematics, with more solid foundations than those that had 
hitherto been thought secure. But as the work proceeded, I was 
continually reminded of the fable about the elephant and the 
tortoise. Having constructed an elephant upon which the 
mathematical world could rest, I found the elephant tottering, and 
proceeded to construct a tortoise to the keep the elephant from 
falling. But the tortoise was no more secure than the elephant, 
and after some twenty years of very arduous toil, I came to the 
conclusion there was nothing more that I could do in the way of 
making mathematical knowledge indubitable." 
[Russell, p53, 1956] 
The importance which Russell saw in logic, in the early period, was that 
it acted as a barricade against universal scepticism. \Then in 
mathematical logic (which is concerned, for example, with problems such 
as infinite sets and other set theoretic concepts and suchlike - not the 
simple problems of modus ponens) certain problems (paradoxes) arose, 
Russell felt the need for a sound philosophical view of logic and 
mathematics. He wrote: 
"I wrote to Frege about it (1) [the logical problems], who replied 
that arithmetic was tottering. He was so disturbed by this that he 
gave up the attempt to deduce arithmetic from logic, to which, 
------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) The story arises of how just as Frege was going to press with the 
second volume of his "Fundemental Laws of Mathematics", Russell's letter 
arrived. At the close of the volume Frege remarked, "A scientist can 
hardly meet with anything more undesirable than to have the foundation 
give way just as the work is finished. A letter from Mr. Bertrand 
IRussell 
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until then, his life had been mainly devoted. For my part the 
trouble lay in logic rather than in mathematics and that it was 
logic which would have to be reformed." 
[Russell, p37, 2nd Introduction to Principia, Cambridge Paperback] 
The need for this reformation was not because the paradoxes were of any 
importance to mathematicians; they were getting on with the job just as 
mathematicians always do (compare with the situation where lawyers are 
rarely concerned with jurisprudential problems). The need, which 
Russell saw, was philosophical - how to ensure that sceptics could not 
pounce upon the contradictions and "problems" of mathematics - the 
problem was, of course, that logic might not be a stable reasoning form. 
Thus, logic was used by Russell (and most other philosophical 
mathematicians of the time) as part of his philosophical structure; it 
was not simply a tool to be used in mathematics - it, or a given view of 
it, was considered essential by Russell to support his view of the 
world. We suggest that researchers in legal logic have paid too little 
attention to hindsight and have taken, without proper consideration, 
that same view of the world as Russell first took - i.e. that it is 
logically structured. 
This world view has led researchers into logic and the law to usually 
consider the prescriptive aspects of logic to be as important as the 
technical aspects. Take, for example, Ilmar Temmelo: 
"In legal reasoning formal consistency of thought is an end 
constantly pursued, even though it is not always achieved. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russell put me in this position at the moment the work was nearly 
through the press." Russell also wrote [Russell, p76/7, 1959], 
"Philosophers and mathematicians reacted in various different ways to 
this situation. Poincare, who disliked mathematical logic and had 
accused it of being sterile, it begets contradiction, exclaimed with 
glee, 'it is no longer sterile, it begets contradiction'. This was all 
very well, but it did nothing towards the solution of the problem. Some 
other mathematicians, who disapproved of Georg Cantor, adopted the March 
Hare's solution: 'I'm tired of this. Let's change the subject'. This, 
also, appeared to me inadequate." 
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Logic is significant for the lawyer in that it helps him to present 
his reasoning in a well-organised, lucid, and cogent manner. The 
actual presentation of his reasoning must be taken into accout, of 
course, the addressees of his train of thought and must be 
adjusted, by employing appropriate informal ways of expression, to 
their intellectual background and habits of thought. But this 
train of thought is more likely to be sound if it is established in 
awareness of the formal requirements of self-consistent reasoning. 
The same awareness is important for legal draftsment. Antimonies, 
gaps, ambiguities, and vaguenesses in law can be avoided if the 
draftsmen are conversant with principles and methods of logic. 
Logical rigour means intellectual integrety and is thus an 
important ethical requirement in the application of the law. To 
blame logic for shortcomings in the administration of the law is 
very much the same as to blame honesty for evils in the world." 
[Tammelo, p132/133, 1969] 
Tammelo believes, then, that self-consistent argument and reasoning will 
win through (just as long as the intellectual background of its 
recipient is taken into account). The vision which Tammelo conjures up 
is of the rational lawyer arguing in an irrational courtroom - if he 
keeps his head, then not all is lost. The second point which comes out 
is that the clarity of legislation is of fundamental importance, and 
that logic can be used to aid correct interpretation of that 
legislation. Thirdly, that ethical integrity is achieved by a technical 
application of reasoning. 
Tamme10's view has much in common with a claim made 381 years previously 
that other researcher into logic and the law, Abraham Fraunce. Ve might 
conclude from these researchers that the history of legal logic as the 
explication of correct reasoning has a long and consistent history. 
Unfortunately, that is not the case Tammel10's logic is that of 
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Aristotle and Fraunce's is that of Ramus. There is a substantial - some 
might say unbridgeable - difference between the two logics. 
Pierre Ramus, the devisor of Ramist logic, was a Frenchman whose work 
epitomized the medieval criticism of the scholastic teaching of 
Aristotle. It was the teaching of the Oraganon to young boys in 
medieval universities in a manner similar to the teaching of 
multiplication tables (in the days before the introduction of the 
electronic calculator) which gave rise to much cyncism about the power 
of, for example, modus ponens. Ong lOng, 1958] has pointed out that the 
view of Aristotelean logic which is the object of that medieval cynicism 
is not the Aristotelean logic of Aristotle (1). It was the early part 
of Peter of Spain's Summulae logicales which was used as the outline of 
Aristotelean logic, a text book used by teenage university students to 
learn the arts of dialectic. It opens with the statement, "Dialectic is 
the art of arts and the science of sciences, possessing the way to the 
principles of all curriculum subjects." 
Ramus took this general spirit of universal applicability as the 
starting point for a logical method which could be used in all the arts; 
it was a means of overcoming the dryness of the scholastic logic and 
applying it to the real world, rather like taking the rote of 
multiplication and using it in a computer model of rice harvesting in 
the third world; an activity so popular in today's primary school 
education. Ramus's lectures, we hear, were popular events attended by 
huge crowds, the lectures peppered with verbal assaults on the material 
and authors taught by his fellow professors. The cries of "Holy 
Jupiter!" and "Good God!" were complemented by "spectactular declamation 
------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) Misrepresenatation being a common enough factor even today in 
jurisprudence - see [Holes, 1985] on Hart's intepretation of John 
Austin. Also we can quote Durkheim's introduction to the 2nd edition of 
his "The Rules ..• "where he stated, "In fact, certain opInIons were 
imputed to us that we had not put forward, on the pretence that 'they 
were in conformity with our principles' " [Durkheim, 1982]. The 
situation must have been even worse when the recipients of the 
misinterpretations were teenage students with little opportunity to 
research the original writers themselves. 
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and gesture." In comparison with the teaching of the syllogism at the 
time, it must have seemed a wonderous improvement in educational 
strategy, rather like the overthrow of the three R's by "the project" 
which occured in this country in the 1960's. 
However, Ramist logic differs from what we might term logic today. It 
accords much more with certain tendancies in General Systems Theory to 
use diagrammatic representations as descriptions of the world. Ramist 
used diagrams to represent dichotomies as systems theorists will use 
diagrams to represent "systems". 
The general Ramist method was to examine a logical class and divide it 
into two parts. This has been pointed out as the the method used in his 
discourse on grammar; it was natural therefore to externalise the 
process and claim the: 
"natural method is essentally the method of two dichotomies of 
proceeding always to separate a logical class into two subclasses 
opposed to each other by contradiction, and to separate the 
subclasses and sub-subclasses in the same way, until the entire 
structure of any science resembled a severely geometrical pattern 
of bifurcations." 
[Howell, p162, 1956] 
As an example of this method, we might see how Fraunce took Ramist logic 
and applied it to an outline of "The Lawyer's Logicke" where each class 
is divided into two sub-classes etc. The same procedure was given by 
Fraunce for the case of the Earl of Northumberland (although he notes, 
"For the Earle of Northumberlands case, I have rather shewed what is 
done by Haister Plowden, than what might have beene done by a better 
Logician.") and "Stanfords crown pleaes". 
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But before we get excited about the usefulness of Ramist logic, it is 
helpful to note what Ong has written of this logic: 
"As a popularized or residual class logic, the Ramist dialectic 
manifests a quantification system which is almost certainly the 
most recklessly applied one that the world has ever seen." 
lOng, p203, 1958] 
Obviously, then, it is difficult to make any claim for similarities 
between Fraunce's logic and that of Tammelo (or MacCormick). It seems, 
therefore, that while initially we might think that legal logic has some 
consistent history, on examination, we find that this is noi so; the 
consistency might arise from the word "logic" but most certainly does 
not arise from the "method of logic". 
It is always possible to say, as some do, that Ramist logic "is not 
logic". Such a position is, as Haack notes, monist; but does a monist 
position stand up to empirical evidence? Can this strict demarcation of 
the validity of logical systems be applied to "traditional" logic? Ye 
would argue, again by looking at empirical evidence, that this 
demonstrably cannot be done; even in what might be called traditional 
logic there are a variety of ways of interpreting the notion of 
implication. 
MacCormick interprets "p implies q" as "if p then q", whilst other 
logicians (for example, Russell in Principia) treated "p implies q" as 
equivalent to "not(p and not q)". Yhile MacCormick's implication is 
causal, in that it demonstrates how the consequent "q" can be concluded, 
Russell's is not - it is based upon the use of negation, not "if 
then". Russell was actually unhappy about expressing implication in any 
natural terms at all and only used his expression as the most convenient 
form (in that it fitted in notationally with the Principia). 
. .. 
Unfortunately, this implication leads to intut\ve problems - first that 
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a false proposition implies any proposition and second that a true 
proposition is implied by any other proposition. These problems 
(basically that Russell's implication was "intuitively incorrect") led 
C.I. Lewis to feel the need for "strict implication". In fact, looking 
at the problems which attempts to define implication have come across, 
it is almost the case that there are as many interpretations of 
implication as there are logicians. And the problem is not simply a 
modern one. Ye can quote Mates on the problem implication [referred to 
in the extract as truth-conditions of conditional propositions] caused 
to the stoics: 
"It seems that questions of logic were 
ancient times. Yhen Diodorus Cronus 
taken very seriously in 
was unable immediately to 
solve a logical puzzle proposed to him at a royal banquet in 
Alexandria, he died in despair. Philetas of Cos, another logician, 
was a victim of the famous antimony of The Liar, as we know from 
his epitath: 
Philetas of Cos am I 
"Twas The Liar who made me die, 
And the bad nights caused thereby." 
Likewise the problem of the truth-conditions of conditional 
propositions, although it apparently caused no fatalities, inspired 
so much discussion in Alexandria that Callimachus reports, "Even 
the crows on the roof tops are cawing about the question which 
conditionals are true." 
[Mates, p43, 1961] 
Other examples of the different views of logical systems arise when we 
leave traditional logic. In non-traditional logic we can perfectly 
easily do away with the law of the excluded middle (which says that only 
a value of true or false can be handled) and we can speak of a variety 
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of possible values. Hodal logics also each have their meaning described 
in a different manner the rules of inference within the systems 
differ. It is, in fact, one of Quine's attacks upon the use of modal 
logic (he is a virulent opponent of them) that the interpretation of 
modal logics is fraught with severe difficlties - Quine noted several 
different ways of using the concept of "necessarily", for instance. 
Having looked, then, at some of the problems of logic, it is hard to 
accept MacCormick's simplistic view of the notion of logical compulsion 
as valid - that logic solves without further consideration the question 
of self-contradiction. But we can go further. 
The logic which MacCormick utilizes is that of Aristotle, a logic which 
arose from the geometric systematization of Euclid. Euclid's task was 
to find a universal set of axioms - what we might call assumptions or 
first principles as Aristotle termed them - which would give a rational 
structure to geometry. Such a task was of prime importance at a time 
when geometrical constructions were of religious and philisophical 
importance(l). Most people have had some contact with Euclid's elements 
the definition of a point as "that which has no parts" - during their 
school education, and have learned that Euclid's axiomatization is only 
relevant in non-curved space (in curved space non-Euclidean geometry 
takes effect). One point about Euclid's axiomatization is that it is 
essentially static and offers no indication of change or expansion of 
the ~ priori knowledge. Euclid's method was seized and applied by 
philosophers as the epitome of rational intelligence. Aristotle was one 
such, and as he states in the Posterior Analytics, he believed that the 
correct manner to work in every science was to find the fundamental 
axioms or first principles and build upon these. The building was to be 
------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) The Pythagorean school of geometers would not allow instruments to 
be used in building their constructions, because of the regious impurity 
that would be imported into the study. Hind you, the pythagoreans were 
celibates who performed ceremonial purgations and would not walk on high 
roads or sit on quart measures, so the revulsion towards geometrical 
instruments is hardly the oddest of their behaviours. 
- 83 -
carried out by either inductive or deductive reasoning, whose form he 
expressed in the Organon. 
Thus logic arose from the formalization of geometrical reason. It was 
accepted because of its inherent usefulness - it was intuitively useful 
as a representation of correct thinking. 
But there is substantial evidence to believe that the geometrical 
reasoning processes from which logic was derived are not all that they 
might seem at first sight. Geometrical reason, this evidence suggests, 
is a reason arrived at by hindsight; the arriving at the definition of 
geometrical structures is a process more akin to negotiation of a social 
kind. Perhaps the most illuminating study of this was carried out by 
Lakatos [Lakatos, 1976] in the analysis of the development of the 
concept of polyhedron as 
other mathematicians would try 
definitions of the object were provided, 
to include other objects within the 
definition or would discover objects which could be included within the 
definition but which were not classed by other researchers as that first 
object. 
There is no need here to repeat Lakotos's study, but we do need to note 
the points that he makes about attempts to formalize geometry and 
mathematics - by formalizing, he means claiming that mathematicians can 
work from basic axioms (or premisses) and build up and extend bodies of 
mathematical knowledge. The extract which we use is of particular 
importance for MacCormick, as a proponent of the deductive approach to 
legal reasoning: 
"The student of mathematics is obliged, according to the Euclidean 
ritual, to attend this conjuring act without asking Questions 
either about the background or about how this sleight-of-hand is 
performed. If the student by chance discovers that some of the 
unseemly definitions are proof-generated, if he simply wonders how 
these definitions, lemmas and the theorem can possibly precede the 
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proof, the conjuror will ostracize him for this display of 
mathematical immaturity. (Some textbooks claim that they do not 
expect the reader to have any previous knowledge, only a certain 
mathematical maturity. This frequently means that they expect the 
reader to be endowed with the "ability" to take a Euclidean 
argument without any unnatural interest in the problem-background, 
in the heuristic behind the argument.) 
In deductivist style, all propositions are true and all inferences 
valid. Mathematics is presented as an ever-increasing set of 
eternal, immutable truths. Counterexamples, refutations, criticism 
cannot possibly enter. An authoritarian air is secured for the 
subject by beginning with disguised monster-barring and 
proof-generated definitions and with the fully-fledged theorem, and 
by suppressing the primitive conjecture, the refutations, and the 
criticism of the proof. Deductivist style hides the struggle, 
hides the adventure. The whole story vanishes, the successive 
tentative formulations of the theorom in the course of the 
proof-procedure are doomed to oblivion while the end result is 
exalted into infallibility." 
[Lakatos, p142, 1976] 
Lakatos points out that we should be wary of the deductive approach; he 
points out that it hides the history of a concept in order to present a 
facade of the infallibility of mathematics. But mathematics is not 
infallible, it changes over time: think of the fact that even the 
axiomatization of Euclidean geometry did not fully occur until the 19th 
century (and in fact can we ever be sure that it has so fully 
occurred?). ~e would argue that this can be translated over to the 
deductivist (logical) approach to the judicial decision - it hides the 
story of just why the decision was arrived at and presents us with a 
fully-fledged logical decision. 
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Now, I do not wish to argue that logic is without value simply because 
there are philosophical problems associated with it. For example, we 
can use concepts like logic and implcation in the mathematical sphere 
with elegance and power (think of the computational power of computer 
logic circuits) but that does not require us to believe that they have 
any life outside of our use of them; they compel us to do nothing - to 
do that they should at least have the requirement that their 
interpretation be precise and without debate. 
Ye can conclude, then, that the claim of the judiciary to be bound by 
logic is frequently made; but our counter-claim is that there exists no 
logic with the power to bind them. Logic is too relative a phenomenon 
for that. 
- 86 -
CHAPTER 5 
A SHORT ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LEGAL CONSULTATIVE SYSTEMS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
There have been a variety of computer legal advisory systems produced in 
the last decade or so, which have attempted to confront the goal set by 
Mehl to provide a computer system which can answer questions set to it 
over any area of the law. It is not unkind to the researchers involved 
to say that no system has so far shown itself to be capable of this 
extensibility; we do not take the view that the ELl system is presently 
capable of this - rather that it attempts to solve at least some of the 
problems which earlier research has brought to light. 
The view we take is that any machine which will, eventually, be able to 
handle legislation in a sound and complete manner - which will not 
suffer from uneconomic setting up, high maintenance costs etc. - will 
be an engineered system. Ve mean by an engineered system that it will 
not operate with anyone particular formalism, but that it will use many 
of the techniques from computer science which are currently being 
developed. These techniques may well be software engineering, logic 
programming, associative networks etc. They will, however, be used in 
association with each other, combined to form the most efficient and 
elegant solution to the problem that the period's state of the art can 
produce. 
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Since we wish to use these systems to highlight aspects of the ELl 
system, we shall criticize particular elements of these other systems as 
required by this procedure, rather than examine all possible aspects of 
the systems. Ye are not concerned here so much with the quality or type 
of advice; rather with the methods that each system uses to represent 
the law. Ye argue that this representation is the most important aspect 
of the systems, at least at this stage in the development of the field. 
The systems which we shall look at are: 
a) The TAXMAN Project 
b) The MELDMAN Project 
c) The LEGOL project 
d) The lNVERCLYDE project 
e) The PRO LOG project 
There are, of course, several other systems which provide interaction 
with the legal community (for example [Sprowl, 1980)), but handle "law" 
less than they provide a useful clerical service - Sprowl's system, for 
example, uses templates to produce documents but not legal advice; also 
since Hellawell's system [Hellawell, 1980] uses, broadly, the same data 
processing techniques as does the lnverclyde project we shall omit it 
from the discussion here - we examine such techniques when discussing 
the lnverclyde project. 
There is also the approach taken by Foundos with the PRETACS/MERITAL 
project [Foundos, 1971] with a cybernetic game playing approach: 
"Taxpayers and Revenue have been guessing a lot for a long time." 
Ve disagree with (and are confused by) many of the statements of this 
project; for example: 
"Both men and MERITAL speak the same language as defined by the 
accountant's formula, semantics and information theory." 
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and also the validity of applying control techniques which have arisen 
from electrical engineering to social situations. 
critique is out of place here. 
However, a full 
Ye deal with the nominated projects in the most convenient order, not in 
order of importance or success. 
5.2 THE TAXHAN PROJECT 
HcCarty's TAXHAN project is interesting both because it is perhaps the 
longest running project and it is one of the earliest to use "knowledge 
representation" techniques which have come from the Artificial 
Intelligence community. 
The basic technique which HcCarty uses is the associative network or 
"semantic" network as it is frequently called because of its claimed 
ability to handle semantic representations. 
HcCarty has stated that only certain areas of legislation are initially 
feasible for representation: 
"Since the representation problems for a legal consultation system 
are so difficult, it is tempting to start with the 'simplest' 
possible legal issues, such as the subject matter of the first-year 
law school courses. Ye might therefore be tempted to investigate 
assault and battery cases from the first-year torts course (see 
Meldman, 1975), or offer and acceptance cases from the first-year 
contracts course. But these cases are 'simple' for law students 
primarily because they draw upon ordinary human experience, and 
this is precisely what makes them so difficult for an artificial 
intelligence system. To understand tort cases, we must understand 
all the ways in which human beings can be injured, intentionally 
and unintentionally, mentally and physically, with and without 
justification. To understand contract cases, we must understand 
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the expectations of 
and the ambiguities of 
real people in concrete business situations, 
human language in expressing particular 
contractual intentions. If we abstract away these details, we will 
miss entirely the central features of legal reasoning, and our 
consultation system will tend to produce only the more trivial 
results. 
Paradoxically, the cases that are most tractable for an artificial 
intelligence system are those cases, usually involving commercial 
and corporate matters, which a lawyer finds most complex." 
[HcCarty, p4, 1980b) 
McCarty explains why corporate areas are so tractable by recourse to the 
invention of legal entities and actions which describe such complex 
commercial ad corporate domains. These actions then become more 
malleable or "discussable" than human entities or actions. For example, 
"corporation" is more easily described than, say, "damage" or "intent to 
injure". HcCarty therefore uses these entities and actions within his 
system, holding them in a "semantic" network. 
HcCarty's work has been described as "analogical" by Horrise because: 
"Semantic network comparison, like analogical reasoning, involves 
the comparison of fact situations. In semantic network comparison 
the fact situations are represented by semantic networks that 
consist of two types of elements, things and relations. In 
semantic network comparison the computer compares the semantic 
network of the case with which the attorney is presently concerned 
with the semantic network of a prior case or statute to determine 
if the two networks match." 
[Morrise, 1980) 
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But this is problematical because it assumes that there must be a prior 
recognition that there is a possibility that the situation under view 
might accord with a specific model held in the computer system. This 
also requires that the case to be matched must be represented in a 
format which is near identical to that held by the system - using 
similar atomic entities and relationships. 
HcCarty has pushed this network model to its limits, conscious that such 
testing illuminates the weaknesses and strengths of the model: 
" the simplification inherent in a formal model is also the 
source of its power and utility: it will often lead us to insights 
that would otherwise be obscured, overwhelmed by the complexity of 
our data. The unexpected consequences of our formulations may 
reveal surprising truths or, just as often, the inadequacy of the 
formulations themselves." 
[HcCarty, p841, 1977] 
HcCarty's analysis of the New Jersey/Delaware example does throw light 
on some problems of the network formalism: 
"Some of the facts could not be represented at all in the current 
TAXKAN system. For example it is not possible to express the fact 
that the New Jersey company 'had been engaged for many years in the 
business of manufacturing and selling explosives,' or that the plan 
of reorganization was 'carried into effect with the assent of a 
sufficient proportion of the stockholders.' " 
[McCarty, p878, 1977] 
and: 
"One rigidity of the current system is the requirement that a case 
be described in full, and then expanded in full, before any 
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analysis mechanisms can be applied." 
[HcCarty, p88S, 1977] 
Although semantic networks have been proposed as effective 
representational systems (for example, [Qui11ian, 1968]), there have 
also been criticisms of their claimed power by researchers who are, 
nonetheless, proponents of their possible utility, for example 
[Brachman, 1983] and also Voods: 
" I hope that I have made the point that when one does extract 
a clear understanding of the semantics of the notation, most of the 
existing semantic network notations are found wanting in some major 
respects notably the representation of propositions without 
committment to asserting their truth and in representing various 
types of intensional descriptions of objects without committment to 
their external existence, their external distinctness, or their 
completeness in covering all of the objects which are presumed to 
exist in the world. I have also pointed out the logical 
inadequacies of almost all current network notations for 
representing quantified information and some of the disadvantages 
of some logically adequate techniques." 
[Voods, 1975] 
The criticisms dovetail neatly with McCarty's perspective on what kinds 
of law can be handled by AI means. Thus, the criticism that the atomic 
objects in the formalism must be accepted as "atomic" the formalism 
cannot handle "fuzzy" objects or objects which are the construction of 
social discourse and negotiation. 
Secondly, that the links between these objects are not properly 
"semantic links" - fuzzy relationships cannot be properly (ie "formally" 
in 'formal semantics') described. For, after all, what is really meant 
by "is owned by" surely, this is only understood in terms of the 
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user's own understanding of the legal context - its usage. 
However, McCarty is aware of the limitations of his model: 
"I do not believe, however, that this is the 
subject. A systematic exploration of the 
current TAXMAN paradigm would, I believe, lead 
final word 
limi tations 
us to a 
on the 
of the 
modified 
paradigm which would correct some of these limitations and permit 
us to say something about the structure and dynamics of even the 
more vaguely defined concepts of corporate reorganization law." 
[McCarty, p893, 1977J 
TAXMAN illustrates well what is perhaps the major problem in attempting 
to computerize domains which are not fully quantifiable or describable 
in terms of atomic units. Mehl noted the problem: 
" the language of the law is burdened with synonyms, such as 
"offer" and "pollicitation", and furthermore these synonyms may 
cover nuances which are sometimes imprecise and of doubtful use. 
For example: limitation, expiration, foreclosure, prescription; or 
again, annul, repeal, rescind. The legal vocabulary sometimes 
becomes paradoxical. In French, the members of a "societe" are 
"associes", but the members of an "association" are "societaires". 
It will be seen already that it is essential to give the words a 
single proper meaning, and eliminate synonyms" 
[Mehl, p761, 1958J 
Such an attempt was of course advocated by 
work; the difficulty (or impossibility) 
acknowledged: 
Vittgenstein in his early 
of such an attempt he later 
"It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in 
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds 
of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the 
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structure of language. 
Logico-Philosophicus)" 
[Vittgenstein, para 23, 1958] 
(Including the author of the Tractatus 
Ve agree with Vittgenstein and suggest that the logical positivist 
approach (described in, for example, [Hanfling, 1981]) endorsing the 
manipulating and reduction of legal language which Hehl proposes is not 
desirable. 
Of course, the success of programs like HYCIN in describing their domain 
in computer suitable format is impressive when those areas are seen in 
perspective: 
"my friends who are expert about medical records tell me that to 
attempt to dig out from even the most sophisticated hospital's 
records the frequency of association between any particular symptom 
and any particular diagnosis is next to impossible - and when I 
raise the question of complexes of symptoms, they stop speaking to 
me. For another thing, doctors keep telling me that diseases 
change, that this year's flu is different from last years flu, so 
that symptom-disease records extending far back in time are of very 
limited usefulness. Moreover, the observation of symptoms is 
well-supplied with error, and the diagnosis of diseases is even 
more so; both kinds of error will ordinarily be frozen permanently 
into symptom-disease statistics. Finally, even if diseases didn't 
change, doctors would. The usefulness of disease categories is so 
much a function of available treatments that these categories 
themselves change as treatments change - a fact hard to incorporate 
into symptom-disease statistics." 
[Edwards, p139, 1972] 
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The MYCIN system overcomes these epistemological problems in the same 
way that scientists have in other medical areas (see for example [Fleck, 
1979] on the Vasserman Reaction and the socio-genetic origins of 
scientific "facts") because it has access to quantifiable information; 
for example, its culture evidence. The importance of this in IKBS 
research is well realized; Stefik et al [Stefik, 1982] in their 'expert 
system tutorial' examine the problems which occur when data - including 
its classification - is not particularly reliable. 
Much of what has been called the art of knowledge engineering arises as 
a direct result of the fact that some computer suitable representation 
of the domain (ie a normalized model) is necessary before the system has 
any chance of operating. Feigenbaum's description of the knowledge 
engineer explicitly describes the process of trying to find a suitable 
representation: 
"She [the knowledge engineer] (in deference to my favorite 
knowledge engineer) works intensively with an expert to acquire 
domain-specific knowledge and organize it for use by a program. 
Simultaneously she is matching the tools of the AI workbench to the 
task at hand program organizations, methods of symbolic 
inference, techniques for the structuring of symbolic information, 
and the like. If the tool fits, or nearly fits, she uses it. If 
not necessity mothers AI invention, and a new tool gets created. 
She builds the early versions of the intelligent agent, guided 
always by her intent that the program eventually achieve expert 
levels of performance in the task. She refines or reconceptualizes 
the system as the increasing amount of acquired knowledge causes 
the AI tool to "break" or slow down intolerably. She also refines 
the human interface to the intelligent agent with several aims: to 
make the system appear "comfortable" to the user ..• " 
[Feigenbaum, p1017, 1977] 
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Note though that at no point does Feigenbaum consider here that there 
might be no AI tool which "nearly fits" or that AI invention cannot 
provide a suitable representation format. 
Buchanan and Headrick wrote of the possibility of the techniques 
acquired from Heuristic DENDRAL (which we subsume under the heading 
IKBS) being applicable to the law. Ye can see the belief - which we do 
not share - that the "facts" of science accord in format, though perhaps 
not in complexity with those of law: 
"Fact recognition is the first step of the Heuristic DENDRAL 
program. Given the experimental data, the program, like any 
scientist must distinguish the "real" data points from the 
spurious. It separates erroneous data and uninformative pieces of 
data from the facts that are important for solving the problem. 
The program can also add pieces of data that "should" have been in 
the original set based on inferences from theory and the data 
actually be appearing. 
Classifying facts and factual situations is also an important part 
of creative legal research. A concept-formation program written by 
Hunt and Hovland suggests a means of devising classification rules 
for a given set of objects. This program models a psychological 
experiment in learning where an individual is presented with a 
series of objects described as A's or not A's Vith an 
extension of the routines used by Hunt and Hovland, one can think 
of a future computer program that looks at a large set of cases 
together with their legal conclusions to determine the common 
elements in the factual situations linking the facts to the 
conclusions." 
[Buchanan, pS7, 1970J 
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Ye would argue against whether using such an approach in legal systems 
is possible. The judicial decision (and finding of "facts") seems to us 
to be slightly more complex. Also, concerning "automatic 
classification", we should note the scepticism that McDermott encourages 
in his analysis of just what claims have been made for, and just what 
results have been arrived at, by AI: 
"As a field, artificial intelligence has always been on the border 
of respectability, and therefore on the border of crackpottery. 
Many critics ... have argued that we are over the border. Ye have 
been defensive towards this charge, drawing ourselves up with 
dignity when it is made and folding the cloak of Science about us. 
On the other hand, in private we have been justifiably proud of our 
willingness to explore weird ideas, because pursuing them is the 
only way to make progress. 
Unfortunately, the necessity for speculation has combined with the 
culture of the hacker in computer science .•. to cripple our 
self-discipline. In a young field, self-discipline is not 
necessarily a virtue, but we are not getting any younger. In the 
past few years, our tolerance of sloppy thinking has led us to 
repeat many mistakes over and over. If we are to retain any 
credibility, this should stop." 
[McDermott, p143, 1981] 
Ve suggest notions of "automatic classification" are examples of 
McDermott's use of the term "sloppy thinking". 
Perhaps McCarty's use of atomic objects and relationships can be seen as 
an attempt to come to terms with the fact that law has no quantifiable 
"cultures" in the HYCIN sense. But law does have legal concepts which 
are under constant review whenever a new case precedent arises; they are 
not static in time. Anecdotally, but taken from a newspaper lying 
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beside me as I write: 
"Yhatever Mr Montgomery's motive, it was an assault - the law of 
Scotland has long accepted that kissing a female without her 
consent is an assault on her and in an age of of sexual equality I 
consider kissing a policeman without his consent must also be 
regarded as an assault upon him. 
Mercifully, the nature, extent and vigor of the kiss planted by Mr 
Montgomery on Constable Mitchell's lips was not explored in 
evidence. In the circumstances I shall regard it as an unusual but 
justifiable act of retaliation which I fervently hope does not 
become a general practice." 
[Sheriff Fulton, written report, Portree Sheriff Court. 
"Press and Journal", Aberdeen, 18th April 1984.] 
Ouoted in 
It is such fuzziness of legal concept ("assault") and continual 
derivation of new legal instances (kissing "without consent" between 
males as a new instance of the concept "assault") which makes legal 
knowledge engineering so very difficult. 
5.3 THE MELDMAN PROJECT 
Jeffrey Meldman [Meldman, 1975] produced a PhD thesis detailing a 
proposed legal analogical system which was to give advice on cases of 
assault and battery. The system was never implemented by Meldman, 
although one other researcher [King, 1976] has done so with one example 
from Meldman's thesis which includes critical comments. 
Meldman's proposed system has been quite heavily criticised by Horrise: 
"Unfortunately Meldman's proposed system has severe limitations. 
Its analysis is based on very simplified doctrines of assault and 
battery, and its design relies upon its very small knowledge base. 
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The system also ignores time as a factor and uses artificial 
categories of its kind hierarchy." 
[Horrise p136, 1980] 
Is this use of a small knowledge base perhaps the "kludge syndrome" 
mentioned by Ades above? 
Vhat is interesting about Heldman's system, though, is that he proposes 
that there should be three layers of semantic network to represent the 
law. The lowest is similar to HcCarty's, the other two: 
"combine analogical comparison with deductive reasoning. The two 
higher levels examine the semantic network to see if facts of the 
case satisfy the general doctrines of assault or battery. For 
example, if the semantic network contained the elements 
"plaintive", "defendant", "contact," and intent," and lacked the 
counter element "consent" the general doctrine of battery would be 
satisfied. " 
[Horrise, p135, 1980] 
The results of Heldman's work which would be interesting to see would be 
several. Firstly, how complex is this three tier system; if it operates 
upon a small number of data items and relationships, will it operate 
upon a larger number. Secondly, the necessary simplification which 
occurs when reducing the legal situation to semantic network format is 
obviously identical to that which occurs with the TAXHAN system - is 
Heldman's system more simplified because it uses three such levels of 
representation. 
Heldman's view of law seems to be intrinsically hierarchical the 
notion that concepts can be of higher or controlling import than others. 
This view has, in jurisprudential circles, met a substantial amount of 
opposition. This is though, not to say that such a representation would 
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not be useful within an engineered legal consultative system. 
5.4 THE LEGOL PROJECT 
Ve mentioned earlier that the aims of the LEGOL project transcend the 
borders of both logic and computing. 
Briefly stated, the LEGOL project sets as its targets, the formalisation 
of logical languages which can express semantic models of the real 
world. These formalisations are to be interpretable by computer; thus 
the LEGOL-1, LEGOL-2 (and associated dialects) languages have been 
devised and analysed in a variety of different situations, each 
situation being viewed as a domain which exhibits normative aspects -
thus: 
"LEGOL is a language for writing rules defining information systems 
at a very general level so that they can be interpreted 
automatically to discover whether they will have the desired 
effect. Administrative legislation has the desirable properties of 
a high-level system specification, providing precise definition of 
what ought to be done, without saying how" 
[Mason, p325, 1980] 
Some of the LEGOL research effort has been applied to the study of 
beauracratic norms [Cook, 1980] and data base philosophy [Stamper, 
1977], as well as legislation [Stamper, 1980a]. The wide ranging domain 
of the LEGOL project arises from the attempt that the research group are 
making to provide experimental logical formalisms which can model the 
'real world' and its normative aspects: 
"Information analysis is being studied at the London School of 
Economics in a study of administrative systems based on complex 
rules. This, the LEGOL Project, uses statute law as experimental 
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material. By attempting to devise a formalism which can express 
the kinds of rules that might appear in a statute defining a tax 
system, for example, it is hoped to discover a way of specifying an 
information system at a very general level. A second prototype 
interpreter for this language is now being designed, an essential 
part of which is a semantic model. The result of information 
analysis may be viewed as a semantic model for an application, 
possibly in some area of law." 
[Stamper, p293, 1977] 
Stamper sees the semantic model which the LEGOL language is to represent 
as being a link between the abstract world and the concrete worlds 
[Stamper, p298, 1977]. 
The goals, then, of the LEGOL project are the provision of experimental 
languages which can be used to describe the world in a logical manner. 
There is also a prescriptive goal - the improving of legal drafting as 
in [AlIen, 1980]. 
As for the design and provision of 'straightforward' legal consultative, 
Stamper has described the LEGOL project in relation to HcCarty's TAXHAN 
project: 
"The project at the London School of Economics, by contrast, is 
quite different in emphasis. It is relatively shallow compared 
with TAXMAN because it deals only with some of the processes of 
deductive reasoning and it makes no attempt to imitate the 
essentially human processes of creative argument and judgement. 
Instead the project is very broad but with a language for doing the 
analysis." 
[Stamper, p52, 1980d] 
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Even though Stamper sees the LEGOL project having different goals from 
legal consultative systems which try to represent the judicial process, 
the LEGOL project has provided research findings which are valuable for 
this other area. Perhaps the major conclusion which we might take from 
the LEGOL project is that modelling the law by logical formalisms is by 
no means as easy as might first strike the computer scientist. 
Stamper's work supports AlIen and Caldwell's statement that "the full 
scope of the interrelations between logic and law is yet far from clear" 
[AlIen, 1963] by showing many of the problems of handling quite simple 
legislation (from the point of view of lawyers), but concluding: 
"For all its faults, the method of semantic analysis presented here 
represents a significant advance upon other available techniques. 
Logical languages which might be used to express rules, such as the 
predicate language or PROLOG, the computer language derived from 
the predicate calculus, have not control over the structure of the 
formulae based upon the semantic theory. The intuition of the 
analyst is left as the sole guide." 
[Stamper, 1980b] 
The LEGOL project ran productively until about 1980 when a pause in the 
research occurred. The project is now restarting, but it is unclear 
whether exactly the same path will be taken or other logical systems 
will be appended to newer versions of the LEGOL language. Or so 
discussion with Stamper has led me to believe might be the case. 
5.5 THE INVERCLYDE PROJECT 
It has been noted by many legal writers that there is a growing quantity 
of what has become known as "administrative law". For example, Spengler 
writes: 
"Three decades ago already the Lord Chief Justice of England was 
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warning of 'the new despotism' 
'administrative law' for the 'rule 
implicit in the substitution of 
of law' and the associated 
increase in 'the pretensions and encroachments of bureaucracy.' " 
[Spengler, p48, 1963] 
Spengler's (and the Lord Chief Justice's) thesis is that a large amount 
of law is being drawn up which exists outside of the common law 
tradition; this administrative law is coming into being to suit the 
needs of bureaucracy - clear, well defined procedures with inflexible 
implementation and little recourse being allowed to common law justice: 
"Indeed, so great has become the threat of the administrative 
juggernaut that in the English-speaking world consideration is 
being given to adoption of arrangements resembling the office of 
Ombudsman established in Nordic countries to guard the citizen 
against the bureaucrat." 
[Spengler, p49, 1963] 
The existence of this type of administrative law dealing with welfare 
rights legislation has enabled formalisation of the clear cut (or 
relatively clear cut) administrative procedures to be handled by a 
computer system; for example, the Inverclyde project [Adler, 1975] by 
using common data processing techniques (batch processing and the COBOL 
programming language) successfully demonstrated that the problem of low 
take-up of welfare benefits could be solved. This approach, given the 
new cheaper and more powerful hardware currently available could easily 
be translated into interactive mode. 
Ye do not feel that the Inverclyde algorithmic approach is suitable for 
other, more traditional, areas of law. Ye take this view, not because 
this approach is so different from others, rather because it does not 
set itself the goal of modelling more complex legislation. 
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There is also the interesting problem of updating the monolithic program 
which is written in a computer programming language. It becomes 
essential to utilize someone with expertise in both programming and in 
the area of the legislation which is to be dealt with to properly update 
the system. This is, of course, a problem which is claimed does not 
exist with IKBS programs; however, some scepticism seems to be in order 
here - see Section 9.2 for example. But perhaps this problem is no more 
severe than that required in amendment of Income Tax programs used by 
the Inland Revenue because welfare rights legislation has been 
simplified since the Inverclyde project. Spengler would see this as a 
further move away from the discretion of common law practice; but 
systems using this approach need not cope with quite the same numbers of 
problems as Adler and du Feu faced: 
"Probably the chief difficulty in writing the calculation program 
is the complexity of many benefit assessments. Some of the code is 
therefore not easy to read and in some cases involving discretion 
(e.g. how to treat 'essential' HP payments) or unknown factors in 
the input data (e.g. how many children will be staying at school 
next year) assumptions have to be made in the program. The program 
errs on the side of caution when estimating entitlement, and will 
usually make the most pessimistic assumption. some other cases are 
too complex to be tackled by the program (e.g. people with two 
wives, a student who is head of a household) at least as far as 
means-tested entitlement is concerned, and where possible in such 
situations the validation program causes a warning to be printed on 
the output." 
[Adler, p12, 1975] 
Hammond has pointed to the revision of welfare rights legislation: 
"Computerized descriptions of benefit entitlement are now feasible 
because the discretionary nature of many benefits has been 
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abolished." 
[Hammond, 1983a] 
Of course, some discretion still exists, and there remains 
of interpretation of the legislation; however, for 
scientist, the position is very much easier, if not for the 
loses out on discretionary payments. 
the problem 
the computer 
client who 
We are aware of other similar microcomputer based approaches currently 
in operation, and look forward to their published results. 
5.6 THE PRO LOG PROJECT 
The PROLOG project is currently underway at Imperial College, London 
and, to some extent, is similar to the ELl project. It is in the 
different attitude to the use of logic versus language which perhaps is 
the most striking difference between the work at Imperial and the ELl 
program, so we shall mainly concentrate upon that here. 
There has been some comparison between the LEGOL project and the PROLOG 
project by Sergot [Sergot, 1980], but Stamper has noted the since the 
versions of LEGOL are so different, such comparison is not 
straightforward: 
"However, PRO LOG like LEGOL-2.0 appears to have no place for the 
kind of semantic structuring that is the main characteristic of 
other forms of Legol." 
[Stamper, 1980b] 
The basic assumptions behind the PRO LOG project is the work of Kowalski 
and "logic programming" [Kowalski, 1979] which proposes logic as a 
problem solving methodology. As one example of this logic 
implementation on computer systems, Kowalski has shown preference for 
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Pro log and extensions to it. He points to the power of Horn clauses (of 
which Prolog is an implementation) as a means of investigating the 
heuristic search, problem-reduction and program execution models of 
problem-solving and argues that logical inference provides a model which 
is simple and powerful. [Kowalski, preface, 1979]. 
As the EL! system uses a production system formalism, so does the Prolog 
project if we accept that the Horn clause formalism is very closely 
related to that system even though it might be interpreted in a 
differing manner. Textually, the difference is slight; in the 
production system the consequent is to the right and the antecedents to 
the left: 
conditions => goal 
whereas the Horn clause representation is the reflection: 
goal <- conditions 
Prolog also allows what have been called degenerate rules, that is rules 
which have only a goal: 
goal <-
which [Cory, p2, 1984] wish to interpret as "facts", that is as 
conclusions to a rule whose existence rests upon no assumptions. This 
may well be useful within the programming framework of Prolog and of 
resolution theorem proving (e.g. [Bundy, 1983]) but is confusing within 
the framework of mainstream computer science and its emphasis upon data 
being kept distinct from procedure. 
Further to this, Pro log also allows predication of its atomic entities 
within the rules: 
<- male(x) 
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From the following examples we can see that the project team's 
normalization of the British Nationality Act ([Hammond, 1983a] [Hammond, 
1983b]] is also involved with the Department of Health and Social 
Security in provision of Supplementary Benefit advice; we concentrate 
here upon the larger teams work, though) is very close to the formalism 
which we dealt with in Chapter 4. Instead of rules defining the concept 
of merchantable quality, they define British Citizenship: 
x acquires British citizenship on date y by sect. 1.1 
if x was born in the UK 
and x was born on date y 
and y is after commencement 
and x has a parent who qualifies under 1.1 on date y 
x acquires British citizenship on date y by sect. 1.2 
if x was found as a new-born infant abandoned in the UK 
and x was found on date y 
and y is after commencement 
and not [x was born outside the UK 
and not [x was born before commencement] 
and not [x was not born to a parent who qualifies under 
at time of birth] 
1.1 
These rules are not actually as used within the system but are 
relatively near to the more formalized versions. They are easily 
readable. These rules are the input to an expert system "shell", APES 
[Hammond, 1983c]; the claimed advantage of an expert system shell is -
as noted above - that the interpreting and interface functions of the 
system do not have to be reprogrammed on each occasion that a new domain 
is to be handled. 
- 107 -
Cory et al intend to normalize the entire Act into this format, a 
process which they describe: 
"The formalisation of the British Nationality Act is an axiomatic 
theory similar, for example, to an axiomatization of Euclidean 
Geometry. In principle, any logical consequence of the 
axiomatization can be generated and tested mechanically by means of 
a computer-based theorem-prover." 
[Cory, p8, 1984] 
but later admit: 
"The formalisation of the British Nationality Act is actually more 
difficult than we may have suggested. There are many logical 
complexities which have not been discussed in detail in this 
paper." 
[Cory, p14, 1984] 
We would argue that this difficulty which the project team have found is 
a direct result of the expectation that a piece of non-administrative 
legislation can be so easily formalized in a truly logical format. We 
mean by "a truly logical format" the "axiomatization" for which Cory et 
al are aiming - the attempt to define a closed logical world which 
accords with first or second order logic. The comparison of the 
axiomatization of Euclidean geometry with legal normalization is 
confusing; what is the connection between the two that the group see? 
Formalisation in mathematics is still a problematical area: 
" systemization calls for more than the ability of a good 
librarian. For example, it was not until the nineteenth century 
that Pasch first formulated axioms concerning the concept "between" 
which had been tacitly assumed but not explicitly stated in Euclid. 
Moreover, a field has to often to be developed very thoroughly 
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before it is ripe for a systematic and rigorous organization. The 
history of the calculus illustrates the point clearly: founded in 
the seventeenth century, rapidly expanded in the eighteenth, the 
calculus got acceptable foundations only in the nineteenth century 
and even today logicians generally have misgivings on the matter 
or, like Veyl, still think that analysis is built on sand." 
[Vang, p242, 1954] 
Thus, even with a formalized system, it is still open to change or 
'negotiation' to give a Lakatosian [Lakatos, 1976] flavour (who was - we 
would argue - contentiously used to support [Kowalski, p242/4, 1979]). 
There are also a variety of ways in which the British Nationality Act 
can be normalized - the simplest method is to divide the APES rules into 
smaller rules. For instance, the rule quoted first above could become: 
x acquires British citizenship on date y by sect. 1.1 
if x satisfies personal citizenship requirements on date y 
and x has a parent who satisfies parental citizenship 
requirements on date y 
x satisfies personal citizenship requirements on date y 
if x was born in the UK 
and x was born on date y 
and y is after commencement 
x has a parent who satisfies parental citizenship on date y 
if parent of x was a British citizen on date y 
etc. 
Each normalization might well interpret the law in a slightly different 
manner. Is this the type of formalization which they group are 
considering, or perhaps just one idealized or Platonic formalization. 
This seems to go against the view of law as being interpreted by the 
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judiciary and also against Hart's thesis open texture. The open texture 
of law can be seen as a matter of observation - legislation is open to 
different interpretation (no matter how much the legal drafting 
profession try to cover all loopholes) and we can expect a variety of 
normalizations. Niblett has noted this and proposed it as an advantage 
a variety of expert systems each with a different interpretation of 
the law which will be suitable for different clients. He writes: 
"It is a mistake to assume that one expert system is sufficient for 
one area of law. Some systems, like some lawyers, will be better 
than others for they will have a more refined knowledge base and 
superior powers of reasoning. Just as some lawyers are plaintiffs' 
men whilst others are more at ease representing defendants, so some 
systems will be tuned to the requirements of plaintiffs and others 
to defendants. Some tax systems will favour the Revenue whilst 
others will be more suited to the taxpayer." 
[Niblett, p4, 1981] 
Ve view the law as norm directed and stand within the legal positivist 
tradition but find it hard to accept some of the assumptions of the 
Prolog project. For example: 
"Logic provides a natural base 
formalism to express legal rules: 
for a computer interpretable 
law treats large sets of complex 
rules that have long seemed suitable for logical analysis, and once 
the law is expressed in some appropriate subset of predicate logic, 
that formulation can function as a program which interprets law." 
[Sergot, 1982] 
Such a statement ignores the long history of logicians attempts to 
formalize the law, attempts which were examined in Chapter 4. It is 
presumptuous to believe that such a naive view of the legal order is 
sufficient requirement for such a complex task. If it were so, then 
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logicians would have had very much more success in the field than they 
have had. 
Cory et al quote Laymen E. AlIen as recognizing that Horn clause form 
of logic is a simple form in which to express legislation. The 
situation is slightly more complex though; AlIen did not claim that 
legislation could be expressed in such a format, only that using such 
techniques drafting would be made more lucid: 
"According to Frank, when courts interpret statutes, they cannot 
avoid engaging in supplemental law making, for two reasons: 
'[TJhe necessary generality in the wording of many statutes, and 
ineptness in the drafting of others, frequently compels the courts, 
as best they can, to fill in the gaps, an activity which no matter 
how one may label it, is in part legislative.' 
Few would dispute this contention. However, Frank's analysis 
becomes even more interesting if carried further by pointing out 
one clear distinction between: 
1. the necessary generality in the wording of many statutes 
2. ineptitude in drafting 
Because of the first, the filling of gaps in legislation by courts 
cannot and should not be entirely eliminated. However, this is not 
the case with judicial legislation made necessary by ineptitude in 
drafting. The contention here is that the necessity for judicial 
legislation should be minimized insofar as that necessity arises 
from drafting ineptitude. This Article represents an effort to 
devise techniques to curtail drafting ineptitude and the 
ambiguities thereby created." 
[AlIen, pS77/S, 1957J 
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Therefore we cannot agree that AlIen states that the Horn clause form of 
logic expresses legislation. Ye would argue that he claimed it might 
help remove drafting errors. 
There is also some contradiction in reports of the ease of inputting 
rules to the system. Cory et al write: 
"The formalisation of legislation by means of rules has almost all 
the characteristics of an expert system. It differs, however, in 
one important respect. In a classical expert system, before 
knowledge can be formalized, it has to be elicited from the 
subconscious [sic] of an expert. This knowledge elicitation 
problem is generally regarded as the main bottleneck in the 
construction of expert systems. It is entirely absent, however, in 
the case of legislation which is already formulated and written 
down. Thus the use of expert system 
legislation has virtually all the 
without the attendant disadvantage of 
problem." 
[Cory, p12, 1984] 
techniques for representing 
advantages of expert systems 
the knowledge elicitation 
But the reported comments of a member of the team seem to belie this: 
'Cory explained that "you have to begin with the conclusion, the 
meaning of the clause; this isn't easy to find or express." 
The student who produced Horn clauses such as these had the most 
tedious job of all. "The systems analysis is all done on paper-
there's no getting away from writing out all those And/Or clauses," 
said Cory.' 
Quoted from Datalink, 13th February 1984 
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Ve would argue that the normalization of legislation is not as simple as 
Cory et al suggest. Rather that it is a very mentally demanding task 
which requires considerable skill (which legal training develops and 
encourages). This skill is that which allows the lawyer to interpret 
legislation (noted above in the extract from Twining and Hiers) but 
until this has occurred the legislation has no meaning and it might as 
well be buried in the "subconscious", wherever that might lie. 
The importance of these criticisms of the Prolog project are 
substantial; if we are to build useful engineered systems it is 
necessary to have clear perspectives of the very real problems which 
have to be met. If we do not, then we risk being incapable of extending 
our systems into other legal domains, and such generality must be the 
aim of legal knowledge engineering. The failure to attend to the 
problems to be solved is a sign of a poor engineering approach. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 6 
THE ELl PROJECT 
The project shares one major common assumption with the Prolog project; 
that is, that legal concepts can be defined by rules. 
The claim of the ELl program is, however, that it is based upon an 
analysis of some of the problems of the domain to be modelled, and that 
this analysis has provided a specification of what the ELl should, at 
least in the early versions, be capable of providing. Such an analysis 
and specification is, we would argue, necessary at the start of any 
sound legal knowledge engineering project. Of course, the specification 
might prove less than useful; but then, at least, we have a reasonable 
conceptual and theoretical framework within which to discuss the failure 
of the system. 
Analysis of the domain has led us to believe that any attempt to 
describe "the law" with any generality within the confines of a first or 
second order logical system has, to date, been unsuccessful. Ve are 
convinced that there is what might be described as a language of 
discourse whose domain is the law; that there exists a manner of 
discussing the law at the "meta-level". It is this language with its 
descriptions of legal concepts, rules and world which it is important 
for any legal consultative system to encapsulate, and not Mehl's 
simplified language of discourse where synonyms are reduced to single 
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tokens. 
A major research goal of the ELl project has been the requirement that 
the legal expert should be able to directly interact with the system -
that is, we wish to degrade the role of the "knowledge engineer" from 
that of constant attendee to the needs of the expert. Ve feel our goal 
should be the provision of sufficiently generalized legal expert systems 
which allow the expert to formulate, structure and then input his or her 
"expertise". 
Friedland has expressed the desirability of this approach: 
"The reasons for providing knowledge entry by the domain expert are 
as follows. First, both accuracy and completeness of the knowledge 
base suffer when domain knowledge passes through the filter of a 
computer scientist, who is not an expert in the chosen domain. 
Much of the knowledge is complex and subtle, and its purpose may 
not be immediately apparent to the non-expert. Second, a large 
knowledge base may be built more quickly when non-experts do not 
have to be intimately involved in describing each object and rule 
in the knowledge base. Finally, in building a knowledge base for a 
program to be used by other experts in the field,an element of 
trust, as embodied in the name of a known authority, is essential. 
Professor Kede's description of cloning strategies is more likely 
to be used and trusted by other molecular biologists than is Peter 
Friedland's translation of Professor Kede's strategies." 
[Friedland, p857, 1981] 
In this chapter we describe aspects of the current ELl program, and in 
later chapter describe how it might be extended, and describe its 
failings. 
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Yhile the system has not actually been used in real situations, one 
legally qualified researcher has interacted with it: her comments are 
contained within Appendix C. 
6.2 RULES YITHIN THE ELl PROGRAM 
There are several important aspects concerning the rules within the ELl 
system. Firstly, is the question of just what is contained within the 
rules; secondly, how can rules be used to define concepts and rights. 
There is also the question of how are these to be interpreted. 
6.2.1 Rule Content 
Ye take a similar view to Sergot: 
"Finally, the norms expressed in law change so rapidly, and are 
derived from so many separate sources, that only an experienced 
lawyer could attempt the construction of a useful legal expert 
system. To expect him to learn unfamiliar computer languages in 
addition is unreasonable." 
[Sergot, p42, 1982] 
Ideally, the language in which the lawyer should be able to express his 
rules should be as close to the legal language that we suggest exists. 
The nature of this language is that it is a subset of natural language 
(but not a "simplification" of natural language); we propose that by 
using English text within a production system formalism that this legal 
expression can be easily handled. 
The ELl system, as we have already described, allows rules of the 
following format: 
IF (applicant is qualified as claimant) 
(applicant is aged 60 or more) 
THEN 
(applicant need not sign on as available for work) 
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This rule says: 
if the applicant satisfies the rules of entitlement to 
Supplementary Benefit and is entitled to claim this Benefit and the 
applicant is over 60 years old, then he/she need not attend the 
offices of the DHSS to sign the attendance slip in their claim 
booklet. 
There is no specific format for these rule elements; it is only 
coincidental that many begin with the word "applicant" - this does not 
operate like a variable within a logical system and is not operated upon 
by the program. 
Other rules can be much longer, the length of the textual string 
contained within the parenthesis being limited only by the expressive 
needs of the person who inputs the rules. For example: 
IF (applicant can claim standard housing benefit) 
(applicant lets part of home to a sub-tenant, 
or to a tenant if a home occupier) 
THEN 
(applicant's standard housing benefit rebate/allowance 
will be calculated on rent received from tenant excluding: 
rates 
water rates or changes for 'environmental services' 
payment for meals 
payment for heating, hot water, lighting and cooking 
$2.70 is deducted if furniture is provided 
$1.35 is deducted if services but no furniture is provided 
$0.35 is deducted if applicant lets a garage or outbuilding) 
There are two points which should be made about this latter rule. It 
contains quite an amount of information which could easily be calculated 
by the ELl program (simply by providing a calculation mechanism) but 
which we have decided not to implement in this version of ELl. Vhether 
it is really useful is a moot point - such simple calculation would not 
be beyond the power of the advisor who is to use the system. The second 
point is that it could have been handled by several rules; the "expert" 
(i.e. the author - his "expertise" in the domain is a controversial 
question) though decided that it was not essential - that as a rule it 
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expressed exactly what was required and did not require a formalized 
format. 
Ye should digress here and discuss what sort of language such systems 
require. 
Feigenbaum has proposed that self advisory IKBS programs will be a major 
market product within the near future with substantial profits accruing. 
Under the heading of "New Fields of Application" he writes: 
"Home entertainment and advice-giving: AI scientists have long 
used games 
generally 
structured. 
as a vehicle for 
has a constrained 
There exists not 
exploring 
knowledge 
new concepts. 
base and is 
A game 
highly 
only a considerable amount of 
competence within the AI community for constructing intelligent 
game programs, but also a vast consumer potential for home 
entertainment of this sort. In the author's view, the money-making 
potential of this market will make microcomputer-plus-TV-based home 
entertainment the dominant market for expert systems. The concept 
of home entertainment is broader than games and includes 
consultation and advice about a broad range of subjects of interest 
to the consumer (e.g., financial advice, and garden and plant 
care). Knowledge bases for these specialities will be assembled by 
experts in much the same way that the 'how-to' books traditionally 
have been." 
[Feigenbaum, p73, 1980] 
Yhether tort advice will appear on your home TV set is debatable. The 
Inverclyde project was adjudged successful on technical grounds but not 
on managerial grounds partly because of the complexities of providing 
useful legal advice: 
"Following the experimental period, the 
the project could only succeed in 
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participants agreed that 
the long-term as part of a 
comprehensive and outgoing advisory service, but as this was not 
felt by the local authority to be one of their responsibilities, 
the experiment was discontinued." 
[du Feu, p190, 1980] 
It seems that legal advice might of itself not be enough; there must be 
a contextual interpretation of that advice which takes into account the 
client's situation. A simple listing of IKBS programs immediately 
disproves the idea that those presently available are used to interact 
with non-experts. Rather these systems are used to assist already 
trained professionals to carry out their roles, albeit in a more 
efficient or adept manner. The application of IKBS programs in this 
type of area has perhaps greater effect than in those areas where the 
system might be used by complete non-experts. This is because those 
experts are able to assimilate more advice from less knowledge; a 
pointer to a specific goal may be all that is required to improve 
greatly the effectiveness of that professional's work. A non-expert 
moreover, cannot be expected to understand the implications of advice 
given in relation to the whole domain in which his problem resides 
without a large amount of explanation; and the more information which 
the expert system provides, the more it becomes a teach-yourself-system 
and less like a true consultation system. 
The problems of even deciding what is a legal problem are not trivial to 
the non-expert. The situation, wi th regard to these "legal problems", 
has been expressed by Bing and Harvold: 
"The problem, as expressed by the client, is not primarily 
classified as "legal" or otherwise. The first step of the lawyer 
is to determine whether the problem - as presented to him through 
his client - is legal or partially legal. This is not as easy as 
it may appear. If a client complains about health, housing, his 
family or his economy, it is not evident that the best solution is 
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an invalidity pension, housing grants, and a divorce. The legal 
problems may be part of a more complex problem situation - or, 
indeed, symptoms of other problems. The client might perhaps be 
better aided by medical care, retraining and contact with a social 
adviser than by extensive legal assistance." 
[Bing, p1S, 1977] 
Allowing those who have no true appreciation of the entirety of the 
situation to freely access expert systems, may not be doing them the 
service to which they are entitled. 
A properly engineered IKBS system, we can conclude should design its 
output for the person who is most likely to benefit from using it. 
The ELl system allows the negation of both conditions and goals. 
elements can be negated by using English text: 
(applicant is not entitled to supplementary benefit) 
These 
which is not recognized by the system. Alternatively, the prefix "NIL" 
(used for convenience in this INTERLISP programmed system) can be used; 
this is recognized by the system: 
(NIL applicant is entitled to supplementary benefit) 
which means the same as above. Examples containing double negation are 
allowable, but confusing: 
(NIL applicant is not entitled to supplementary benefit) 
The preferred form of negation is with the prefix NIL. Using this 
allows the system to use the negated information in the processing. The 
system can also simplify the questions that are being asked by removing 
the prefix from the rule element before asking the user of their truth. 
Thus if the element which is to presented to the user is: 
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the user will see: 
Is this true? 
.. 
. . today is friday 
(NIL today is friday) 
answering "yes" will cause the system to conclude "no" and answering 
"no" will cause the system to conclude "yes". Such a facility only 
helps increase the simplicity of the interface. 
Ye make mention (in Chapter 7) of the use of a token in the knowledge 
base which handles both the value of the condition or goal and also any 
annotation which the expert wishes to attach to that token. The 
usefulness of this is that the expert can attach further information to 
the rule element either to explain further what the element means or to 
indicate where it was extracted from. Thus these tokens could be used 
to reference legislation and/or case precedent. The annotations 
attached can be of any format - perhaps most usefully in English text -
and are available to annotate rules as well as the conditions and goals. 
Ye deal later with the conceptual matching process - a procedure which 
was designed to aid rule input when the rules are of a textual format. 
6.2.2 Definitional Rules 
Ye follow the general pattern of the Pro log project (and of that part of 
the means-end analysis of [Vaterman, 1981] which deals with legislation) 
in that we see that rules can be used to define "legal concepts" which 
appear in the antecedent list of other rules. Take for example the rule 
we presented above: 
IF (applicant is qualified as claimant) 
(applicant is aged 60 or more) 
THEN 
(applicant need not sign on as available for work) 
Ye can say that this rule means: 
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if the applicant satisfies the rules of entitlement to 
Supplementary Benefit and is entitled to claim this Benefit and the 
applicant is over 60 years old, then he/she need not attend the 
offices of the DHSS to sign the attendance slip in their claim 
booklet. 
because there are other rules in the system which define just what is 
meant by "applicant is qualified as claimant". This is not a "legal" 
concept, but one which was used to represent the fact that before a 
person can receive Supplementary Benefit, he must be capable of 
satisfying the regulations, and must also be entitled to actually claim. 
For instance he cannot usually claim if he is not a British citizen nor 
a national of an EEC country (although ELl copes with certain other 
cases); and until recently only the male member of a family was entitled 
to claim for his wife and family (ELl defines those who cannot apply). 
\le can thus define those who are "entitled to claim" by showing that the 
applicant accords with, for example, the following two rules: 
IF (applicant is available for work) 
(applicant is a British citizen) 
THEN 
(applicant satisfies the rules of entitlement to 
supplementary benefit) 
IF (applicant satisfies the rules of entitlement to 
THEN 
supplementary benefit) 
(applicant is over 16 years of age) 
(applicant is usually resident in the OK) 
(NIL applicant is in full-time work) 
(applicant is qualified as claimant) 
The same definitional process applies for some of the other conditions 
in the rules. For example, we could use defining rules to define 
whether the client is a British citizen or not. 
It is simple to add rules which have no legal necessity, but improve the 
consultation by reducing the amount of information which needs to be 
input. For example: 
IF (applicant is aged 60 or over) 
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THEN 
(NIL applicant is under 60 years of age) 
Although, one must be careful not to cause looping during interpretation 
of the rules with these type of rules the problem arises in 
self-reference where in order to prove a given consequent, other rules 
which contain that consequent as one of their antecedents exist (during 
testing these make their appearance as infinite loops). 
example, to include information about retirement is simple: 
IF (applicant is aged 60 or over) 
(applicant is female) 
THEN 
(applicant has reached normal age of retirement) 
6.2.3 Handling Negation 
As another 
In any useful system which attempts to allow non-trivial rule handling, 
it is necessary to have interaction between rules other than simple 
definition. For example, in order to have rules which not only define 
how to be a member of a certain classification it is necessary to have 
rules which define who cannot be a member of that classification. This 
cannot be done by using only negation of the rule's conditions: 
IF (child is under 5 years old) 
THEN 
(child is a pre-school child) 
is completely different from: 
IF (NIL child is under 5 years old) 
THEN 
(child is a pre-school child) 
Vhat is needed is some means of negating the goal. For example: 
IF (NIL child is under 5 years old) 
THEN 
(NIL child is a pre-school child) 
which reads, "if the child is not under 5 years old, then it is not a 
pre-school child" or "if the child is over 5 years old, it is not a 
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pre-school child" 
The ELl system incorporates this negation handling within the control 
element. It assumes that a negatively defined conclusion has precedence 
over a positively defined conclusion (within computing this would be 
described as "higher priority"). Thus, if the two rules above existed, 
it would attempt to prove the rule with the negated goal before trying 
to prove the rule without the negated goal. 
Thus with the ELl rule: 
IF (NIL applicant is disabled) 
(applicants works 30 or more hours per week) 
THEN 
(applicant is in part-time work) 
when it is being interpreted, the ELl interpreter will first try to 
determine whether the first condition has any rules in the knowledge 
base which define it (either negatively or positively). It does this by 
first searching for a goal "NIL applicant is disabled". If one exists 
it attempts to prove it; if proven then the interpreter tries to remove 
any rules from the knowledge base which have "applicant is disabled" as 
their goal - because these rules are now redundant. This procedure is 
very effective in reducing the number of rules which exist within the 
knowledge base as possible contenders for future triggering. 
prunes the knowledge base, to use computing terminology. 
Thus it 
If there had been no incidence of the negated goal "applicant is 
disabled" in the knowledge base, then the system would try to find one 
which is not negated, and then try to prove it by testing its 
cond it ions. [Clark, 1978] has discussed the use of negation by failure 
_ the searching of a data base for a certain item and if it does not 
exist assuming that it has been negated. The ELl system has a form of 
this negation by failure; it comes into play, though, only when a 
non-negated goal has been found. If all rules which have it as their 
consequent (ie the "concept's" defining rules) have been unable to prove 
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it, then the ELl interpret assumes that it has been negated. This 
negation by failure can be expressed in another way. The knowledge base 
of the program contains - we might say - all legal rules which might 
conveniently define given conclusion, say illegal act x. If, given 
situation y, after processing all these rules, we have not been able to 
"infer" the conclusion x, then we can colloquially say that, "there's no 
law against y." 
Ve can usefully talk of the ELl interpreter being in either "open" or 
"closed" mode. If we assume that the knowledge base contains all 
possible information and rules defining the domain, then it is closed 
and negation by failure is a suitable strategy. 
If the knowledge base does not contain all possible information, then it 
is open; and negation by failure is not a suitable strategy because if 
may well be that there are situations (known to the person who interacts 
with the system) which are not represented in the knowledge base - ie 
that there are defining rules external to the knowledge base. In this 
case, before assuming negation the system should ask the user whether to 
assume negation by failure. 
Switching between the two modes could conceivably be useful (and simply 
done by amending procedural control); it is not, though, present in the 
ELl system at the moment. ELl presently uses the closed mode, ensuring 
that there is a sufficiently general condition which is askable; for 
instance, the condition: 
"circumstances are such that the Supplementary Benefits Officer 
considers it unreasonable for the applicant to sign on". 
6.2.3.1 Pruning The Knowledge Base -
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There is a second strategy which utilizes negation. Like the previous 
strategy it operates within the program, but rather than discussing 
actual rules we can see it in the following toy example. There are a 
large collection of productions, of which several have the same 
conclusion: 
<a> <b> => <x> 
<c> <b> => <x> 
<d> <e> => <x> 
<f> <g> <h> => <x> 
etc. 
Ye wish to discover whether <x> can be concluded, and in the traditional 
form of production system interpreter (perhaps "pure" is a better 
description) we must try each of these rules in turn until we do trigger 
one rule or we finally terminate the search and conclude that "we have 
proven not <x> by failure". 
For example, we could list a series of rules which define who is allowed 
to apply for supplementary benefit. These rules would list the 
necessary conditions (residence, nationality, age etc.) which allow 
access to that benefit. If none of the rules applied to the recipient 
of the systems's advice, we would have had to proceed through all these 
rules asking questions at each one. And such monotonous question asking 
is one of the potential faults of advisory systems; the user is bored by 
its inflexibility. 
In real life, though, the situation is quite different. Ye frequently 
do not have to resort to such a strategy; we usually have a shortcut 
method of deciding whether <x> can be effected or not - we have 
information which can be modelled by a rule of the sort: 
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<y> <z> => not <x> 
An example of this type of rule from the ELl program is: 
IF (applicant is 19 years of age or more) 
(applicant is in full-time non-advanced education) 
THEN 
(NIL claim can be made for supplementary benefit) 
Yhen we are trying to effect a certain conclusion, we can first try to 
discover whether we can trigger a rule whose RHS is the negated version 
of our desired conclusion. If one such "negative" rule is found and 
triggered then all the other "positive" rules can be pruned from the 
knowledge base. 
Such pruning can quickly reduce a large knowledge base to a relatively 
small one; this is advantageous because it has been noted that the 
processing time for production systems is directly related to the number 
of rules which they contain: 
"A production system is a programming language with an unfortunate 
characteristic: larger production system programs execute more 
slowly than small ones. The extra instructions in the larger 
program do not have to execute to slow down the system, their mere 
presence is sufficient." 
[Forgy, 1979] 
Such pruning is a necessary tactic, because in legal knowledge based 
systems we can expect many thousands of rules - the law is after all 
quite complex - and in such large systems simple negation by failure is 
a wasteful procedure. 
6.2.4 Control 
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The use of negation in ELl is an example of using rules to control 
procedural interpretation. 
The general situation and necessity for 
represented by Georgeff: 
"A production system consists of a set 
called productions and a data base 
control is succinctly 
of modules or procedures 
on which these productions 
operate. Each production denotes a condition-action pair, the 
conditions having to be satisfied by a state of the data base 
before the production can be applied to that state, and the action 
specifying the result of the application. No explicit means of 
procedural control are provided. The system is thus solely event 
driven, and production invocation can only be achieved indirectly 
through the data base. 
This lack of control structure results in a system which is 
strongly modular, flexible and adaptive, and thus well suited as a 
knowledge-based system. However, in many problem domains some 
means of representing and using control knowledge is essential. 
This knowledge can be important in two ways. First, the solution 
to the problem may require knowledge about plans or sequences of 
action rather than simply about individual actions ••• Second, the 
efficiency of the system and the size of the search space may 
depend on domain specific constraints on production system 
invocation." 
[Georgeff, p176, 1982] 
Georgeff proposes that there should be a separate control structure 
within the system which determines which productions are to be part of 
the conflict resolution group at any given time (by conflict resolution 
group we mean the set of those productions which we could try next -
obviously we wish to try the one which is most likely to provide us with 
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a solution, and also a solution at the least computational expense). 
For ease of interaction with the system, though, such a separate control 
module is problematic; it means a more complex structure (which the 
expert inputting the information) must be aware of. 
We prefer to use Davis's approach, where the productions are "turned in 
on themselves" since this allows the expert to conceptualize in a 
similar way about the rules and rule handling strategies: 
"the control structures and knowledge representations can be made 
sufficiently comprehensible to the expert (at the conceptual level) 
that he can (a) understand the system's behaviour in those terms 
and (b) use them to codify his own knowledge. This insures that 
the expert understands system performance well enough to know what 
to correct, and can then express the required knowledge, i.e., he 
can "think" in those terms. Thus part of the task of establishing 
the link between the expert and the system involves insulating the 
expert from the details of implementation, by establishing a 
discourse at a level high enough that we do not end up effectively 
having to teach him how to program." 
[Davis, p321, 1977a] 
Ve argue that the simple technique of negation within the productions is 
such a conceptualizable methodology, common in every day and legal 
discourse. Vhile relatively simple, it allows the user to specify at 
the meta-level which productions should be removed from the existing 
list. Ve do not add any productions to the knowledge base by use of 
this technique; but if we start with a large enough collection of 
productions, we can quickly prune them to a set which is suitable for 
the interaction in hand. 
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The ELl system operates in a domain where there is no attempt to find 
anyone particular solution; that is, since the ultimate goals being 
effected are beneficial to the client (in that they represent accruing 
sums of money) the strategy is to try and effect all those which we can. 
There is therefore no need to incorporate any quantification of the 
strength or usefulness of any particular path. We are not certain how 
any attempt to incorporate such knowledge beside the negation processing 
of ELl would be achieved, but see it as a possible area for engineering 
enquiry. 
It has been pointed out (for example, [Davis, p219, 1980b) that 
elegance is achieved by having the system interpreter interpret both 
meta and object level productions. Negation, as used in ELl, allows 
this. 
Davis [Davis, p224, 1980b) discusses the distinctions between content 
reference "by name" versus reference "by description". The former 
references rules by their name (say RULE-38 in the ELl system); the 
latter by aspects of the content of the rule. Since HYClN (used as the 
basis for TEIRESlAS) used a well formatted rule based upon a well 
formalized language syntax, it was possible to refer to the the rules by 
the contents of each segment of the condition. Shortliffe [Shortliffe, 
p113, 1975] represented his language as: 
<rule> ::= <premise> <action> I <premise> <action> <else> 
<premise> ::= ($AND <condition> <condi tion» 
<condition> ::= «func1> <context> <parameter» I 
«func2> <context> <parameter> <value» 
«special-func> <arguments» I 
($OR <condition> 
<action> ::= <concpart> 
<else> ::= <concpart> 
<condition> 
<concpart> ::z <conclusion> I <actfunc> I 
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(DO-ALL <conclusion> 
(DO-ALL <actfunc> .. 
<conclusion» 
<actfunc» 
where the terminals are descriptors of the domain in which HYCIN 
operates. 
The main argument of much of this text is that such a representation is 
not possible within legal areas. Legal knowledge engineering must 
accept that its problems are, to a very great extent, the problems of 
natural language handling. Therefore we cannot expect any legal IKBS 
system to be quite so elegantly designed as Davis' system. However, we 
can be less specific and can refer to the rules either by one of their 
conditions or by their goal. In the negation processing, we reference 
rules "by their consequents". 
6.3 CONCEPTUAL HATCHING 
To overcome the problems inherent in handling textual rules, the tactic 
of trying to match rule elements by words or phrases contained within 
them was devised. This process, we believed could be expanded to allow 
more detailed analysis of the rules in the system. This would, then 
allow a more advanced form of me ta-knowledge by content referencing. 
However, as we discuss in Section 7.2.4, due to implementation factors 
(specifically speed) this matching process is very processor intensive; 
in that section we describe how we might improve it in future versions 
of EL!. 
The current module is relatively simple, but does allow expansion. It 
operates by using three word lists (an "important", a "noise" and a 
"permanent noise" list) together with two lists which contain, 
respectively, conceptual matches and non-conceptual matches. A 
conceptual match is a match between two rule elements which have a 
similar meaning but a different textual format; for instance: 
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(applicant has retired) 
and 
(applicant is over retirement age) 
or: 
(a claim can be made for supplementary benefit) 
and 
(applicant is entitled to supplementary benefit) 
and 
(rules of entitlement to supplementary benefit are satisfied) 
Ye might say that the first two are similar because of their use of the 
term "retirement", and the second by the term "supplementary benefit". 
However, the system might contain other rules which are not conceptual 
matches which use the same terms; for example: 
(retirement age has not been reached) 
or 
(supplementary benefit is known as supplementary allowance) 
Ye can conclude that there are problems about deciding just which rule 
elements are matched. 
Ye believe that this conceptual matching is important in any system 
which will have more that two or three hundred rules. Because there is 
no set format for the rules and because we wish the program to be able 
to accept legal language, it is essential that some means of flexibly 
accepting input is incorporated within the system. 
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As the rules are input to the system they are examined to ascertain the 
existence of "important" words (which can be defined in the SETUP mode 
or added during the BUILD process - see Appendix A) the system will ask 
the expert whether the input rule element is a match with an already 
input element. If so, they are treated as equivalent; if not they are 
distinguished. This information is then kept by the system and whenever 
the knowledge base is to be updated, this information is still 
available. 
In inputting the rules to the ELl system, the matching module did notice 
many matches where there were spelling mistakes, differing words etc. 
From that point of view, the module was effective; it does however work 
on a simple algorithm and could be much improved. 
One early design idea had been to use techniques from the language 
translation field for example by utilizing a dictionary. One major 
disadvantage of this methodology is that a good dictionary which is 
context sensitive requires a substantial input of expertise (for 
example, [Hacklovitch, 1984] states that only 450 terms can be properly 
indexed per man/year). This input is contrary to the effort that we 
wish from the eventual users of legal advisory systems. 
Ye intend to continue examining how the EL! concept matching module can 
be improved; not least, because we believe it could be very useful in 
any meta-knowledge using reference by content. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ELl IMPLEMENTATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are basically three problems in the implementation of an IKBS 
system. The first, and most difficult, is to choose the data structures 
which will represent the area of expertise handled by the system. As 
with all computer programs it is necessary to choose one of several 
possible structures. Each of the possible data structures might be 
advantageous in solving one particular problem, but not another. So it 
is with IKBS programs - one might use production rules, another frames 
and a third, associative networks. Just as likely as a system which 
uses only one data structure to handle its expertise is a system which 
uses more than one (MYCIN uses a tree structure - called a context tree 
- as its prime data structure; it is built and transformed by production 
rules held in a different structure). 
The second area is that of interpretation - how can the information 
which is held in these data structures be extracted from it. 
The third area is that of 
information which, when 
expertise. 
filling up the 
interpreted, 
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data 
is to 
structures 
become the 
with the 
system's 
In this chapter INTERLISP functions are given in Pseudo-LISP format to 
improve clarity. The actual program listing is somewhat more complex, 
with necessary exceptional case handling and interface incorporated. 
7.1.1 Rules And Knowledge Bases 
The rules which represent or hold the legal information are of a simple 
format; they are composed of one or more conditions or antecedents and 
one goal or consequent. It is useful to consider the antecedents being 
preceded by the keyword "IF", and the consequent being preceded by the 
keyword "THEN". The format of each rule is then: 
IF «antecedent) ... (antecedent» THEN (consequent) 
These antecedents or conditions represent states which must all be in 
effect for the consequent to be triggered. More loosely, the conditions 
must be "true" for the consequent also to be proven to be "true". If, 
when the conditions in a rule are tested, any of the conditions is found 
not to be true then that rule's consequent cannot be proven. This does 
not meant that the consequent is "false" - only that it cannot be 
effected by that rule. 
The conditions and consequents in the rule can have any relevant 
content; they could simply be symbols or, as in the case of ELl, they 
can be textual strings which represent legal situations. For example 
one rule might be: 
IF «client's resources are insufficient to meet his 
requirements) 
(client is entitled to apply for supplementary benefit» 
THEN 
(client is entitled to supplementary benefit) 
In some systems these rules incorporate Bayesian degrees of belief 
and/or a variety of logical operators. In the described system such is 
not the case; the rules are simple textual strings of the above format. 
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Whatever the choice of condition format it is important because this 
format will determine the method of interpretation and the amount of 
expertise which can be extricated from the corpus of rules. In the ELl 
system, the textual format was decided upon because of the nature of the 
knowledge to be represented; most other domains can more usefully use 
more complex schemas, even though this means more effort in setting up 
and 'tuning' the system. Davis et al [Davis, 1977b] noted that although 
the format of MYClN's stylized rules was essentially "non restrictive" 
within the domain, there was a tendency towards some rules with 
awkwardly long and complicated premises, and the creation of desired 
triggering paths was a sometimes non-trivial task. The rule is the 
basic unit of the type of knowledge based program using production 
system techniques; but an IKBS system with only one rule is not 
particularly useful. A useful system is one which contains about 100 to 
200 or more; less than this and the system tends to produce trivial 
advice. The section of the system which holds this corpus of rules is 
called the knowledge base. 
Combined together into a knowledge base, the rules must be interpreted 
to produce advice. It is necessary to prove more than one consequent 
because conditions in one rule are often goals from other rules. In 
order to effect these former rules, the latter ones must be effected 
first. The process of interpretation (sometimes called the control 
cycle) is therefore the attempt to trigger the rules contained within 
the IKBS program. Just as research effort is being applied to the 
design of rule formats, so is effort being applied to interpreter 
design. 
There is one more aspect of a rule-based program which is necessary for 
their operation - a small data base which contains a list of all those 
conditions and goals which are true (having been input by the user) or 
proven (i.e. effected by the interpretation process). A second list 
can contain details of conditions which the user has specifically stated 
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as being false. This data base is empty at the beginning of the 
interpretation; as the interpreter tries to effect goals, though, the 
data base gradually fills up with names of proven and true conditions 
and goals. The data base is available to the interpreter so that it 
"knows" what has already been proven. This data base is akin to a 
psychologist's "short term memory", and in Artificial Intelligence 
literature on production systems it is frequently described as such. 
7.1.2 Structuring The Rules In A Graph. 
~hile production systems usually structure their rules into one or more 
vertical lists, the ELl system utilizes a graph structure with the 
following aspects: 
(a) the graph has (i) a 'top level' of nodes (ii) 'goal' nodes, 
and (iii) intervening nodes. 
(b) top level and intervening nodes hold the conditions of 
rules. 
(c) the goal nodes hold goals of rules. 
(d) nodes are referred to as 'planes' because they frequently 
hold a condition which is part of several rules. 
(e) planes are ordered into specific levels. 
Diagramatically, the position is: 
- 137 -
/ / / 
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conditions / 
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conditions 
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I 
Conditions are I 
held within leVelS\ 
, 
I 
r-;V-;"7.:......,~~~~:.....,..<:....."Jh " Goals are held in 
lowest level 
of structure 
There are several reasons why this structure was chosen, as an 
appropriate representation. Elegance was on considered aspect - the 
fact that the structure can be decomposed into root-topmost or 
root-bottommost trees (Section 7.2.3.1) but other factors are: 
(i) individual conditions can be physically shared by rules 
This factor allows conditions to be treated as the most important 
elementary object. Held in this manner they are examinable in three 
ways: 
(a) as individual conditions which represent one chunk of causal 
knowledge 
(b) as parts of an individual rule they represent one cause for 
that rule having (or not having) triggered 
(c) as common elements of more than one rule, they represent common 
aspects of the pattern of triggering of those rules. 
(ii) links allow self control of access 
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This can be illustrated by considering the topmost condition (or 
bottommost goal) to define access to the conditions and goals 
underneath. To a certain extent, the process of structuring productions 
hierarchically allows the topmost conditions to be defined as 
meta-conditions, thus in the program one of the conditions for many 
rules which appears on the top level is "applicant is qualified as 
client". Such control allows easy pruning of the knowledge base of 
large blocks of rules. 
7.1.3 Incorporating Rules 
Given that a set of rules have been written, how are they incorporated? 
Somehow each rule must be inserted into the graph structure (or 
knowledge base as we shall call it from now). 
There are three main techniques, which are applied to the rule in the 
following order; (a) each of the input conditions is matched against the 
top level conditions until a match between an input and an already 
assimilated condition is found (if not found, then procedure (b) is 
followed). The rule number of the input rule is then attached to this 
condition and the links to lower conditions are retrieved. The same 
matching technique is then used on the conditions one link below the top 
level condition. This process continues until no match can be found; at 
which point the remaining conditions from the input rule are then 
inserted by themselves. The goal base is then tested to find a match 
for the input goal; if one is found then the input goal is assimilated 
with that goal, else the input goal is assimilated by itself. The 
general pattern of integration from this method is: 
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(b) If procedure (a) is ineffective (i.e. no match with a top level 
condition can be found) then an attempt is made to match the input goal 
with an already assimilated goal. If no match is found then procedure 
(c) is followed. If a match has been found, however, then the process 
of (a) is attempted in reverse, i.e. 
with already assimilated conditions 
point comes when no further matches 
trying to associate the conditions 
from lower levels upwards. If a 
are found, then the remaining 
conditions are inserted by themselves, one being placed on the top 
level. The pattern of integration: 
(c) If (b) has not been successful (i.e. no matching goal can be 
found), then the conditions are inserted as entire rules; i.e. one 
condition is placed on the top level, the goal is placed in the goal 
list, and the remaining conditions are placed in the successive levels 
above the goal. The pattern is: 
7.2 THE PROGRAMMED SYSTEM 
7.2.1 Overview Of System Parts 
The present system is composed of the following INTERLISP files: 
SETUP.COM 
BUILD.COM 
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INTERPRET.COM 
KNOYBASE.KNOY 
RULES. RULE 
(although, in fact, the .KNOY and .RULE files are user created and may 
have any valid file identifier). 
Briefly, they fulfill these roles: 
SETUP.COM contains functions which allow the input of rules into 
RULES.RULE. The rules so input can be edited and suchlike before being 
automatically inserted into the knowledge base (contained within 
KNOYBASE.KNOY) by BUILD.COMj this latter file also contains functions 
for inserting single rules, deleting others and producing a list of 
conceptual matches between the various rule conditions. INTERPRET.COM 
allows interpretation (Le. "consultation") of the knowledge base held 
in KNOYBASE.KNOY. 
7.2.2 Implementation Of The Knowledge Base 
7.2.2.1 Handling Conditions -
The elemental data structure which is used within the system to hold 
conditions is a list. Before conditions, or more correctly, the planes 
whose value is a condition, are appended to the structure, the list is 
of the form 
«LEVEL-1) (LEVEL-2) (LEVEL-3) .•• ) 
where the actual number of levels in the initial structure is determined 
by the user. The rationale for this is discussed later. for now, 
though, we shall imagine the initial list to be: 
« LEVEL-l » 
As higher level planes are added to the structure, so must levels (since 
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the structure being held on the list is intrinsically hierarchical). 
Therefore, if a rule with three conditions is added, one will be the 
value of PLANE-1 (an atom generated by the system); one will be the 
value of PLANE-2; and the third of PLANE-3. Since each of these planes 
are particular to one level, there must be three levels within the 
knowledge base list. i.e. LEVEL-2 and LEVEL-3 (atoms which are system 
generated) are inserted into the structure. 
«LEVEL-l)(LEVEL-2)(LEVEL-3» 
and the planes associated onto the relevant level: 
«LEVEL-l (PLANE-I» 
(LEVEL-2 (PLANE-2» 
(LEVEL-3 (PLANE-3») 
represented by typical LISP diagram as: 
PLANE-' PLANE-2 
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PLANE-l 
If another rule with three conditions is inserted into the knowledge 
base, then those conditions are set as the value of newly generated 
atoms, PLANE-4, PLANE-5, and PLANE-6. They are then attached onto their 
particular level in LEVELLIST: 
«LEVEL-1 (PLANE-1)(PLANE-4» 
(LEVEL-2 (PLANE-2)(PLANE-5» 
(LEVEL-3 (PLANE-3)(PLANE-6») 
Any planes can be accessed in this structure by processing the desired 
number of COR's to access the necessary level; to access the plane once 
again apply the required number of COR's. 
When entering rules into the knowledge base, if the plane whose value is 
the only condition of a rule is to be associated with a level, then it 
is associated with LEVEL-1; if the rule has two conditions then their 
relevant planes are associated first with LEVEL-1 and then with LEVEL-2. 
For example, two rules one with only one condition (the value of 
PLANE-10, say) and one rule with only two conditions (the value of 
PLANE-1l and PLANE-12, say) are inserted into the knowledge base. Then 
LEVELLIST becomes: 
«LEVEL-l (PLANE-l)(PLANE-4)(PLANE-10)(PLANE-ll) 
(LEVEL-2 (PLANE-2)(PLANE-5)(PLANE-12» 
(LEVEL-3 (PLANE-3)(PLANE-6») 
It is important that rules have one condition present on the top level 
(i. e. LEVEL-l) because the interpreter must be able to access them 
here. 
Conceptually LEVELLIST, in its present state, should be seen as: 
kLANE-l PLANE-4 I PLANE-la I PLANE-lll 
fLANE-3 PLANE-6 I 
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[PLANE-2 l PLANE-S l PLANE-12 J 
Note, that the conceptual ordering of the planes differs from their 
position within LEVELLIST. The ordering with LEVELLIST is necessitated 
by the need to add new levels as larger rules (i.e. rules with more 
than, in the present example, three conditions) are to be inserted. 
Thus for example, a rule with 4 conditions, where the conditions are the 
values of PLANE-13, PLANE-14, PLANE-1S and PLANE-16. It is easy to add 
the first three onto LEVELLIST: 
«LEVEL-1 (PLANE-1)(PLANE-4)(PLANE-10)(PLANE-11)(PLANE-13» 
(LEVEL-2 (PLANE-2)(PLANE-S)(PLANE-12)(PLANE-14» 
(LEVEL-3 (PLANE-3)(PLANE-6)(PLANE-1S») 
but what of PLANE-16? The answer is to append a new level (LEVEL- 4) 
onto the structure, onto which can be attached PLANE-16: 
«LEVEL-1 (PLANE-1)(PLANE-4)(PLANE-10)(PLANE-l1)(PLANE-13» 
(LEVEL-2 (PLANE-2)(PLANE-S)(PLANE-12)(PLANE-14» 
(LEVEL-3 (PLANE-3)(PLANE-6)(PLANE-1S) 
(LEVEL-4 (PLANE-16») 
which diagramatically can be seen as: 
I PLANE-l I PLANE-4 I PLANE-10 I PLANE-11 PLANE 13 I~ 
[PLAN£-16~ 
"--__ ..A--", 
I pLARE-3 I PLARE-6 I PLANE-IS I~~ 
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PLANE-2 PLANE-S PLANE-l 2 PLANE-14 IQ 
The knowledge base can thus expand to accept rules with any number of 
conditions, simply by appending them onto the end of LEVELLIST. 
7.2.2.2 Handling Goals -
Vhile it was possible to easily incorporate the goals within LEVELLIST, 
because goals are treated as conceptually distinct from conditions, the 
decision was made to incorporate these in a different list structure, 
GOALLIST. Essentially, though there is no difference between the 
incorporation procedure: each goal is set as the value of a system 
generated atom (with the general formal GOAL-n). As each goal atom is 
generated, it is added onto the end of GOALLIST: 
«GOAL-l)(GOAL-2)(GOAL-3) .... ) 
7.2.2.3 Addressing-
Vhile inserting conditions and goals within these two list structures is 
relatively easy, there does exist quite a severe problem of keeping tabs 
on which plane is part of which rule. This problem is exacerbated when 
two rules have one or more planes in common. Thus if a further rule is 
to be entered into the structure, and one of its conditions is 
equivalent to an already assimilated condition on LEVEL-I, then the 
relevant plane (say, PLANE-I) is utilized as a plane which is part of 
that 'conceptual rule'. Thus if that rule has conditions on other 
planes - PLANE-17 and PLANE-18 - we can show the current state of 
LEVELLIST and GOALLIST, with links connecting elements of each rule as 
(assuming that each rule has a conceptually distinct goal): 
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Obviously, the intra-list position of each plane gives no indication of 
its relevance to planes within other levels. The standard methodology 
for indicating links between data objects within a data structure is by 
the one of linked lists or tree structures; but the application of these 
techniques to the current problem would need a much more complex 
structure than the format of LEVELLIST; rather than simply indicating 
the level position, the links would have to point both up and down the 
structure. This is, of course, possible using Pascal's dynamic pointer 
ability, if not quite so simple with LISP. However, one major 
disadvantage with the Pascal implementation is that access to the nodes 
within the structure is only possible by traversing the graph the 
nodes cannot be accessed simply by identifier (which is a LISP advantage 
I use and explain later). 
The solution I applied to the problem utilizes three pieces of 
information particular to each plane with the structure. These are: 
(i) address of that plane 
(ii) address(es) of ancestor(s) 
(iii)address(es) of descendant(s) 
The address of each plane in LEVELLIST is a list composed of two parts -
the level, and the position within that level. Thus (1 3) in the 
example structure we have been dealing with is PLANE-10; (2 2) is 
PLANE-S and (4 1) is PLANE-16. An address of (GOAL 1) relates to the 
first goal on the goal list (i.e. GOAL-1), and (GOAL 5) to GOAL-5 etc. 
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Each plane holds a list of these addresses for both the descendant(s) 
and ancestor(s). Thus for PLANE-1 these are: 
ancestor = NIL 
descendants = (3 1) (3 4) 
For PLANE-3: 
ancestor = (1 1) 
descendant = (2 1) 
For PLANE-2: 
ancestor (3 1) 
descendant = (GOAL 1) 
For GOAL-1: 
ancestor = (2 1) 
descendant NIL 
Conditions on the top level and goals have, of course, respectively, no 
ancestors and no descendants because of their position within the 
structure. 
7.2.2.4 Creating Planes And Goals -
Vithin INTERLISP, the formation of new data objects is easily achieved, 
and also the association of a unique identifier with that object. Using 
Pseudo-LISP code, the function within the described program which 
achieves this is written: 
NEVPLANE [ ] 
(SETQ PLANE-VALUE (ADD1 PLANE-VALUE» 
(RETURN (LIST (HKATOH 
(CONCAT (HKSTRING 'PLANE-) 
(HKSTRING PLANE-VALUE»] 
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where PLANE-VALUE is a globally available integer value, incremented on 
each occasion that a new plane is to be produced. 
As mentioned earlier, in the knowledge base, the condition which is to 
be inserted within the structure is given as the value to the plane; 
thus the condition (in the form of a list of words) is set as value of 
the relevant plane. i.e. (SETQ PLANE-l '(THIS IS A CONDITION» 
The other relevant information which is appended to each plane (that is, 
its address, list of ancestors and descendants, list of rule numbers to 
which that plane is associated, and interpreter information - dealt with 
later) are all held on the property list of that atom. Ve shall examine 
these in the following sections. Goals are of an identical form to 
conditions planes, excepting their form is GOAL-n. 
7.2.2.5 Structure Traversal -
Traversal of the knowledge base structure is important for both building 
the knowledge base and also for interpreting it. The process utilizes 
items held on the property list of the plane known as the LINKDOVN and 
LINKABOVE properties. Other non-permanent traversal information is also 
used. This non-permanent information is also held on the property list 
of atoms with PLANE-n or GOAL-n identifiers. The non-permanent 
traversal information consists of the following properties lists of 
addresses: 
INTERPRETUP - ancestors of plane or goal 
INTERPRETDOVN - descendants of plane or goal 
The function RESETKB, used in interpretation, can be set out in 
pseudo-LISP code as: 
RESETKB[ ] 
[For all planes and goals in knowledge base 
DO 
(PUTPROP x 'INTERPRETUP 
(GETPROP x 'LINKABOVE» 
(PUTPROP x 'INTERPRETDOVN 
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(GETPROP x 'LINKDOVN»] 
It sets, as initial values, the properties INTERPRETUP and INTERPRETDOVN 
to be, respectively, identical to LINKABOVE and LINKDOVN. Thus when 
system interpretation starts, the interpreter (which accesses 
INTERPRETUP and INTERPRETDOVN but not LINKABOVE and LINKDOVN) has full 
information allowing it to traverse the entire graph. To reduce the 
search space within which interpretation is constrained, information 
(i.e. particular ancestor and descendant addresses) can be removed from 
these two traversal properties. This removal is done by the function 
HARK which accepts as its sole argument, a list of addresses for one 
particular rule (the list is extracted by GRULE which searches the top 
level planes for the specified rule number and follows the LINKDOVN 
links returning the addresses of the relevant planes); thus in the 
previous example this list for rule number 1 (the first inserted) will 
be: 
«GOAL 1)(2 1)(3 1)(1 1» 
HARK uses this list to remove from the properties INTERPRETUP and 
INTERPRETDOVN all ancestor and descendant addresses: 
HARK [address list for particular rule] 
[FOR x in address-list 
DO 
(PUTPROP x 'INTERPRETDOVN 
(LDIFFERENCE (GETPROP x 'INTERPRETDOVN) 
address-list» 
PUTPROP x 'INTERPRETUP 
(LDIFFERENCE (GETPROP x 'INTERPRETUP) 
address-list»] 
(where LDIFFERENCE returns the difference between two lists). 
Such a marking procedure is essential, because where a goal has been 
effected it is normally useless to keep on trying to effect it in 
different ways (that is useless for normal interpretation not for 
accessing structural information in a question/answer mode). As an 
example take the following decomposed tree: 
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If A1 A2 A3 is followed, then it is no longer essential to test the 
paths which lead from B1 to B2 to A3 and from Cl to B2 to A3. Therefore 
MARK is applied to A3 to remove from B1 B2 and Cl all traversal 
information pertaining to A3. Unless these conditions are intrinsic to 
other rules, they will not be tested by the interpretation process until 
after the system is initialized by application of RESETKB. 
7.2.3 Interpretation 
The action of the interpreter can be explained by the use of two 
procedures, called DOVN and UP and the fact that a complex graph of the 
sort used in the knowledge base can be decomposed into a variety of tree 
graphs. 
7.2.3.1 Decomposition-
The knowledge base structure can be seen by the following simplified 
structure: 
In order to process this structure, it is decomposed into simple trees. 
Thus, if a is to be first tested, the search tree below this is: 
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~ ~ 
the search tree for the node b to be tested is: 
Note that is matter of indifference whether or not x is represented 
twice as a leaf node with the tree. Likewise, the decomposition will 
produce trees whose leaf nodes are above the origin. For example from 
w: 
and y: 
• 
(which is a tree where every node has only one successor), and x: 
~ D 
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~hich of these structures are being processed at any time depends upon 
the point in interpretation that the interpreter procedure is at. 
DOVN is the downward processing search procedure. For each of the top 
level conditions this function is applied to them and their successors. 
It takes the general form of: 
DOWN [SUCCESSORLIST] 
IF (CAR SUCCESSORLIST) = leaf node 
THEN 
ELSE 
ENDIF 
Add to known goals 
(IGNORE (GETPROP (CAR SUCCESSORLIST) 'LINKABOVE» 
(SETQ SUCCESSORLIST (COR SUCCESSORLIST» 
(DOVN SUCCESSORLIST) 
IF NOT (TRUE? (CAR SUCCESSORLIST» 
THEN 
ELSE 
ENDIF 
(SETQ SUCCESSORLIST (CDR SUCCESSORLIST» 
(DOWN SUCCESSORLIST) 
(DOWN (SUCCESSORLIST of (CAR SUCCESSORLIST») 
(DOWN (CDR SUCCESSORLIST» 
where SUCCESSORLIST is the list of a node's descendants. The procedure 
is, of course, a simple recursive process attempting to visit as many 
leaf-nodes as possible. The search along any particular branch is 
allowed or disallowed only depending upon the truth or falsity of the 
condition held on each branch, or whether any of the nodes have been 
"marked" by the function IGNORE which simply applies HARK to all the 
rules whose goal has just been proven. 
TRUE? is a function which determines the truth or falsity of the 
particular successor node under consideration. The pseudo-LISP code is: 
TRUE? [CONDITION] 
IF CONDITION already known to be false 
THEN 
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(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
IF CONDITION already known to be true 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
IF CONDITION is also a GOAL 
THEN 
IF (UP (ancestors of 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
ELSE 
Ask user and return 
as appropriate. 
ENDIF. 
GOAL» is 
T or NIL 
true 
The important point about this function is its use of the function UP 
when a GOAL is conceptually identical to the CONDITION under 
consideration. This accords with the use of the rules, as mentioned 
earlier, in a definitional manner. possible paths might be: 
~\ 
b~ 
If a3 is conceptually equivalent to b4, then the path a1 a2 a3~might be 
taken at which part the interpreter notes that a3 = b4. The function UP 
is then applied to b4, and since a2 and a1 are known to be true, a3 must 
also be true (since b4 has been effected; i.e. it has been proved 
"true".) Therefore the rule a1 a2 a3 a4 is effected, with the goal a4 
also being effected. 
The pseudo code for UP is almost identical to DOVN, as may be expected 
since it is only an inverted tree search. However, while DOVN searches 
for all possible leaves, UP must terminate when the first leaf is 
achieved. Since it is theoretically impossible to terminate a truly 
recursive procedure recourse must be made to the LISP stack to allow UP 
to return T, when a leaf is achieved. The pseudo code is: 
UP [SUCCESSORLISTJ 
IF (CAR SUCCESSORLIST) = leaf node 
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THEN 
ELSE 
ENDIF. 
manipulate stack, 
terminate procedure and 
(RETURN T) 
IF NOT (TRUE? (CAR SUCCESSORLIST» 
THEN 
ELSE 
ENDIF 
(SET SUCCESSORLIST (COR SUCCESSORLIST» 
(UP SUCCESSORLIST) 
(UP (SUCCESSORLIST of (CAR 
SUCCESSORLIST») 
(UP (COR SUCCESSORLIST» 
SUCCESSORLIST in this case is derived from the LINKABOVE properties 
rather than - as in DOVN - the LINKDOVN property list. 
7.2.3.2 Negation-
In many production systems, negation is not fully utilized. In the ELl 
program negation is used in several ways. Both conditions and goals can 
be negated within the system by prefixing them with the flag 'NIL': 
(NIL this condition is false) 
The ASK user function (called by the TRUE? function) notices this 
negation and uses it to simplify the questions that are being asked by 
removing the prefix from the rule element before asking the user of 
their truth. Thus if the element which is to presented to the user is: 
(NIL today is friday) 
the user will see: 
Is this true? 
:: today is friday 
answering "yes" will cause the system to conclude "no" and answering 
"no" will cause the system to conclude "yes". 
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The ELl system also incorporates this negation handling within the 
interpreter. It assumes that a negatively defined goal has precedence 
over a positively defined goal. 
TJhen the rule: 
IF (NIL applicant is disabled) 
(applicant works 30 or more hours per week) 
THEN 
(applicant is in part-time work) 
is being interpreted, the ELl interpreter will first try to determine 
whether the first condition has any rules in the knowledge base which 
define it either negatively or positively - that is, it is negatively 
defined if the negated version of the condition body appears as a goal; 
it is positively defined if that condition body appears as a non-negated 
goal. It does this by first searching for a goal "NIL applicant is 
disabled". If one exists it attempts to prove it; if proven then the 
interpreter tries to remove any rules from the knowledge base (with the 
IGNORE function) which have "applicant is disabled" as their goal 
because these rules are now redundant. This procedure is very effective 
in reducing the number of rules which exist within the knowledge base as 
possible contenders for future triggering. 
If there had been no incidence of the negated goal "applicant is 
disabled" in the knowledge base, then the system would try to find one 
which is not negated, and then try to prove it by testing it's 
conditions. If it is proven, then the negated goal is IGNOREd (that is, 
rules with it as their goal are removed from the knowledge base). 
In order to incorporate this negative processing, the function TRUE? 
described above must be extended: 
TRUE? [CONDITION] 
IF CONDITION already known to be false 
THEN 
(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
IF CONDITION already known to be true 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
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ENDIF 
IF CONDITION is negated 
THEN 
IF there is a negated corresponding GOAL 
THEN 
IF (UP (ancestors of GOAL» is true 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ELSE 
IF there is a non-negated corresponding GOAL 
THEN 
IF (UP (ancestors of GOAL» is true 
THEN 
(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
ELSE ;CONDITION is not negated 
IF there is a negated corresponding GOAL 
THEN 
IF (UP (ancestors of GOAL» 
THEN 
(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
IF there is a non-negated corresponding GOAL 
THEN 
IF (UP (ancestors of GOAL» 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
Ask user and return T or NIL as appropriate. 
7.2.4 Conceptual Matching 
It is necessary to apply some kind of conceptual matching to the 
conditions of input rules as they are input to ensure that the 
conditions which are conceptually equivalent but not textually 
equivalent are associated together. The general format of the operation 
was specified before. There are, within the system, two lists, CONLIST 
and NOTCONLIST, which respectively hold information concerning 
conditions and goals which are conceptual matches and secondly 
concerning conditions and goals which are not conceptual matches. 
Before rules are entered into the system these two lists are empty. 
However, as the system discovers that some conditions and some goals can 
be classified by the relationships "conceptual match" or "not conceptual 
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match" it adds them to the appropriate list. Having added them to these 
lists, the same relationships need not be computed in future. These 
lists are also added to during the "test" phase of knowledge base 
consultation. 
The computation of the relationship is as follows, by CONMATCH whose two 
arguments are the conditions or goals to be tested for a match: 
CONMATCH [STI ST2J 
IF ST1 ST2 ON CONLIST 
(RETURN T) 
ELSE 
STt ST2 ON NOTCONLIST 
(RETURN T) 
ELSE 
IF (CHKLST STt ST2) 
ask user if conceptual match exists 
IF user answers "yes" 
(PUTONCONLIST STt ST2) 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
ELSE 
(PUTNOTCONLIST ST1 ST2) 
(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
PUTONCONLIST and PUTNOTCONLIST are used to keep, respectively, CONLIST 
and NOTCONLIST up to date. CHKLST is the heart of the matching process; 
it is: 
CHKLST [X YJ 
Remove noise words from both X and Y 
IF (Ea X Y) 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
IF X smaller than Y in length 
THEN 
ELSE 
ENDIF 
LOOP 
(SETa SHALL-LIST X) 
(SETa LARGE-LIST Y) 
(SETa SHALL-LIST X) 
(SETa LARGE-LIST Y) 
FOR any letter in SMALL-LIST which 
appears in LARGE-LIST 
DO 
IF that letter starts a word or part of a word 
which appears in LARGE-LIST 
THEN 
(RETURN T) 
ENDIF 
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REPEAT until no untested letter match between 
SHALL-LIST and LARGE-LIST remains. 
(RETURN NIL) 
The reference to the removal of noise words is to those words like "IS", 
"TO" etc. 
7.2.5 Building The Knowledge Base 
Yhen the rules which the user wishes to input into the knowledge base 
have been entered into the system by the SETUP process, they are input 
into a PRETTYDEF (i.e. INTERLISP format) file (RULES.RULE) from which 
they can be read as separate S-expressions. 
There are three ways in which rules can be entered into the system, two 
methods using rules setup in RULES.RULE, and the third allowing extra 
rules to be input during the build process - particularly useful in 
"fine-tuning" the knowledge base. 
The first input method is to use the rules straight from the file: this 
is done by FROMFILE: 
FROHFILE [ ] 
[(LOAD 'RULES.RULE) 
(for x in RULE-COLLECTION do 
(INCORPORATE X)] 
where rule-collection is the list of rules held in RULES.RULE. 
INCORPORATE is the "control function handling rule input by means of 
GUPINC, TDINC and INSPR which add rules, respectively, 
(i) for the goal up 
(ii) for the top down 
(Ui) above 
as described above. The second method is by using the function 
READYMADE which can specify any of the existing rules in RULES.RULE and 
enter them; once again useful in "fine tuning" the knowledge base. The 
third, uses the same basic finish as is used in SETUP to allow 
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individual rules to be written and inserted into the knowledge base. 
As these rules are input the rule number is incremented so that each 
rule has a higher number than all previously input rules. This does 
lead to some lack of neatness - especially when some rules have been 
input and then deleted; this can be overcome by using the Reformat 
function which will clear up the knowledge base and overcome "gaps" in 
the numbering. 
The actual setting up of the knowledge base is the adding of atoms to 
LEVELLIST, together with a PLANE-n identifier, LEVEL-n identifier (or 
GOAL-n identifier), rule number and lists of ancestors and descendants 
using GUPINC, INSPR and TDINC. The skeletal LISP format for TDINC is 
given; the others have the same general characteristics. 
TDINC [INPUT-RULE RULE-NUMBER] 
(SETQ CONDLIST (CADR RULE» 
(SETQ TOPLIST (MAPCAR CONDLIST 'TOPSER» 
IF (NULL TOPLIST) 
THEN 
(RETURN NIL) 
ENDIF 
(ASSCOND (CAR TOPLIST» 
(SETQ CONDLIST (REHOVE (CAR TOPLIST) CONDLIST» 
(SETQ INCORPORATED-LIST (LIST (CAR TOPLIST») 
LOVERLEVEL 
(SETa CLIST CONDLIST) 
(SETa POSSIBLE-HATCHES 
(GTLKSTO (LAST INCORPORATED-LIST») 
(SETa LOVER-CONDS (HAPCAR POSSIBLE-MATCHES 'GTFADD» 
(For Y in LOVER-CONDS 
DO 
IF (CAR Y) = 'GOAL 
THEN 
(SETa LOVER-CONDS (REMOVE Y LOVER-CONDS» 
ENDIF) 
IF (NULL LOVER-CONDS) 
THEN 
(GO ANYMORECONDS?) 
ENDIF 
NEXTPOSSIBLE 
(For ZZ in CLIST 
DO 
(For ZZZ in LOVER-CONDS 
DO 
IF (CONMATCH ZZ ZZZ) 
THEN 
(ASSCOND ZZZ RULE-NUMBER) 
(SETQ INCORPORATED-LIST 
(APPEND INCORPORATED-LIST (LIST ZZZ») 
(SETa CONDLIST (REMOVE ZZZ CONDLIST» 
ENDIF 
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until condition associated) 
until condition associated) 
IF condition associated 
THEN 
(GO LOVERLEVEL) 
ENDIF 
ANYMORECONDS? 
(For X in CONDLIST 
DO 
(SETQ LEVEL (ADDl LEVEL» 
(INSCOND X LEVEL) 
(SETQ INCORPORATED-LIST 
(APPEND INCORPORATED-LIST (LIST X»» 
INSERTGOAL 
(SETQ GOAL (CAR (LAST INPUT-RULE») 
IF GOAL already on GOALLIST 
THEN 
(ASSGOAL GOAL RULE-NUMBER) 
ELSE 
(INPUTGOAL GOAL RULE-NUMBER) 
ENDIF 
Set links between inserted and associated conditions 
and goals using INCORPORATED-LIST 
(RETURN T) 
TOPSER searches the top level condition to determine whether its 
argument has a conceptual match there. GTLKSTO simply gets the LINKDOVN 
property list from a plane. GTFADD uses the address which is its 
argument to fine the name of a plane. ASSCOND is used to associate an 
input condition with an already existing plane. INSCOND associates the 
input condition on a new plane which is entered into the knowledge base 
(i.e. LEVELLIST). 
7.2.6 Annotating The Knowledge Base 
Annotations can be applied to the knowledge base. These take the form 
of pieces of text in the form of lists; the lists are formed by the 
function INPUTTEXT, using both upper and lower case, with paragraphing 
if desired. The function PPTEXT is used whenever these annotations are 
to be printed on the user's terminal. 
There are three types of annotation: 
(i) attached to an entire rule 
(ii) attached to one condition 
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(iii) attached to one goal. 
Currently, the annotation is attached to a rule by means of INTERLISP 
Hash-links; this allows a given atom to be related to another atom in an 
array. In the described system, the value of the second atom is the 
annotation. This method was utilized because, in the knowledge base, 
there is no entity which relates only to a rule as there is to 
conditions and goals (i.e. the latter are planes with the structure). 
The annotations to conditions and goals are held on the property list of 
those planes with those conditions and goals as values. This is 
currently suitable since annotations on the conditions are not 
particularly long or complex. However, this is an area of possible 
future development, especially if the system is to be used as a 
commen~ary upon legislation other than welfare rights. 
7.2.7 System Tools 
Vhile it is feasible that all rules to be input into the system are 
initially prepared and input without any recourse to amendment - be it 
deletion or alteration of the rules - it is more than probable (if not 
definitely the case) that various alterations will have to be made to 
ensure correctly derived triggering paths. 
One tool available to help search through the knowledge base is the 
SEARCH procedure which allows: 
(i) one or more incidents of a condition which contain a phrase 
or word to be found 
(ii) one or more rules to be deleted which contain a specified 
condition to be found. 
It has the form: 
SEARCH [string to be searched for] 
(for X in Rules in RULE.LSP 
DO 
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(SETQ TEMP X) 
(SETQ FLAG 
(STRPOS Y (EVAL X)] 
repeatuntil (NOT (NULL FLAG» 
finally 
IF FLAG = T 
(PRINl Z) 
ELSE 
(PRINl "string not found") 
ENDIF 
Various editing procedures are also contained within the system. They 
continue the INTERLISP notion of trying to integrate tools within the 
environment. Therefore rule, condition and annotation editing all 
access the INTERLISP editor. 
7.3 A NOTE ON LANGUAGE 
No claim can currently be made to the system being efficient, due in a 
large part to the fact that it was programmed in INTERLISP. For 
example, the use of EQUAL rather than EQ is a case in point. Both these 
functions carry out roughly the same task - testing if two S-expressions 
are equal. However, since EQ enquires whether the pointers point to the 
same objects and it is impossible to dump the knowledge base to a file 
and reload it with the same pointers pointing to the same objects, the 
program must utilize EQUAL which is substantially slower. 
String handling in INTERLISP is also particularly slow - and since so 
much of the ELl processing is string handling, the slowness of the 
system can be understood. 
Vhile other expert systems have also been produced in this type of high 
level language (but those use pattern matching rather than string 
processing techniques) it is by no means necessary - Pascal or Fortan 
could be used just as well. It is perhaps interesting, though, to 
briefly note just why we implemented the programs in lNTERLISP rather 
than, say, Pascal. 
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The major difference between INTERLISP and more procedural languages is 
the level of abstraction from the machine - LISP objects, collected into 
lists, are the prime data entities. These objects can be built and 
manipulated in much more complex ways than what have become known as 
'middle level' languages - Algol like languages and their perspective of 
data as numeric, character and pointer. The power of LISP can be seen 
from the ability of data to be both data and executing sub program. As 
well as this complexity of data structure, the interactive nature of 
INTERLISP allows easy programming and debugging and the ability to break 
into a program's execution, edit it and then continue execution with the 
edited program; also available are system packages which can be utilized 
by programs - the editing functions in the ELl program use the INTERLISP 
structure editor for instance. 
Given these advantages, though, the system is inefficient in comparison 
with middle level languages. The ELl system was written as a prototype 
and experimental vehicle - efficiency was not a consideration whereas 
ease of "bread-boarding" ideas was. I would therefore see that any 
future development of ELl would require translation into a middle level 
language now that techniques and methods have been tested. 
Some arguments have been proposed for the use of logic programming as 
the de rigueur language for IKBS research. Kowalski, for one, has put 
his position as: 
"There is only one language suitable for representing information -
whether declarative or procedural and that is first-order 
predicate logic. There is only one intelligent way to process 
information - and that is by applying deductive inference methods. 
The AI community might have realized this sooner if it weren't so 
insular. The data base community, for example, learned its lesson 
several years earlier." 
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[Kowalski, p44, 1980] 
Ye see this as harking back to the Vienna School and logical positivism, 
the Platonic belief in the certainty of mathematics [Kline, 1980J and we 
are not convinced that Kowalski's case is proven; we remain with 
traditional programming techniques. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FURTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT YITH RULE-BASED TECHNIQUES. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ye shall severely criticize rule-based legal IKBS systems in the next 
chapter and propose that for 'real life' law they are severly limited. 
Of course, that does not mean that these rule-based systems can have no 
utility at all simply that this utility is not that for which was 
originally aimed. The role of these systems, it seems to us, to be 
appropriate in only clerical areas - areas where rules are applied in a 
formalistic manner e.g. in bureaucratic situations. Any advice which 
can be got from them is limited to advice on "how to apply the rules". 
This, we argue in the next chapter, is not law. 
However, we should not write off rule-based systems completely; there is 
still a substantial market for easily accessible information about how a 
goverment department, for example, applies the rules. But, if we wish 
to argue against these rules, we should still go and see a lawyer. 
In this chapter we accept the limitations and posit how, even with them, 
we might develop the rule-based system described earlier in the text. 
8.2 SHORT TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELl PROGRAM 
One immediate concern is 
improvements which analysis 
primarily to carry out some program 
of the current version of the program and 
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plans which already exist have shown to be useful developments. 
can be discussed under the headings of: 
These 
a) extending the program to cope with 
meta-processing required 
the more complex 
b) extending the program by implementing an assertion facility and 
an explanation facility 
c) upgrading the importance of the SETUP facility - enabling it for 
instance, to check rules before input to the knowledge base. 
d) examine the feasibility of utilizing an algorithmic language. 
8.2.1 Extending Heta-Level Control 
In earlier sections, we noted that one of the current areas of research 
in IKBS is the introduction of means of meta-Ievel control over 
interpretation of the rules in the knowledge base. This has been 
described as allowing control by reasoning about the content of the 
rules. Ye have also described the problems which ELl has in deciding 
just what the content of its rule elements are because those rule 
elements are based in natural language. Ye have also pointed out, 
though, that ELl utilizes what might be described as reference by 
consequent - used especially in the negation handling interpretation 
process. Here, we wish to describe some further strategies which we 
intend to incorporate within the EL! program which allow the expert to 
insert rules within the knowledge base. 
Ye noted above that there are basically two methods of incorporating 
meta-rules within an IKBS system. Georgeff [Georgeff, 1982] proposed 
the use of a separate control module, whilst Davis [Davis, 1980b] 
proposes that elegance is achieved if the meta and object level rules 
are processed by the same interpreter. This latter is the method which 
- 166 -
we use in the following. 
Ve start by adding an extra rule element keyword which can be recognized 
by the interpreter - the TRY keyword. This keyword can appear only in 
goal elements: 
IF (this is a condition) 
(and this) 
THEN 
(TRY this goal) 
The TRY keyword specifies which goal an attempt should be made to 
effect. Thus, when the interpreter meets a goal which is prefixed by 
TRY, it will test whether the antecedent conditions are true, and if so, 
will try to effect goals in the knowledge base which are of the textual 
format which follow it. The type of strategic information which we 
might wish to add to the knowledge base might be: 
IF (NIL applicant is entitled to supplementary benefit) 
THEN 
(TRY applicant is entitled to urgent needs payment) 
which says that: 
"even if the applicant is not entitled to supplementary benefit it 
is worth trying to ascertain whether an urgent needs payment can be 
got." 
Thus, this kind of rule does not actually decide anything - it only 
allows the expert to guide the search strategy. This is, of course, an 
important aspect in systems with large knowledge bases which might 
contain several thousand rules. 
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Since these TRY rules are handled by the interpreter, their failure will 
aid the pruning of the rule base, just as their success will aid the 
move towards the desired goal. 
The ELl interpreter 
conditions in the 
presently begins processing by accessing the 
top level of the knowledge base. Adding these TRY 
rules requires amendment of this - the interpreter should look first at 
the goals in the knowledge base and attempt to effect the TRY rules, and 
only after these have been removed (pruned) from the knowledge base 
should the top level conditions be serially processed. 
This TRY strategy might also usefully be applied if the knowledge base 
was to be partitioned into modules, each modules containing a self 
contained block of rules. In this case, the TRY rules would reference 
those blocks of rules rather than other consequents. 
This idea of adding keywords to the rule elements seems to be 
particularly powerful, substantiating the view that logic programming 
languages (e.g. PROLOG) which do not allow the user to manipulate the 
interpretation procedure are perhaps not the most effective programming 
languages for IKBS research. As another example of this use of keywords 
we might suggest the use of PERHAPS to allow processing with information 
which is not fully true or fully false: 
IF (PERHAPS this might be true) 
THEN 
(TRY such and such a goal) 
which can be read as: 
"if it might be the case that ••. 
whose content is ••• " 
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then try effecting the goal 
This allows a sense of degree of belief without the complexity of 
Bayesian values. 
A third strategy is to allow the rules 
compartmentalized. Ye might invoke 
keyword: 
IF (conditions warrant it) 
THEN 
(DO applicant has child rules) 
in the knowledge base to be 
a block of rules by using a DO 
There are several advantages which might accrue from this. First, the 
context problem [Goldstein, 1977] is to an extent overcome - we can 
treat these blocks of rules as we might treat subroutines or procedures 
by specifying which pieces of information can be passed to the rules and 
what the results being passed out are. Thus, we will not be concerned 
about the triggering of rules in other parts of the knowledge base or 
other blocks. The context problem arises either because the knowledge 
base is too large or we wish to change the view which we have - at one 
point we ask questions about the applicant, perhaps, and next about 
their parents or dependants/lodgers etc. Yith complex changing 
viewpoints, it is very difficult to ensure that side effects from 
triggering rules do not cause undesired effecting of other goals. 
The second advantage comes from being able to treat a large knowledge 
base as smaller blocks of rules the rules are easier to handle, 
remember, edit and suchlike; this advantage should not be underestimated 
when the number of rules in a knowledge base gets over 100, say. 
One of the problems discovered with the present system is that 
concerning easily updating the legislative rules held in the system. 
This is important in legal systems; for example, since the ELl rule base 
was set up, the legislation has been amended on several occasions and 
also new rulings have been made by the Commissioners and the Secretary 
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of State. Currently ELl only allows searching of the rule base by 
string handling means - just as a word processor operates. Yhile this 
is useful, we wonder whether it is ideal, or whether some means of 
"conceptually indexing" the rules in the knowledge base should be used 
with more advanced tools (such as [Reboh, 1981]). In many ways, this 
problem is similar to that problem of updating some data bases. No 
approach used there has shown itself to be overtly superior, but one 
possible idea is to use the notion of describing the general area by 
means of a classificationary tree (as used by Dewey indexes in 
librarian's systems) and indexing individual rules according to this. 
The problem of "losing" individual rules within large knowledge bases is 
perhaps a problem which will appear more frequently in legal IKBS 
systems due to the expected size of their knowledge bases. It is 
therefore, most certainly an area of future research. 
8.2.2 Query By Assertion And Explanation Facilities 
Much has been made of the abilities of expert systems to allow 
explanation and to allow query by assertion. The ELl program currently 
contains program stubs which can be easily extended to allow these 
facili ties. 
Ye do not however see these as being essential requisites of the system 
at the present time. Ye feel that although easy to add, we are not 
quite sure what people who would interact with the system actually 
require. It has been stated by Slay ton that legal retrieval systems 
should be designed to accord with the working practices of lawyers: 
Yhat is needed is a pause in funding and development while emphasis 
is given to serious study with four objectives: 
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1. research into the nature of legal thought processes; 
2. careful experimentation with operating retrieval systems to 
determine their exact capabilities and to compare their results 
with those of manual searching; 
3. careful juxposition of conclusions concerning thought processes 
with the constraints imposed by, and the results of, electronic 
retrieval; and 
4. development of the experimentation with advanced artificial 
intelligence systems (such as the HcCarty TAXHAN project) to 
determine whether and in what respects they constitute a line of 
development worthier of pursuit than development of established 
retrieval systems." 
[Slay ton, 1974] 
Slay ton's remarks caused some controversy in Jurimetrics Journal at the 
time, but discussion with lawyers has led me to believe that there is a 
distinct difference between what, for example, these lawyers would like 
and what they actually receive from legal retrieval systems. Therefore, 
it seems sensible to spend some time, in the development of the ELl 
system, to ascertain the requirements of the "para-legal" users of these 
programs rather than simply to provide facilities that - as a computer 
scientist - we think is needed. Below we deal with this further. 
8.2.3 Utilizing An Algorithmic Language 
There are two main reasons why lNTERLlSP is not the most ideal language 
for a system which is seen as a developmental vehicle. They are a) 
speed and b) portability. 
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Ve have already mentioned some of the problems of speed the use of 
EQUAL as opposed to EQ just being one of the problems - but a second 
problem is that of portability. Put quite simply, there are so many 
dialects of LISP, and so few implementations of INTERLISP that it is 
difficult to allow potential users of such programmed systems to use 
them. 
Obviously, a portable language is a desirable feature. It wi 11 allow 
users to use the system as an "expert system shell", as a research aid, 
and (as suggested by one lecturer on a course on "Computing and Law") a 
teaching aid. The only problem is deciding which language to use; that 
decision will be made later, but since the ELl system requires access to 
the interpretation element of the production system it is unlikely to be 
one of those languages which provide a ready-made interpretation 
facility (e.g. PRO LOG and suchlike). Also, since it is difficult to 
justify using as similarly as esoteric a language as INTERLISP as a tool 
for reasons of portability, it seems sensible to use one of the commonly 
available and used programming languages - say, Pascal. 
8.2.4 Revise The SETUP Facility 
The SETUP facility was originally conceived as simply an editing and 
rule writing module, but it is becoming obvious that its role might well 
be increased. Particularly important would be the extraction of the 
conceptual matching module from the BUILD module, and the implementation 
of this within the SETUP module. 
One of the main reasons for this is that such a substantial amount of 
processing time is taken up by conceptual matching within the BUILD 
procedure, that the BUILD process takes a substantially large amount of 
processing time (particularly when the number of rules being 
incorporated is over, say, 100). By putting this processing in the 
SETUP module, it could be carried out much more efficiently, and 
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probably much more elegantly. 
The SETUP module could also have the facility to carry out the indexing 
of rules mentioned above. Doing this as the rules are extracted from 
the legislation etc. should make it convenient for the expert. 
8.2.5 Conclusion 
Ye reiterate that the ELl program is not seen as a commercially 
implementable system; useful legal expert systems (outside perhaps of 
small, legally uncontroversial areas - perhaps, advising on the "easy" 
aspects of House Conveyancing while leaving complex cases to the expert) 
are still some distance off. Also, since this project has been carried 
out by one person working alone, the programming solutions provided are 
only one person's solutions - we do not see that they are necessarily of 
any greater effect than other possible solutions. 
However, we do feel that the project has a substantial amount of 
"research space" open to it, and that the indications of future 
extensions mentioned above are only a small proportion of possible 
extensions. 
8.3 MAN/MACHINE CONSIDERATIONS 
8.3.1 Lawyer/machine Interaction 
In IKBS research we currently face the problem of being able to design 
useful problem-solving programs with high levels of expertise in domains 
where that expertise is rare and expensive while being unable to 
persuade all their potential users of their utility. For example, the 
MYCIN system although available to doctors in Stanford Medical School is 
not used by those for whom it was intended. A listing in [Bond, p179, 
1981] illustrates how few current expert systems are actually being used 
by their proposed recipients, and the point has also been made by 
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\loolgar: 
"An initial surprise in surveying the expert systems literature is 
the marked discrepancy in available reports about the state of 
research in expert systems. In addition to the extraordinary 
optimism of some reports, there is considerable caution, not to say 
pessimism, about the achievements to date. On the one hand, expert 
systems is generally regarded as one of the most active and 
exciting areas of AI research. On the other, there is considerable 
concern about the fact that the field currently faces "fundamental 
problems". In terms of the number of expert systems in existence, 
we can find claims that "nearly fifty" had been built by early 
1982. In the less popular press, however, it is admitted that 
despite impressive performances by some of these systems, only four 
of the best known systems are in regular use. 
respondents, even this is an overestimate!" 
[\loolgar, 1984] 
According to some 
\loolgar references [Davis, 1982], [Duda, 1983] and an interview with 
Szolovits at HIT to support the point. 
The HYCIN system was designed with substantial input from a medical team 
and the design work was carried out in a medical school. Not only were 
these positive environments available, but as Shortliffe states: 
"HYCIN has also been developed with more attention to human 
engineering than is typical of much of the AI field. The goal has 
been to develop mechanisms for interacting with medical 
professionals who are not only unfamiliar with AI but have never 
used computers before. HYCIN's rules have therefore served as a 
highly useful representation scheme since they can be individually 
retrieved in order to explain why questions have been asked or to 
justify aspects of the program's advice. As AI applications for 
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use by scientists and other individuals become more common, HYCIN 
may well suggest some useful guidelines for interactions with 
novice computer users." 
[Shortliffe, p376, 1975] 
Given such input by potential users of HYCIN and such an optimistic view 
of its "user-friendliness", the question remains - why is the system not 
currently being used by the doctors for whom it was designed? 
Ye can examine several possible reasons: legal, usefulness, 
convenience, complexity which can all be seen to be relevant to both 
medical usage and legal usage of computers. 
8.3.1.1 Legal Problems -
It is perhaps ironic that, in discussing the use of computers in the 
law, the reverse must also be considered. The computer since its 
inception, though, has caused legal problems, from the problem of the 
copyright of software [Tapper, 1973] to the use of computer output as 
evidence in court [Sizer, 1982]. Many of the problems for IKBS programs 
have arisen because 
a) computer programs are error-prone: 
"For several years 
expressed about the 
now there 
problems 
has been considerable disquiet 
of designing and producing large 
software systems. This concern has even been called a crisis and 
has resulted in the use of the term 'software engineering'. It is 
said that there is little software which is reliable and which is 
based on the best techniques currently available. 
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Reliability should be thought of as a relative term, being related 
in some way to the application under consideration. In 
applications such as air traffic control the computer system must 
never fail; in other cases, some level of performance slightly 
short of this may be acceptable." 
[McGettrick, 1982] 
b) their operation is opaque to the user. In fact, their operation is 
even opaque to other 'maintenance' programmers: 
"A fundamental problem with program maintenance is that when a 
change is made it often introduces unforseen side effects. Fixing 
a bug has a substantial chance of introducing a new bug. 
Often a change has system-wide ramifications which are not obvious 
This situation is made worse because the maintainer of 
repairer is often not the person who wrote the original code 
Maintenance changes tend to deteriorate the structure of programs, 
often making them more complex and more difficult to maintain next 
time." 
[Martin, p8, 1983] 
The former problem is one which has haunted computer scientists from the 
earliest days of programming and turns up in all situations where 
programming is used. The latter problem arises in part from the former 
(that is, the user has to take on trust that the program does what it is 
supposed to do) and also from the fact that computers are more and more 
being used by people who have very little real conception of their 
operation or construction. 
The particular problems which accrue when IKBS programs are used is that 
the user is expected to "know" less than the machine. Vhile this is 
satisfactory when the system produces reliable and correct advice, it is 
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not satisfactory when unreliable and incorrect advice is produced. 
It has been suggested by various researchers that providing 
capabilities within IKBS programs will overcome this 
opaqueness. While this does have an intuitive appeal, we 
explanation 
problem of 
feel that 
explanation capabilities are most valuable to those who might already 
understand the program's operation (ie its sphere of knowledge); they 
will not be properly comprehendable by those with a naive or novice view 
of the problem domain. There is, of course, no real evidence to believe 
that the problem of opaqueness has been completely overcome by the use 
of the expert system methodology; perhaps the available evidence argues 
against such a view. For example, HYCIN's knowledge base was so tender 
to rule input that a committee was set up to decide which rules were to 
become part of the generally available knowledge base of the system: 
"Although we are eager to permit experts to teach the system new 
rules, there are potential dangers in letting anyone have 
uncontrolled access to HYCIN's knowledge base. We therefore 
do not yet automatically store new rules as part of the permanent 
Consultation System. Instead they are stored temporarily in a file 
assigned specifically to the expert from whom the rules were 
acquired. Whenever that expert uses the system he may load his 
personal files and they are automatically added to HYCIN's 
knowledge base. HYCIN project members have an opportunity to 
examine both the new rules and the English text from which they 
were derived, however, before the new knowledge is transferred from 
the expert's personal file to the permanent Consultation System." 
[Shortliffe, p344/5, 1975] 
Shortliffe briefly dealt with the legal problems, such considerations 
being important in the U.S.A.: 
"For example, some physicians may be reluctant to consult the 
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program until they know the legal ramifications of following or 
ignoring HYCIN's advice. Hospital lawyers may be able to provide 
assistance with such questions. If there has been any test cases 
on the subject, however, they have not been nationally prominent, 
and it is therefore difficult to state with certainty who must 
accept responsibility. I have stressed, however, that HYCIN is a 
tool for the physician and not a replacement for his own clinical 
judgement. It therefore seems likely that the ultimate legal 
responsibility will rest with the clinician rather than with the 
computer system or its developers." 
[Shortliffe, p333, 1975] 
Campbell has noted that the professional (who will interact with these 
machines) is expected, by legal principle, to: 
"maintain a competent knowledge about the tools and standards of 
his profession [Rogers, 1979], and that he should not neglect to 
make use of state-of-the-art technology in his field there this a 
means of avoiding injury or damage [L.T., 1945]." 
[Campbell, 1982] 
Campbell also writes of the particular problems for 
professional inherent in IKBS systems: 
the legal 
"Firstly, expert systems set expert knowledge into a framework that 
may be qualitatively different, as experienced by the trainee 
professional, from the framework in which his traditional education 
is conducted. Therefore, unless he has had a significant exposure 
to methods of diagnosis or reasoning in his subject that are 
explicitly tied to rules of the forms R1 or R2 (rather than 
conducted by analogy or example, which is normal in medical and 
some other professions), he may (i) have no feel for what is behind 
a given output from an expert system, or (ii) be unable to 
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formulate questions whose answers are essential for the prevention 
of an injury and which an expert system may be fully able to 
provide, or (iii) fail to understand that a particular publicized 
enhancement of a rule-base allows certain expert systems to solve 
new classes of problems in his field, or (iv) appreciate that 
proprietary system A to which he has bought access cannot solve a 
class of problems that a rival system B can handle because of its 
state-of-the-art features. These problems contain some messages 
for deans of medical and other professional schools, in connection 
with planning and curricula." 
[Campbell, p9, 1982] 
Ve do not know how such legal problems might be resolved; but such is 
the situation with the problems created by so much of todays new 
technologies. Presently though, the legal position is unclear about who 
is financially liable for damages from a system which produces incorrect 
advice; it may be possible to sue the computer scientist just as easily 
as the legal user of the system. 
Concluding then, there are many legal problems which relate specifically 
to the use of computers and the introduction of computers to areas which 
were previously free from "programming". The area of legal knowledge 
engineering is but one more. 
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8.3.1.2 Persuading Potential Users -
Shortliffe has seen the problems of the acceptance of MYCIN as being 
related to the educational needs of the medical profession, and that 
educational programmes: 
"demonstrate that physicians will learn to use computers and accept 
their role, if the benefits of the technology outweigh the costs of 
learning to use the devices and the costs of integrating them into 
one's normal routine." 
[Shortliffe, p17, 1982]. 
Teach and Shortliffe reported upon the effects of a two day tutorial 
used as a means of testing the "before" and "after" views of doctors 
concerning medical computing systems. It is interesting that the 
physicians on the course were not found to be generally opposed to the 
use of computers on the ward, but were to those which appropriated their 
own responsibility for patient care: 
"Applications that were presented as aids to clinical practice were 
more readily accepted than those that involved the automation of 
clinical activities traditionally performed by the physicians 
themselves. The distinction between a clinical aid and a 
replacement seems to be important to physicians and suggests design 
criteria and preferred modes for the introduction of computing 
innovations. This perspective is consistent with historical 
attitudes regarding the adoption of other kinds of technological 
innovation. For example, computerized axial tomography has been 
widely accepted largely because it functions as a remarkable useful 
clinical tool, providing physicians with faster and more reliable 
information, but in no way infringes on the physician's 
patient-management role." 
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[Teach, p553, 1981] 
In many situations it is possible to overcome the opposition to new 
technology which appropriates a job skill (for instance on the factory 
floor), but there are as Nickerson has written other groups: 
"Some computer systems are used because their users have no choice 
in the matter. That is to say the users must use the system or 
they cannot perform their jobs. Examples include airline 
reservation systems, hotel reservation systems and sales 
registration systems. My interest ••• is in systems that do not 
have to be used and in users, or potential users, who are not 
required to be users by virtue of their jobs. This delimination of 
the problem will have the effect of focusing attention primarily on 
people, such as managers and professionals, who tend to have 
considerable latitude in how they perform their jobs, as opposed to 
technicians and clerical personnel whose tasks are likely to be 
more tightly prescribed." 
[Nickerson, p469/70, 1981] 
Perhaps one of the most persistently used IKBS program of the current 
generation is the DENDRAL system [Lindsay, 1980]. This system can be 
seen in this "technical aid" light, it carrying out a large amount of 
tedious processing which had to be done by hand previously. The DENDRAL 
system therefore aided the user without detracting from the user's 
control over what should be done with the results. 
Similarly, the introduction of legal information retrieval systems was 
carried out without detracting from the managerial or decision making 
role of the lawyer. Having searched through one of these system's data 
bases, it is still required of the lawyer to analyze it. 
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But in legal knowledge engineering, the question arises: what if no 
lawyer wishes to use a system which actually tells him how to go about 
his daily work? Because, that is the very goal of IKBS programs - they 
extract the expertise from one person and give it to another, in the 
manner that an apprentice must accept the expertise of his or her 
craftsman. 
It is currently held by Teach and Shortliffe that the answer to this 
problem is - in the medical field, anyhow - to: 
"Strive to minimize changes to current clinical practices. The 
system should ideally replace some current clinical function, 
thereby avoiding the need for an additive time commitment by the 
physician. The system should ideally be available when and where 
physicians customarily make decisions." 
[Teach, p556, 1981] 
There have been several descriptions of the "legal decision process" 
written; it has been noted that: 
"electronic legal retrieval systems designed to assist in, or 
substitute for, a key part of the legal thought process have been 
developed with little understanding of what the process is, and 
what the consequences of changing it will be". 
[Slay ton, p21, 1974]. 
It seems that this approach has succeeded with legal retrieval systems 
despite this lack of analysis (but see some of the problems alluded to 
in [Larson, 1980]); but we should not expect it to occur with IKBS 
programs. 
- 182 -
Yhat we are implicitly saying is that the future research of the EL! 
system cannot suffice with purely computer science goals (that is, more 
effective representation, easier and quicker access of that represented 
information) but that we should note the point often made by the 
recipients of computing technology - that computer scientists should 
design what they need rather than what is perceived to be the need. In 
order to do this, we believe it is essential that the system should 
become the research focus of both computer scientists and lawyers, 
rather than the situation at present (where only the author has had any 
say in the design). 
Ye do see a time lag between these first experiments in legal knowledge 
engineering and the eventual (useful rather than novelty) implementation 
of such systems in less than trivial domains; in this time period we see 
the EL! system undergoing many changes in design specifically to 
incorporate the needs of the legal profession. For, after all, we can 
justify this process in such a complex area as the law by recourse to 
Buchanan: 
"However, there is no reason to believe that the expert's first 
conceptualization is complete or correct. The expert will begin 
with classical textbook statements that are reasonably certain and 
well accepted. But in domains like mass spectrometry and medicine 
there is still a gap between what the textbooks say and what is 
needed for expert performance. Similarly, there is no reason 
to believe that the programmer's first implementation is correct 
and appropriate. There is tremendous potential for misinterpreting 
what the expert says when the programmer has little understanding 
of the domain. A more serious problem is that the internal 
representation chosen by the programmer, on the basis of initial 
conversations with the expert, will be appropriate for ideas to be 
incorporated later. Thus it is not surprising that new 
applications programs often need to be completely rewritten after 
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their initial implementation." 
[Buchanan, p418, 1979] 
Accepting that we do not see the current ELl program as the final 
solution, though, the important problems of lawyer/machine interaction 
to be solved will relate to the following: 
a) who will use the IKBS program 
b) why will this person want to use the program 
c) where in the user's workload is the system to be directed 
d) what specific representational problems will this user have 
that is, what is his/her view of "the law" and need it be 
integrated into the system 
e) how can the usefulness of the system be quantified 
f) how can the use of the system be improved 
Of course, there may well be more than one type of user; therefore, in 
each case the above points will need to be investigated. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE LIMITS TO RULES AND LOGIC IN LEGAL KNOVLEDGE ENGINEERING 
"Logic, Law and Switzers can be hired to fight on 
anybody's side." 
16th Century Proverb 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a substantial debate in certain areas of computing research on 
the possibility of intelligence being rule-based. The view is prevalent 
in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence as we have mentioned 
earlier. This view has also been seen in jurisprudence as we described 
earlier when providing a model of Neil MacCormick's thesis. In 
mathematics we might suggest that the debate is about the search for a 
decision procedure or means of effective computability. It is my 
contention that these three views - I shall call them all formalist -
are representative of the same error in epistemology. That error is one 
of failure to see that human understanding and constructions are the 
outcome of an essentially social process: life, we can say, is not 
effectively computable. And understanding that error, if accepted as 
such, leads to a position which can be put quite clearly as: 
the legal process cannot be captured by formal methods 
This means that none of the attempts which have been made so far to 
represent "the law" will be successful. No computer technique or 
logical system has the capacity to describe the legal process. Such a 
perspective is controversial and needs to be argued. In this chapter I 
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present this argument and suggest that this argument offers legal logic 
programmers a clear statement of a position which is contradictory to 
the one which they provide: if they accept my argument, then they 
cannot accept the utility of formalizing the law. 
Since the research on the EL! project began, the same rule based 
approach has been utilized by other researchers. Ye might almost say 
that it is becoming a commonplace to attempt to incorporate "legal 
rules" into legal expert systems (or at least to consider doing it). As 
examples of this ongoing research, we can point to two other projects 
which have used, to some extent or other, rules as the primary entity in 
their knowledge bases (i.e. [Cory, 1984] and [Yaterman, 1981]). Since 
the work on the ELl project began, difficulties and problems have arisen 
which suggest to me that rule based methods are of limited use in expert 
systems which attempt to provide advice built upon models of "rule 
orientated legal reasoning". Ye posit that this limitation is a direct 
result of the incompatability between logic and the legal process - put 
simply, "law is not logical". It seems that other researchers, too, are 
becoming disillusioned with these methods, but unsure from where they 
arise or how they can be solved (for example the personal note from a 
member of the Alvey/DHSS Demonstrator project [Lapham, 1985); in this 
chapter we hope to clarify the problem and pose limitations on the 
solution to that problem. 
Yhen the ELl project originally began, it seemed obvious that the law 
and legislation could be represented as relatively simple (even if 
sometimes verbose) rules. Implicit in this belief was a following of 
that school of jurisprudence termed legal posivitism, a school which 
posits the legal rule, rule interpretation and rule following as the 
principle elements of the legal process. 
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By capturing enough of these rules from legislation, case reports or 
secondary legal sources, it was thought possible to represent "the law". 
The capturing was to be done by the expert. This means that we did not 
see the legislation as the only basis for the expertise the 
encapturing of the rules was to be done by the expert interpreting the 
legislation, together with any information from secondary sources, case 
reports or indeed, the personal opinion of the expert. 
Given such a potentially large number of concepts and rules, it might 
seem as though the major research problems would be in the physical 
handling and storage of the rules in other words, research would 
become orientated towards solving computer 
examples of these problems, imagine trying to 
science problems. As 
ensure that the rules 
triggered in the correct manner (a problem known as truth maintenance of 
the knowledge base) when the rule corpus became as large as, say, two 
thousand rules. Another problem was seen to be the need to prune the 
corpus as the interaction between lawyer and system took place 
obviously we do not want to test rules which have little relation to the 
problem in hand since this only increases the time of interaction and 
boredom of the users. Other computing problems are seen to be of 
paramount importance if we accept that it is valid to represent the law 
as a collection of rules; we gradually move the research question from 
"what are we trying to encapsulate" to "how do we manipulate what is 
encapsulated". 
The distinction between the two questions is most decidedly important 
with the first question we state that we are unsure about first, what 
the law is and second, how it might be represented in a computer 
program. The second question states that we can ignore any 
jurisprudential aspects of the research area and concentrate upon the 
computer science aspects. 
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In Chapter 5, above, we 
approached the field of 
suggested that at least one 
legal knowledge engineering 
project had 
in what was a 
grossly simplistic way. 
research question, and 
Their approach was directed towards the second 
they felt that any legal or jurisprudential 
aspects might be safely ignored. The research for the ELl project is 
novel in that we have always attempted to handle both of these questions 
concurrently - developing a rule based expert system on one hand, and 
trying to come to terms with just what it was that "the law" is. Since 
we felt, and still feel, that commercial legal expert systems are some 
distance from general applicability, this particular research 
methodology was considered essential. Here, we shall try to enunciate 
some of the conclusions - but primarily those of a negative nature -
which have been reached. Conclusions which have not emanated from other 
IKBS legal research. It should be noted that this position is novel in 
the drawing together of the philosophy of law, philosophy of logic and 
computer science; and also, it is novel as a pointer to the most 
appropriate kind of legal knowledge engineering which might be achieved 
given - as we argue - the limitations of rule based approaches. Ve 
suggest that the novelty of this position is more than superficial; it 
offers a radical new insight into the potential of the research field. 
It is the only statement from a researcher in the field of legal 
knowledge engineering which, so to speak, swims against the tide. That 
tide is epitomized by the view that by the refinement of our tools 
whether conceptual or actual - we will some day have systems which can 
provide answers to legal questions. I swim against this orthodox view 
and present the heterodox perspective that no computer tools or methods 
will ~ have the capacity to represent "the law" or "answer legal 
questions". The novelty of my position is, in part then, that I propose 
the most limiting constraints upon the research field yet stated. 
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It is important to recognize also that this position was not one which 
was taken as an a priori presumption; it grew out of the research 
problems cast up from the attempt to marry computing and law. Such 
questions as, what is law, how does legislation stand in relation to 
language to logic, what are the "intelligent" aspects of IKBS 
techniques, were those which led to the conclusions dealt with in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
I shall start by examining the view of the legal rule which I took when 
beginning the research, then how this was incorporated into the ELl 
program. After that, I shall present a criticism of the very notion of 
the validity of "legal rules" as concrete entities which can be handled 
by legal expert systems. Then a return to Prolog and "real law" which 
should be seen as a challenge set to the orthodoxy from the heterodoxy. 
9.2 CLEAR RULES 
It has long been held that the very notion of just what a legal rule is 
is problematical. For instance we can see the reference to them by 
Twining and Hiers: 
"Ve are now sailing near some very deep waters. Vhat is involved 
in 'understanding' a situation, a rule, or the law is a central, 
and extremely problematic, question of social theory. In studying 
interpretation of rules we are here faced with a dilemna: we 
cannot reasonably expect to plumb the depths of philosophical 
questions about the nature of understanding social phenomena, but 
neither can we pretend that such questions are irrelevant." 
[Twining, p167/8, 1982] 
And we can also see the more neo-Platonic rules of H.L.A. 
which he classifies as primary and secondary. Ve 
neo-Platonic rules because Hart's rules seem to possess 
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Hart, rules 
can term them 
an ontology 
which is separate from the creators or enforcers of the rule. For 
example, Hart writes: 
"At any given moment the life of any society which lives by rules, 
legal or not, is likely to consist in a tension between those who, 
on the one hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining 
the rules, and to see their own and other persons' behaviour in 
terms of the rules, and those who, on the other hand, reject the 
rules and attend to them only from the external point of view as a 
sign of possible punishment. One of the difficulties facing any 
legal theory anxious to do justice to the complexity of the facts 
is to remember the presence of both these points of view and not to 
define them out of existence. Perhaps all our criticisms of the 
predictive theory of obligation may be best summarized as the 
accusation that this is what it does to the internal aspect of 
obligatory rules." 
[Hart, paa, 1961] 
The reader of Hart's "Concept of Law" will look hard to find a full 
definition of the qualities of these rules (he states [Hart, pS, 1961), 
for example, "Vhat does it mean to say that a rule exists?" but fails to 
provide a non-circular answer) but will be aware from reading through 
the text that, to Hart, they seem to have, what we might call, "a life 
of their own" - the rules are the objects which control human behaviour: 
rules which people follow or circumvent. But although the conjunction 
of these primary and secondary rules are, to Hart, the essence of law 
there is a further clarification - law has an "open texture". This open 
texture is an answer to the rule-sceptic who would accuse Hart of 
formalism: 
"In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two 
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social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great 
areas of conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to 
themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social 
issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an 
informed, official choice, issues which can only be properly 
appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case." 
[Hart, p127, 1961] 
The legal system, then, is composed of rules which classify, but carry 
this out to an extent depending upon the fact situation to which it is 
applied. As Hart claims: 
"All rules involve recognizing or classifyng particular cases as 
instances of general terms, and in the case of ever thing which we 
are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear 
central cases, where it certainly applies and others where there 
are reasons for both asserting and denying that it applies. 
Nothing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a 
penumbra of doubt when we are engaged in bringing particular 
situations under general rules." 
[Hart, pl19, 1961] 
A successor to, and indeed refiner of, Hart's thesis is Neil HacCormick 
who, as we stated in Chapter 4, presents a model of judicial behaviour 
which is both analytic and normative - it attempts to describe how the 
judiciary arrive at a decision through a deductive procedure (with legal 
rules as the elements of the deductive form) and also upholds this as 
the correct manner in which legal rules should be applied. Thus 
HacCormick poses strict logic as the method of legal rasoning. He 
states: 
"Scotsmen and Scots lawyers by contrast [with English lawyers) have 
taken some pride in being logical and in having a legal system 
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which exhibits the virtues of logic. 
.... The Scottish system, and indeed the Civilian systems 
generally, are less likely to be subject to that mistake [of using 
observations which might be true in the non-technical logical sense 
but which are false in the technical logical sense]; but perhaps 
such systems are at risk of suffering from the converse 
equivocation. Since legal reasoning is a form of thought it must 
be logical, i.e. must conform to the laws of logic, on pain of 
being irrational and self-contradictory. 
'logical' in the technical sense." 
[Maccormick, p40/1, 1978] 
That is, law must be 
Generally, then, the framework within which I operated was that of "the 
oxford school" of legal postivism, a school which claimed primacy for 
rules and their technical application (by which I mean that their 
prescription for how the law ought to operate was technical - the judge 
should attempt to apply the rules in as logical and strict a manner as 
possible there should be no recourse to any notions of, for example, 
"justice". This 
application of 
held in British 
justice arises, they would claim, from strict 
the legal rules). This framework is the general view 
and American (and perhaps other) jurisprudential 
thought; it is a framework which it is natural for a computer scientist 
to initially accept. 
One of the most basic assumptions of the Oxford school is that there is 
such a thing as a "clear rule" - it is a rule which can, to a large 
extent, be applied without further thought. It is, to Hart, the core of 
certainty which "nothing can eliminate"; to HacCormick it is the major 
premise from which the judicial argument must and does proceed. Later 
in this chapter I shall suggest that the very idea of a clear rule of 
law is an invalid idea, and that it cannot be used successfully to 
provide legal expert systems which can predict real judicial decisions; 
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in the next section we shall see how the concept of a clear rule was 
encapsulated in the ELl program. 
9.3 CLEAR RULES IN ELl 
First we must point out that when we speak of a clear rule here we do 
not necessarily mean a logical sentence (though we might); rather we are 
usually speaking about a piece of text which might run as: 
"Read the rest of this text" 
Others might wish to formalize such a sentence into the predicate 
calculus or deontic logic, but this was never our aim. 
What is important about clear rules is that they can be written and 
interpreted with the minimum of conufusion and that, to an extent, they 
almost (but not quite) "step forward and claim their own context". 
Also, and this is correlated to the lack of confusion, they are held to 
be commonly the case: these are the rules of law over which there is no 
or 11 ttle argument. It is only in what are termed "hard cases" that 
there is a problem of interpretation (involving the penumbra of doubt); 
in the easy cases the core of certainty is to the fore. 
It was relatively easy to describe these clear rules (or rather, the 
core of certainty of these rules) by simply handling them as sentences 
which either singly or in mutliplicity make up an antecedent or 
consequen t • 
The traditional production system interpretative strategy was not 
considered suitable for interpreting these rules. Firstly, because 
there would be much complexity in positioning individual rules within 
the listing of productions (since in the traditional method 
interpretation begins at the head of the list, incrementing down until 
one rule is triggered and then restarting at the head of the list 
again). An implicit context is thus awarded to each rule in the corpus 
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which, unfortunately, requires a large amount of manipulation from the 
builder of the knowledge base. In fact, any architecture will have a 
context problem, but we used a hierarchical structure to try and 
overcome some of these problems (we do see, by the way, that a more full 
investigation of that structure is required; and would hope to carry it 
out in the future). 
But what of the "penumbra of doubt"? This was provided 
annotations to the individual rules or parts of rules. 
might typically cover aspects such as where the rule was 
by attaching 
Annotations 
derived from 
(Act, Section etc. or secondary legal source) or a fuller explanation 
of what the rule might mean or any qualifications which might be added. 
The user, then, when asked whether a certain rule element is true or not 
could call up the (i) annotation linked to that rule of which that 
antecedent was a part, and (ii) the annotation linked to that 
antecedent. Thus an element of doubt can be incorporated the 
intuition of the user can be left as the final decider. 
Hart's model was of a two part rule system - primary and secondary 
rules. Since the ELl system was not attempting to model the entire 
legal system it did not require "secondary rules [which] are all 
concerned with the primary rules themselves [as] they specify the ways 
in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, 
eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively 
determined." [Hart, p92, 1961]. I therefore did not include any such 
refinement. 
I have attempted to give the flavour of the ELl program here with 
specific reference to its closeness to a particular school of 
jurisprudence, not to fully describe it; of course, earlier parts of 
this text give more details. In the next section, we present a 
criticism of that jurisprudential school, important since that school 
offers the orthodox view of legal interpretation and prediction. 
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9.4 A CRITIQUE OF CLEAR RULES 
Hart and HacCormick posit that we can view the law as a collection of 
rules which seem, at least to me, to have 'an existence of their own'. 
It is not unfair to see these two writers as agents of a formal or 
technical view of the law. It is also not unfair (especially when we 
remember Vhitehead's statement that, "The 
characterisation of the European philosophical 
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato") to 
safest general 
tradition is that it 
suggest that this 
formalism is of a neo-Platonic nature; the rules are seen to be set 
apart from any human participation in their invention and in their 
application. Of course, the individual rules may be amended (Hart 
speaks of secondary "rules of change") but the outline, "idealized" form 
of a legal rule remains. Analogously, the triangle may have different 
dimensions, but the Platonic geometer will still have a purer conception 
of "triangle" than the individual example. I do not use the descriptor 
"neo-Platonic" as a positive adjective, since I see it as an attempt to 
avert my eyes from real life; Bertrand Russell suggested that the 
division between Platonism and non-Platonism seemed 
between those who preferred perfection to real 
preferred real life to perfection. 
to be a division 
life and those who 
The problem I see with this view of clear legal rules is that it ignores 
the social determinators of the process: by presenting a technical 
methodology as to how the judiciary ought to reason they present an 
essentially conservative view (a point which I take up when looking at 
the Prolog project again, below) which bears little relation to 
empirical evidence. By empirical evidence, I mean the written case 
reports - the substantive law - which present a completely different 
story. By looking at how the judiciary actually adjudicate, we can see 
that there is very little evidence for the notion of a clear rule which 
they can apply without further thought. 
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My first argument is borrowed from Moles [Moles, 1985] critique of Hart 
and restatement of Austin and Aquinas. Later I develop my own argument 
pertaining to the British Nationality Act (1981). Briefly expressed, 
Moles suggests that we cannot look at "the rule" in isolation - we can 
only see its existence within a social context since it depends upon its 
interpretation for the context in which it is to be applied. I shall 
later return to just what this means for legal rule-based expert 
systems, for now I shall try to concisely re-present his argument. 
Moles takes a piece of legislation which might on first appearances 
appear to be the statement of a clear legal rule. The legislation (for 
those who might wish to formalize it) is a provision from the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 Sl (1): 
Sl (1) Yithout prejudice to the jurisdiction of the High Court, on an 
application by a party to a marriage a county court shall have 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction containing one or more of 
the following provisions, namely, -
(a) a provision restraining the other party to the marriage from 
molesting the applicant; 
(b) a provision restraining the other party from molesting a 
child living with the applicant; 
(c) a provision excluding the other party from the matrimonial 
home or a part of the matrimonial home or from a specified 
area in which the matrimonial home is included; 
(d) a provision requiring the other party to permit the applicant 
to enter and remain in the matrimonial home or a part of 
the matrimonial home; whether or not any other relief is sought 
in the proceedings. 
(2) Subsection (1) above shall apply to a man and a woman who are 
living with each other in the same household as husband and 
wife as it applies to the parties to a marriage and any 
reference to the matrimonial home shall be construed 
accordingly. 
Now this seems, at least to me, to be a relatively clear piece of 
legislation. Ye might think of it as an example of Hart's secondary 
rule with a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt. No doubt the 
legislators who drafted it too, would have considered it relatively 
clear. But did the judiciary think so? Unfortunately not, as Moles 
points out. The relevant cases in the argument are ~ v ~ [1978] 1 
All E.R. 821, Catliff v Jenkins [1978] 1 All E.R. 
Johnson [1978] 1 All E.R. 841. 
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836 and Davis v 
Holes first points to the case of ~ v ~ where the trial judge took 
the view that it was unreasonable for Hrs B to continue living with Hr B 
(Hrs B have left the joint home, of which Hr B was tenant, leaving the 
children there) and ordered Hr B to leave the home within 14 days. Hr B 
appealed, an appeal which was allowed, the decision being arrived at on 
the fundamental issue of the proper construction of SI. A summary of 
the judgements is: 
(1) the judges all agreed upon what the main facts and points of 
law were 
(2) the approach to the meaning of the legislation is technical 
it does not concern itself much with the social conditions of the 
case - only with the meaning of the law 
(3) that technical investigation of the law is mainly concerned 
with trying to fit SI into other existing legislation (in fact 
primarily of property rights, and the jurisdictions of the High 
Court and County Court). 
In effect the bench decided that the provisions above had very little 
real effect - that although there existed a clear rule, it was of little 
consequence since other clear rules negated it. This was markedly 
different from a second case which came before the Court of Appeal 
within a few days of the delivered judgement in ~ v~. Once again, in 
this second case, a women had left the joint home which was tenanted by 
the male partner. 
In this second case, Cantliff v Johnson, the trial judge had ordered 
removal of the male from the home (adding power of arrest without 
warrant to the order). The Appeal judges overruled this order in a 
similar manner to that of B. v B. - that is, in a technical light 
without any real investigation of the social facts. Yet, whilst the 
first appeal judges had interpreted S1 to have little real effect, in 
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Cantliff v Jenkins they found that it did in fact have effect - it was 
only effective against a person with no right or interest in the 
property, they decided, else it would have a transfer of property 
effect. And such a situation, they seemed to imply, could not possibly 
be. 
Thus, we can pause here, and note that so far the provision has been 
interpreted in two separate cases in two separate ways. The judicial 
interpretations have, I would contend, little relationships to my view -
as a layman let it be admitted - of what the provision is meant to do. 
The matter arose again within a month in the Court of Appeal, in the 
case of Davis v Johnson. Davis left the home with her two year old 
child and had Johnson ordered to leave. Johnson applied to have the 
order lifted (after B. v B. and Cantliff v Jenkins); it was and Davis 
returned to the woman's refuge. However, on this occasion the result 
was somewhat different, with the Court of Appeal rejecting (strongly, in 
fact: "1 am afraid that the judges sitting in B v B must have 
misunderstood the law as it is applied in the Family Division") the 
decisions of ~ v ~ and Cantliff. 
Rather than looking at the purely technical way in which the provision 
relates to other legislation and substantive law, the Court of Appeal in 
Q!Y!! v Johnson looked to the broader perspective and the social 
circumstances. In effect, they looked at the same provision as the two 
previous courts had, but discovered that there was a different legal 
rule! Or, to be quite precise, four went for this different rule, and 
one stated a preference for that of B. v B •• 
Ye can present an empirical account: 
There is first the layman's interpretation - "a", we shall say - of 
the rule (we shall give it a count of 1 - a conservative figure). 
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Then comes the case of B. v B. "b" - where a different 
interpretation of the legal rule arises (we shall give it a count 
of 3, one for each of the judges on the bench). 
Then Cantliff - "c" - where another interpretation arises (once 
again a count of 3 for the unanimous members of the bench). 
Then Davis - "d" - where a specially constituted Court of Appeal of 
five produce two rules (4 for "d" and 1 for interpretation "b"). 
In total then, our "clear rule of law" has a scorecard of: 
Interpretation 
a 
b 
c 
d 
Score 
1 
4 
3 
4 
So where, I might ask, is the core of certainty and the penumbra of 
doubt which we might expect to find? Cynically, I might suggest that 
there is a large penumbra of doubt and no core of certainty. 
Now one argument which might be put against this is that, "Yes, clear 
rules are not always clear - but they are clear until the judiciary 
change them". In which case I would say, there is no difference between 
our posi tions simply that you call a clear rule something which, to 
me, isn't clearl To me, the existence of the rule depends upon the 
personal view of the judge positing that rule it is created, 
discussed, manipulated by the judge as an abstract concept. It is not 
pulled out from the law reports and legislation on that judge's 
bookshelf - it has no concrete life which leads to it being spotted 
automatically by any number of judges. 
Another argument might say, "Yes, there are parts of the law which it is 
very difficult to formalize; we should therefore limit our attempts to 
find clear rules to certain sub-parts of the law. Perhaps tax law." 
This is of course an argument which is presented by HcCarty when he 
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writes: 
"it is tempting to start with the 'simplest' possible legal issues, 
such as the subject matter of the first-year law school courses. 
Ve might therefore be tempted to investigate assault and battery 
cases from the first-year torts course ••• , or offer and acceptance 
cases from the first-year contracts course. But these cases are 
'simple' for law students primarily because they draw upon ordinary 
human experience. Paradoxically, the cases that are most 
tractable for an artificial intelligence system are those cases, 
usually involving commercial and corporate matters, which a lawyer 
finds most complex." 
[McCarty, 1980b] 
My argument rests upon the assumption that there is no difference 
between any judicial interpretation of legal rules, whether they arise 
from tort, contract or commercial or corporate matters. The problem of 
finding the clear legal rule in any of these areas is insurmountable, my 
argument states, because there is no clear rule which cannot be 
overruled, forgotten or created by the judiciary. Take another example 
from Moles, an example which relates to tax cases, one of those cases 
which McCarty might consider most tractable. The case is Vestey v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners (nos! and ~ [1979] 3 All E.R. 976. 
Vestey concerned access to a foreign-based trust and income tax due upon 
income from the fund. The crown claimed that where an individual had 
either received or had power to enjoy the income from such a fund, the 
person became liable to taxation on the whole of the income of that fund 
no matter how much had actually been paid. The previous ruling in 
Congreve v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] 1 All E.R. 948 had the 
unanimous support of the House of Lords upholding a unanimous Court of 
Appeal (a sure indication of a "clear rule") yet in Vestey it was 
overruled. Holes points to the importance of this decision: 
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"Thus change was called for, and if there was any doubt that the 
change was substantial, rather than marginal, it would probably be 
dispelled by the opening words of the article by Anthony Sumption 
in the British Tax Review: 
"Congreve v Inland Revenue Commisioners had stood for nearly 
32 years as one of the great landmarks in the development of 
the law enacted by [the relevant section of the Act] •••. Now 
Vesty v Inland Revenue Commissioners (Nos ! and 2) has come 
like an atom bomb to blow Congreve away and obliterate all the 
fortifications in defence of the Revenue which had been 
constructed upon the foundation of that case." 
Ye all know that atom bombs are not used to make minor 
adjustments." 
[Moles, 1985] 
Yet another tax case, Y.T Ramsey Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1981] 1 All E.R. 865 is dealt with by Moles. Briefly, Ramsey was 
concerned with tax avoidance, whereby a series of transactions were 
carried out in order to reduce a tax commitment. The previously held 
ruling ruled that each step in the whole transaction process must be 
seen in individual terms - if each individual transaction was legal, 
then the whole transaction was legal - that is, the tax avoidance scheme 
was legal. However, with Ramsey, the court took a decidedly different 
tack - they overrruled that previous clear rule, and stated that it was 
now valid to look at the individual steps as being part of one larger 
transaction. Looked at this way, the tax avoidance scheme was 
considered illegal. 
Moles strategy of actually looking to the weekly reports is an 
instruction which is worth more than the individual examples he cites 
(it is surprizing how many philosophers of law manage to get by on a 
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handful of cases from the pre-war years). By taking up Holes' strategy, 
any number of useful examples can be found. But, of course, one 
requires the proper perspective in order to find the examples; a 
perspective which appears to be missing from Vasserstrom, when in the 
following he looks to the individual decision framed in logical terms, 
rather than the general pattern. Vasserstrom quotes the following from 
Fuller: 
"The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. 
And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty 
and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty 
generally is illusion and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind 
the logical form lies a judgement as to the relative worth and 
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate 
and unconscious judgement, it is true and yet the very root and 
nerve of the whole proceeding." 
[Vasserstrom, 1961J 
and then comments: 
"Vhy, since common-law courts have been deciding cases for over 750 
years, did the theory's inaccuracy remain hidden until the 
twentieth century? Again, the answer is soon found. If one were 
to look no further than the opinions that judges write to accompany 
their decisions, it would not occur to one that the decision 
process could be anything but deductive. For it is one of the 
curious features of Anglo-American case law that regardless of the 
way in which a given decision is actually reached, the judge 
apparently feels it necessary to make it appear that the decision 
was dictated by prior rules applied in accordance with canons of 
formal logic." 
[Vasserstrom, p17, 1961] 
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Ye might suggest that the inaccuracy of the theory over the past eight 
centuries has not remained hidden. The confusion was clearly answered 
by John Austin in the Lectures (Austin, Vo13, 1863J; and the real 
confusion lies, as Moles suggets, with the Oxford School of 
Jurisprudence, and in particular the complete misunderstanding of John 
Austin's position by H.L.A. Hart (a misunderstanding now accepted, it 
should be noted, by Hart's defender, Neil MacCormick). 
Of course, the cases we have borrowed from Moles and presented here have 
all been successful overrulings of previously "clear rules". 
Examination of case reports leads me to suggest that this rule breaking, 
manipulative process, is continual, though not always successful; many 
are the attempts of members of the judiciary to overrule previous 
decisions which are not successful (and this is related to my position 
that the very dichotomy of "easy cases" and "hard cases" is false). I 
can present one such case as the attempt by Lord Scarman (in Sidaway v 
Bethlem Royal Hospital Governers [1985J 1 All E.R. 643) to overrule the 
"Bolam Rule", a rule which holds that doctors, to act professionally, 
need only behave as a responsible number of their fellow professionals 
might reasonably behave in that situation. Scarman made specific 
reference to judicial decisions in certain States of the USA and in 
Canada; he also made specific reference to secondary materials. For 
instance an academic article, of which he said: 
"This case, which has now been approved by the District of Columbia 
Appeal Court in Crain v Allison (1982) 443 A 2d 558, is discussed 
learnedly and lucidly in an article by Mr Gerald Robertson 
'Informed Consent to Medical Treatment' (1981) )' LOR 102, on which 
I have drawn extensively in reaching my opinion in this appeal. 
The author deals so comprehensively with the American, Canadian and 
other countries' case law that I find it unnecessary to refer to 
any of the cases to which our attention has been drawn, interesting 
and instructive though they are, other than Canterbury v Spence and 
- 203 -
a case in the Supreme Court of Canada, Reibl v Hughes " 
Unfortunately, for Scarman LJ, his view of the rule was not accepted by 
other members of the Court, and that new and revised ruling did not come 
into being. But his comments tend to imply that Hart's secondary rules 
are not quite so slavishly followed, if at all, as he might imagine. 
This critique, it should be noted, does not say that the concept of a 
legal rule is without use. I am not saying that we should not speak of 
legal rules. Vhat I am saying is that we should be careful to remember 
that legal rules are objects (or rather "abstractions") of discourse, 
not objects with a concrete nature which we can mysteriously formalize 
and "find" in the legislation or the weekly law reports. 
Before we turn to discussing just what this view of the judicial process 
means for legal expert systems, I might point out my view, which accords 
with that of Holes, on the technical application of rules which ignores 
the social situations of the receivers of judicial decisions. The early 
Appeal Courts made little mention of the physical factors which were 
involved in the cases; for example, in ~ v ~, Bridge L.J. related the 
facts: 
"In the last year or two the relationship between these two parties 
has seriously deteriorated. There have undoubtedly been incidents 
of violence between them It is unnecessary to go into the 
matter at any length. In short, Hrs B's case was that Mr B had 
behaved so badly towards her that the relationship between them was 
at an end and there was now no prospect of reconciliation." 
Vhen, in Davis v Johnson the social factors were taken into account, we 
learn something of the the rationale behind the making of the 
legislation, a point noted by Denning M.R. about the previous 
decisions: 
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"The two decisions aroused consternation. Protests were made in 
responsible quarters. It was said that Parliament had clearly 
intended that these women should be protected; and that this court 
had flouted the intention of Parliament. So much concern was 
expressed that we have called together a full court - a court of 
all the talents - to review those two decisions; and, if satisfied 
that they were erroneous to correct them." 
The social factors were less formally, yet more graphically, described 
by Denning M.R.: 
"The judge said that there were two instances of extreme violence 
of a horrifying nature. On one occassion the man threatened her 
with a screwdriver. He said he would kill her and dump her in the 
river. He kept a chopper under the bed and threatened to chop her 
body up and put it into the deep freeze." 
My point is, that we should be careful lest a desire for formality makes 
us forget that there is a world in which legislation and the legal 
process are of paramount importance. Below, we point out that some 
research in legal computing might tendentiously be described as of an 
extremely conservative and anti-democratic nature. 
9.5 CLEAR RULES AND LOGIC IN LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEMS 
9.5.1 Negotiation Not Clarity 
Implicit in the critique of clear legal rules above was a view of what 
the legal process is. I will express it here, by enunciating its 
points. 
First; there is no part of the law which is not constructed by social 
negotiation. Thus there can be no neo-Platonic legal ideals (be they 
rules, principles or whatnot) to which general legal recourse can be 
made, and therefore there must always be confusion over the meaning of 
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any legal idea or judgement. 
Second; the role of a good lawyer is not to determine "the law" but to 
represent his or her client by persuasion of the judiciary involved in 
the case. The lawyer does this by presenting a rational argument: that 
is an argument which uses points which are considered valid in that 
court - in the same way that [Patterson, 1982] considered valid role 
behaviour and which are constructed by trying to find previous 
judgements or "points" of law which might be interpreted in a favourable 
light to the client. Barristers do not accept any given rule of law 
(unless they wish to); rather they try to find ways of circumventing it 
by recourse to the particular facets of the case: the barrister is a 
rule-breaker. It is this factor which is most important in stating that 
rule based methods are not the most powerful ways to build legal expert 
systems; for the more powerful strategy will always be the rule breaking 
strategy. In the ELl system some attempt was made to overcome the lack 
of this strategy by use of annotations - but those can only clarify a 
rule, not suggest a new one which can readjust the interpretation of the 
knowledge base. 
Third; the judiciary are not constrained by any notion of stare decisis 
if they do not want to be. Ve saw how Lord Scarman, for example, tried 
to overcome the views of previous judges by making recourse to an 
academic article about non-UK law. Even if the judiciary did want to 
apply strict canons of stare decisis (and there is no evidence to 
believe that they would wish to give up their "judicial creativity"), 
due to the very nature of things (the problem of language and personal 
viewpoint) they would be incapable of doing so in as full and consistent 
a manner as, say, MacCormick claims they do and ought to do. Few 
members of the judiciary would propose that "the law" is ever so simple 
that it can be applied in a formal way; this view of law says that we 
should not ask them to try. 
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Fourth; the application of the law can best be seen to operate in 
layers. 
(i) At the lowest layer is the person who might have an issue which 
can best be adjudicated by law - since the legal process is so 
expensive this person will have little option but to forgoe proper 
solution to their problems. This is the group which must "accept 
the rules" provided by the legal system. 
(ii) The next layer are those who can afford a proper legal 
solution to their problems either by dint of wealth, or that 
their solution can be found in one of the cheaper courts (such as 
the Small Claims Court in the UK) or the state makes provision for 
their case to be heard (by Legal Aid or ex parte hearings in the 
UK) and who thus have access to the legal process. This group 
has the ability to break the rules to a limited degree. 
(iii) Third, is the layer which is - it sometimes appears above 
the law, and who thus have a prime opportunity to make the "clear 
rules" of law even when opposed to those in group (ii). In this 
grouping we can place large and very wealthy corporations such as 
IBH, with their ability, for example, to outmanouevre anti-trust 
laws by putting a large number of high quality lawyers onto a case 
to apply delaying startegies (see for example [Halik, 1975] and his 
chapter entitled "A Lawsuit a Day keeps Justice at Bay"). Also, we 
can place large insurance companies in this bracket; they can 
choose the legal case upon which they decide to go to court -
ensuring that the case has the best chance of success and that if 
successful, it will offer a legal ruling of future advantage to 
that company: many are the stories of insurance companies making 
out of court settlements in the final stages of a case - the 
payments are made to stop a new unwelcome ruling being made. The 
greatest degree of rule manipulation (excepting judicial 
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creativity) arises from this group. 
Fifth; whilst the previous four are basically sociological, we must not 
forget the philosophical overview. Ye claim that the Austinian view of 
law as a sovereign power providing adjudication upon the meaning of 
legal rules is a much more sophisticated and correct view of the law 
than offered to us by Hart's "fresh start". Legal rules, to my 
perspective, have existence only in their enforcement; it is possible to 
discuss what a rule might be, but it is never possible to decide what a 
ruling will be until it is given and that action implies that power is 
available to enforce it. 
I propose, then, that this view of law is not one which is consistent 
with computer systems based upon rule based methods because these 
systems present only rules they cannot present rule breaking 
strategies. Neither, as a collorary, can they present rule supporting 
strategies, which are, in both criminal and civil litigation, a 
necessary opposition to the attempted rule breaking of the appellant's 
or defendant's counsel. The ELl system, judged by the standards of real 
law, must be a failure. 
It should also be noted that this idea of a clear rule has far reaching 
implications, for we can see the same strategy involved in the logical 
description of law as we see in the use of clear rules. In fact, a 
logical sentence is just another form of clear rule - it contains no 
contextual information, it is a piece of law which is supposed to 
explain its own context, and which, its proponents have argued, is not 
open to negotiation. As we have argued earlier, the perspective that 
logic is of that nature is naive and incorrect. 
9.5.2 The Ouster Clause - A Problem For Formalization Of Law 
It is our contention that logical methods are not appropriate for 
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handling the law, since the real problem of law is not the clarification 
of individual legal terms from the legislation, but the control of the 
judiciary. If we wish the judiciary to apply the "rules of law" with 
the purpose intentioned by the legislators, we cannot do so by giving 
them "clear" rules of law since they will simply use "common law" 
arguments to interpret these terms. And, since the common law exists 
only as a large collection of legal texts, commentaries and legislation 
it is not difficult to find supporting evidence for any position which 
the individual judge might wish to hold. Note, for example, how Lord 
Scarman in Sidaway went to an academic article concerning law in North 
America to bolster his argument: legal textbooks would not normally 
suggest this as a correct source of U.K. common law, but that didn't 
stop Lord Scarman. 
Legal expert systems are, of course, involved with prediction of the 
judicial decision. And such prediction can only occur when there is a 
clear pattern of past events: some have suggested behavioural 
techniques [Schubert, 1963] and [Haines, 1922] has suggested that 
personal knowledge of the members of the bench is the best form of aid 
to prediction. Others have suggested that prediction can only occur 
when there is a clear formalization of the legislation which the 
judiciary cannot but fail to understand - they will be compelled by 
clarity to apply the rules in the desired manner. 
The predictive method used by the EL! project was a weak form of the 
behavioural technique. Ye suggested that by using the interpretation of 
the lawyer as a means of building the rule corpus - and allowing any 
annotations that the expert thought appropriate - that the expert might, 
due to the very nature of being an expert, be able to weakly predict how 
the judiciary would interpret and apply the rules of law. Ye suggest 
now that, due to the very nature of legal rules, even this weak 
prediction is too weak: it is only useful as a means of discovering how 
a bureaucratic organisation might apply rules. 
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Formalizers of law, however, would argue with this suggestion. They 
would claim that strong prediction can be achieved from a proper 
normalization of the law. Clarity of legislation - they would claim -
is the aim which is important. Ye wish to suggest in this section that 
the ELl project was closer in understanding the true situation regarding 
the need to interpret the legislation and then input it into an expert 
system rather than as, for example, the Prolog project claims is the 
requirement to simply normalize the legislation. Ye intend to do this 
by recourse to the idea of am "ouster clause". Ye shall outline what it 
is, give a brief description of the way it has been applied and then 
point out that one exists within the British Nationality Act (1981); the 
existence of this brings into substantial doubt, the claim to be able to 
formalize a piece of legislation. 
9.5.3 The Ouster Clause 
Administrative law is, broadly, the 
governmental power. Thus this 
law relating 
law deals with 
to the 
the 
control of 
powers which 
departments of a government have, and how they ought to be applied. The 
British Nationality Act (1981) would be described as one piece of 
administrative law, dealing as it does with the way in which the Bome 
Secretary (or his agents) can dispense or deny British Citizenship. 
Administrative law is thus concerned, in part, with power and its 
alloca t ion. 
In any application of power, it is to be expected that there will be 
disagreement over the way in which it is applied. There thus exists the 
need for a body to adjudicate upon the conflicting claims; claims which 
may well relate to payments made by the social welfare agencies, the 
regulation of landlord and tenant relationships, or to provide 
employment protection. This adjudication could have been left to the 
existing court system as the body of administrative law built up, but 
there were a variety of reasons why it was not left to the court system. 
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First was the view that the court system would not be able to cope with 
all the disputes, and that the cost of servicing these disputes would be 
substantial. There was also, as one commentator suggests, "the feeling 
that the courts might not be altogether sympathetic to the content of 
some of the legislation, having restrictively interpreted similar 
legislation in other areas." Vhatever the reasons, it was decided that 
independant (from the government departments, that is) Tribunals were 
the better alternative to the court system. One such area which has 
these tribunals is immigration. 
Vhatever the reasons for the use of tribunals, they had the pratical 
effect of attempting to keep the judiciary out of public policy 
operation. This restriction on the judiciary was not welcomed by them 
in the inter-war years, was accepted in the war and immediate post-war 
years, and is now subject to much judicial hostility as most 
commentators agree [de Smith, 1980]. The problem for the legislators 
has been to keep the judiciary out of this public policy operation; the 
method which they have attempted to use has been the ouster clause. The 
ouster clause is a piece of text which has been inserted into the 
legislation with the intent of precluding judicial intervention. 
However, it has been noted that these formulae have had little effect 
they have been ignored or over-ruled by the judiciary. 
Now, we have been arguing that the legal process is principally a 
process of social negotiation; this negotiation occurs, with regard to 
ouster clauses, in a running battle between the legislators and the 
judiciary to formalize a clause which will have the desire effect. 
Thus, not only the meaning of the words which are contained within the 
clause, but also the practical effect which they might have has been 
taken into account. Thus, the legislators have understood that the 
legal text is not sufficient, but that the expected countering 
strategies of the judiciary must be taken into account a perfect 
example of negotiation, we would argue. As examples of some of these 
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clauses we can look to those 
judiciary completely; others 
rather than exclude judicial 
classification from [Craig, 
response. 
which have attempted to exclude the 
have been tried which attempt to limit 
intervention completely. Ve use the 
1983J and his analysis of the court's 
Finality Clauses: these are clauses which attempt to render the 
effect of a tribunal as "final" or unnassailable. The courts gave 
these short shrift by a variety of methods - for example, Denning 
L.J. cncluded that they only affected appeal, not judicial review. 
Even this limited effect of the clauses is now viewed as out of 
date. 
"No Certiorari" Clauses: Craig [Craig, pS18, 1983J writes of these 
clauses: "Part of the reason for legislative dislike of judicial 
review was that the courts would overturn decisions for reasons 
redolent of a Dickensian caricature. Technical error was seized 
upon and verdicts quashed with an excess of vigour that bordered 
upon the pedantic. The legislature responded in a number of ways, 
one of which was the insertion of no certiorari clauses within 
statutes. Judicial response to such terms was not wholly 
aggressive: the courts acknowledged that they had been 
overtechnical. Jurisdictional defects continued to remain 
unaffected by no certiorari clauses; the courts still struck them 
down." 
"Shall not be Questioned" Clauses: this type of clause means what 
it says, and was often used in conjunction with no certiorari 
clauses. Of them, Craig [Craig, p520, 1983] writes: "Any hope 
that persevering parliamentary draftsmen might have had that this 
formula would work where all else had failed was to prove 
unfounded." 
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"As if Enacted" and "Conclusive Evidence" Clauses: these were 
relatively crafty means of putting a statutary order or a 
minister's decision on the same level as a piece of legislation and 
thus, since the judiciary cannot overrule legislation, immune from 
review. It had some success in the early part of this century but 
has passed out of fashion. Craig anyhow considers that it is 
unlikely that it would be successful if brought back into usage 
"in the light of the interpretation placed upon other attempts to 
exclude review, one would hesitate to put too much reliance on 
them" [Craig, p521, 1983J. 
So, we argue that there is much in law which is not part of the 
legislation; the legislation, although clearly stated, does not seem to 
have much effect upon judicial review of administrative and tribunal 
practice. But the Prolog team think otherwise. They believe that a 
useful predictive expert system can be built by simply interpreting the 
legislation (and, according to [Cory, 1984] having this done by a 
computer science student rather than a lawyer, it should be noted) and 
inputting this into a logic program. We argue that this is naive, for 
the British Nationality Act (1981) too has an ouster clause, and as we 
have seen above, ouster clauses seem to have no effect. (Not only that, 
but the section containing the clause is self contradictory - in logical 
terms - and would provide a substantial problem to logic programmers.) 
We argue, then, that even if the Pro log team did manage to fully 
formalize the Act, it would have little predictive power in that part, 
at least. This, we argue, is a strong rebuttal of the ability to 
axiomatize an Act of law. 
The ouster clause in the British Nationality Act (1981) is in Section 44 
(2); the logical contradiction between 44(2) and 44(3): 
44 (2) The Secretary of State, a Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor, 
as the case may be, shall not be required to assign any reason for 
the grant or refusal of any application under this Act the decision 
on which is at his discretion; and the decision of the Secretary of 
State or a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor on any such application 
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shall not be subject to appeal to, or review in, any court. 
44(3) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of any court 
to entertain preceedings of any description concerning the rights 
of any person under any provision of this Act. 
Ve suggest that only by recourse to an understanding of the debate over 
ouster clauses can the logical contradiction between the two pieces of 
text be understood. That will always be outside the ken of any expert 
system which contains only axiomatized legislation. 
The courts have, for the record, already (given the time scale) carried 
out judicial review on several cases; this review has been done in the 
following reported cases. It is important to note that if the ouster 
clause operated as .!..! "logically" should; these ~ should not have 
been considered for judicial review purposes. 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Yates, 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List), 11 Harch 1985 (reported 
on LEXIS). [In this case the difficulty of isolating the 1981 Act 
from the 1971 Act is shown - thus an axiomatization of the 1981 
Act, if such a thing were possible, could not be formally or 
logically understood without a similar axiomatization of the 1971 
Act, which would require further axiomatization ••• etc. etc.] 
The Queen v The Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Haheswary 
Chelliah, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List), 21 February 
1985, (reported on LEXIS). [In this case, the judge termed the 
argument proposed by the Secretary of State as being an "over 
legalistic costruction" - the judge preferred the common sense 
construction, it seems, rather than a technically (perhaps 
logically) correct construction]. 
Smita Kiritkumar Brahmbhatt v Chief Immigration Officer Heathrow 
Airport Terminal 3, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 12th December 
1984, The Times. [In this case the judiciary involved themselves 
in considering the proper construction of sections of the 1981 Act 
- obviously the ouster clause has not worked.] 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Parveen, 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List), 23 October 1984 (report 
by LEXIS). [In this case the judge took the view that he could not 
enter into discussion of the meaning of the 1981 Act: "In any 
event, it seems to me that the matters urged, namely, that rule 47 
is somehow inconsistent with the British Nationality Act or is an 
infringement of the statement of human rights, are not matters in 
which I am prepared to enter." Forbes J gave as the reason why he 
felt unprepared to enter into these discussions was that the 
Immigration Rules were clear about the case in hand - notice that 
he did not state that it was because of the ouster clause in the 
Act.] 
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R v Secretary of Stator for the Home Department ex parte Syed, 
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List), 25 May 1984 (report by 
LEXIS). [In this case Mann J. stated that, "I fully accept that 
the Home Secretary is entitled to have rules of policy which 
approach or equal the rigidity of a rule. Vhat, however, he is not 
entitled to do is simply to decline to consider an applcation from 
a person who satisfies the pre-conditions imposed by parliament" 
this is, of course, a clear attack upon the discretion awarded to 
the Home Secretary by the legislation]. 
Of course, this does not mean that the reviews have been successful for 
those appealing: as Griffith [Griffith, 1985] has pointed out, the 
courts have not been too keen to side with those from, for example, the 
Indian sub-continent. But that does not remove the fact the courts have 
ignored section 44(2) of the Act, and that this ignoring of that section 
contradicts the claims of legal logic programmers. 
As a short aside, we should note that the political character of the 
judicial process has been noted by such a conservative character as Lord 
Hailsham. Speaking in a House of Lords debate, he put the position 
quite succintly as: 
"Judges cannot choose the work they do; they have to come to a 
decision one way or another on all litigation which is brought 
before them. If they assume jurisdiction they are in politics; if 
they decline jurisdiction they are in politics." 
[House of Lords, 20th November 1978, Col. 1384] 
So, my argument - noted in the next section - about the importance of 
seeing the judicial role as intrincsically political (eg with their role 
in judicial review) cannot be argued against as "radical". 
Ve suggest that the approach taken by the ELl program in utilizing the 
abilities of an expert to reformulate the meaning and effect of an Act 
achieves an end much closer to that of real law than that promised by 
logic programmers. Veak behaviourism is better than stong 
formalization. 
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The British Nationality Act (1981) has only recently come into force and 
so there is only a limited understanding of how the judiciary will react 
to it; we might expect other differences between the legislation and the 
interpretation of the legislation to appear. In the next section, we 
argue that even if the legislation was clear and the judicary did follow 
it precisely (if such a precision could exist) there are still problems 
in trying to handle law as a set of clear rules principally problems 
of morality and responsibility in a democratic society. 
9.6 CONSERVATIVELY APPLYING THE RULES: LOGIC AGAIN 
One of the most forcefully presented arguments of the positivist 
philosopher has been that of the relationship of morality to law. 
have presented the argument that the technical application of the 
of law is the way in which justice is best achieved. 
legal 
They 
rules 
This concern with justice should, we hold, be a matter of concern to all 
who are involved in the legal process; even those of us in computer 
science or logic who have an interest in the law should be concerned 
with its moral application since many of us entered the research field 
with a strong inclination to provide tools which increase access to 
justice, not simply to raise the (not insubstantial) earning power of 
the legal pracitioner. 
The question, though, which is raised by positivism is: is technical 
application of the rules of law the best way to achieve justice? Or 
might there be some other process which we can concentrate upon which 
has a "higher moral worth". MacCormick is certainly one of those who is 
most adamant that justice is best found through logic using logical 
reasoning, proceeding step by step through the legal norms. The belief 
in the utility of this technical process is certainly very strong: 
recently, even socialists have claimed that the correct way to control 
the creativity of the judiciary is to ensure that they apply the rules 
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in a technical manner [Robson, 1981]. 
This is a view we reject; primarily because it frees the judiciary from 
the responsibility for any of the judgements which they arrive at - they 
can say, as they do, "1 would like to award judgement to X, but 
unfortunately 1 cannot". Judges in our view should be held responsible 
for their adjudications. They should apply the law, not in a formal 
manner excluding the social factors and context, but as the legislators 
and society would wish. Ye should remember that the Yar Crimes trials 
after the second wold war were notable for the number of defences which 
claimed, "1 was only applying the rules". Such a defence was not 
accepted then; and it should not be acceptable now. 
The problem is particularly important, we believe, to computer 
scientists entering the field, because it is a well known fact that 
"scienfication" and legitimation can often be achieved by the presenting 
of contentious information in the form of a computer program. Ye can 
point to the study by Bloomfield [Bloomfield, forthcoming] which 
demonstrates how the computer-based Urban Dynamics Model prepared by a 
team under J.Y. Forrester (the inventor of the magnetic memory core) 
was given extra legitimati~n in the eyes of administrators. The model 
proposed that by demolishing low cost housing in American cities, the 
poor would be removed from the cities thus solving many of the problems 
of urban deprivation. Of course, because the model only dealt with the 
city in isolation, it provided little information on what was to happen 
to these disposessed poor. 
Ye believe that the presentation of the Pro log project is just as 
problematical. The language which has been used to present the system 
is appealing to those who might wish a system which uncritically 
presents their view as "a logical consequence of the Act". There is to 
be no escape from the logical compulsion by interacting with the 
program people will discover whether they are British citizens or not. 
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This is, the extreme cynic might suggest, an ideal explication of the 
governmental position; that extreme cynic might suggest that a 
government given the opportunity to fund research which presented its 
law as closed to negotiation or to fund research which was critical of 
this view would choose the former. But this is not to suggest that the 
Prolog team are necessarily government funded apologists for right-wing 
immigration policy. It is, perhaps, more to do with the failure of 
current jurisprudence to escape the errors of postivism than a conscious 
decision on the team's behalf to persuade potential users that "the 
law's the law". 
Ye shall emphasize that "the law's not the law" by looking behind the 
legislation of the British Nationality Act (1981) to suggest that we 
cannot simply accept a legal rule and its application without further 
discussion. Thankfully, there are ways and means whereby a more just 
solution can be arrived at. 
It has been noted by many (non radical) legal commentators on British 
Immigration legislation that there are implicitly racist overtones 
involved. For example, one of the stated primary aims of the 
legislation has been to reduce the incoming numbers of immigrants so 
that employment prospects for those already in the country are not 
reduced; yet, if this were so, the commentators have argued, those Irish 
from Eire should have been subject to the same immigration policies 
which affected other countries prior to the UK's joining the EEC. In 
fact they were subject to no restrictions whatsoever. Also, these same 
commentators have pointed out that even those who are fully qualified 
for British Citizenship cannot migrate to the U.K. without proper 
documentation: such documentation can be obtained within a few days in 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand, but some 12 - 18 months or 
more in, for example, 
logical formalization of 
the Indian sub-continent. 
the British Nationality 
nothing about these factors. 
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The point is that a 
Act will tell us 
As well as the legislation having an implicitly racist bias, the British 
Courts have been keen to support the legislation (which is different 
from their approach to, say, tax cases). Griffith [Griffith, 1985] has 
noted the generally limiting view of they have of their interventionist 
ability in these cases; this limiting view has been upheld in various 
appeal cases. This can also be seen in those cases which have appeared 
dealing with judicial review of the British Nationality Act (1981): for 
example, it could be argued that the current entry clearance required 
for entry to the U.K. need not necessarily be provided in the country 
of origin since there is no place in the legislation which says that the 
potential immigrant must arrive with this documentation. The courts, 
though, have supported the Home Office policy as implemented by the 
Immigration Officer and stated that "a current entry clearance was 
required before she entered this country" ~ v Secretary of State for 
the Home Office Department ex parte Choudhury. Thus, the courts held 
that the woman in that case had to return to the country of origin to 
await proper documentation being prepared, rather than wait for this at 
Heathrow. 
The conjunction of racist legislation and a compliant judiciary might, 
it could seem, bode ill for any potential immigrant from India or 
Bangladesh. However, as is currently being shown, there are means to 
overcome this bias against certain (ie coloured) immigrants. The means 
comes from EEC legislation; this indicates further that when we wish to 
analyze the law and how we should react to it, we cannot simply look at 
one piece of legislation (and formalize that) and expect it to answer 
all our questions there are often strategies which the legislation 
would have us believe do not exist. Logicians, therefore, should not be 
the first port of call for advice if you have immigration problems, we 
might suggest. 
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MacDonald has written of the interplay of EEC and UK law (although, 
prior to the effects of the 1981 Act): 
"The impact on UK immigration law and practice by the EEC has been 
striking and is by no means fully worked out. British immigration 
authorities have, on the whole, been brought up and nurtured on a 
diet of exclusion and restriction. That after all is the history 
of the alien legislation from the time of the French Revolution, 
when Jacobins had to be kept out, to modern times when it was 
French communards, Jews and Germans. It is very much part of the 
mentality of exclusion embodied in the modern legislation from 1962 
onwards. The difficulty for British immigration authorities is to 
cope with a set of laws, in whose making they played little part, 
and which is based on an opposite philosophy to their own - on the 
liberal view that it is right and proper and a good thing for 
people of different nationalities to move freely from the territory 
of one member state to that of another. The policy for the 
European Court had also been a liberal one, extending the scope of 
the free-mevement provision and reducing the restrictive powers of 
member states. This contrasts with the British courts where the 
trend of immigration decisions has been to tighten immigration 
control and extend the power of the state almost to the point of 
arbitrariness." 
[MacDonald, p3, 1983] 
And there also exists that other European court which British subjects 
(including those excluded from the U.K.) have access to - the European 
Court of Human Rights. Now, whilst this Court has no authority with the 
legislature, it most certainly does with the Crown who have agreed to be 
bound by the decisions and practice of that court. The European Court 
has recently found that the immigration rules breached Article 13 of the 
Convention on Human Rights because they discriminated against women. 
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Under the rules, foreign men with full residency rights in the UK could 
bring in their wives or fiances, but foreign women cannot. At one 
hearing the British Government claimed that the purpose of the rules 
were to protect the domestic labour market at a time of high 
unemployment. The court ruled that this was a legitimate aim, but 
provided insufficent grounds for justifying a breach of article 13. 
These rules are not directly a part of the 1981 Act, but they do 
indicate that the word of the legislature is not final. Given the time 
lag between the beginning of an appeal or judicial review to possible 
judgement at the European Court in Strasbourg, we might expect the 1981 
Act to be soon commented upon by this Human Rights court. The logic 
programmers 
the likely 
with their "logical consequences" can tell us nothing about 
eventualities of such a process. Hence, we can only 
reiterate the advice to potential immigrants or those concerned with 
their nationality to discuss the problem with an expert; not with a 
legal rule-based expert system. The advice they would get could not 
possibly be worse. 
Ye would suggest that for all the limitations of the EL! project, it did 
at least consider some of these problems of law in its design. 
eventually claim that even this extended and annotated 
That we 
type of 
rule-based system is too weak for real handling of law, should not 
detract from the fact that we were aware of some of the problems 
inherent in applying rule-based strategies to the law. The remaining 
problems came to light only on analysis of the completed system. 
9.7 SYNOPSIS OF THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL LOGICIANS 
The content of this chapter has been an attack upon the very notions of 
logic and rules in the law. Ye have suggested that the problems with 
these approaches are of a deep and substantial nature - in effect, that 
tinkering with programs such as the ELl program will not overcome the 
- 221 -
limitations. Rather, if we wish to use ELl type systems, we shall have 
to find a para-legal situation for them (Chapter 8). 
But we have also gone further and suggested that logic programming has 
no place at all in the law - for it is incapable of presenting secondary 
and contextual information of the sort which a system such as ELl might, 
with its annotations and secondary information contained within the 
system. Now these are substantial criticisms of claims which are 
currently being made by logic programmers; we should apply a surgical 
technique to this chapter and list the objections which are made: then, 
these researchers will not be under any illusion about the major 
criticisms which they must resolve in order to disprove the argument. 
The challenge can be presented as: 
1) Explain how the formalization of 
legal process: thus, why is it 
legislation (such as ouster clauses) 
when read in the usual manner (or in 
have little of their intended effect 
legislation relates to the 
that there are sections of 
which ought to have an effect 
a "logical" manner, even), yet 
in practice. 
2) Explain how logical contradictions can appear in the body of 
legislation (such as appears in the British Nationality Act (1981» 
and yet the legislation can still be used to offer a consistant and 
coherent perspective from which the judicary can adjudge. 
3) Explain how the legislation has a constraining effect upon the 
judiciary, when that judiciary will interpret the legislation in 
the light of common law principles (since, as our view has it, the 
judiciary are the legal dictionary which gives meaning to the 
legislation). 
4) Explain how the notions of morality and justice can be handled 
by a series of logical sentences. Thus, should judges apply the 
rules without considering the legal and social context within which 
those rules were made; or should they, as Lord Denning has 
proposed, find some way of overcoming the rules to reach a just 
settlement. If the latter, explain how might this be done by 
logic? 
I would accept these explanations in the form of a logic program which 
could convincingly be used by legal practioners, or even by para-legal 
practitioners. But I do not expect to see such a program, no matter how 
great the claims which have been made and are being made for logic 
programming. I do not expect to see this program, because logic 
programming is flawed by an errant epistemology - it sees the world in 
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terms of a computational, logical model; and when that model meets the 
real world it fails because the world is neither a logical nor a 
computational world. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION: AFTER RULE-BASED SYSTEMS? 
10.1 RESEARCH GOALS 
The goals of research teams in this field differ fundamentally. Some 
might wish to provide powerful computer systems which can answer the 
user on any question in law that might be put to it (as was suggested by 
Mehl). Others might wish to formalize the law into some language which 
allows conceivable logical conclusions to be tested. Yet another goal 
might well be a system which attempts to predict indiviudal judicial 
behaviour. All these goals will require the setting of different 
questions which must be asked to assess potential success or failure; 
yet, there will be a core question which can be asked of all those 
systems which attempt to represent "the law". That question is quite 
simply, 
"is it the law or the legal process which the computer system is 
actually describing, or is it some kind of limited psudo- or para-
legal model which is being represeted?" 
I have tried to argue that logical and rule based methods are not 
appropriate or powerful enough means to represent either the law or the 
legal process. If my argument is accepted, then how might researchers 
pose further questions to determine when they have produced powerful 
legal expert systems which do handle properly legal questions? I would 
argue that the two questions are: 
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(1) Is the system capable of generating legal rule breaking 
strategies Can counter rules, reasons for ignoring rules, 
contrary interpretations be provided, for example, by the system? 
(2) Is the system capable of generating legal rule supporting 
strategies Can supporting interpretations of rules, reasons for 
supporting rules, examples of contrary interpretations which have 
been declined in earlier cases be provided, for example, by the 
system? 
since my view of the legal process is that these two aspects of rule 
breaking and rule supporting are fundamental - it is those two aspects 
which are at the heart of the law. It is therefore those two aspects 
which are of fundamental importance to any system which claims to rise 
above the purely clerical to that level of providing "legal advice". 
For rules are only a shorthand means of communicating information: 
rules miss out so much of the necessary contextual information. For 
proper advice it is necessary to go beyond the shorthand to something 
more verbose and informative. 
Since I now propose that the legal process is a negotionary process and 
not one which is principally rule based, I must return to the point made 
earlier concerning the importance of research questions - in this new 
field of legal knowledge engineering, it is essential that we do not 
forget that there were two questions: 
(a) what is it about the law that we are trying to represent within 
our computer programs? 
(b) how can our assumptions about what the law is be represented in 
a computer program? 
I started off, in the initial research phase, answering question (a), 
with the proposition that the law is rule based; this resulted in 
answering question (b) with the use of rule-based methods. Having a new 
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answer to question (a), my ideas about the solution to (b) have, of 
course, to be revised. They are not yet in a completed form. But this 
is the nature of research - entering a dark cupboard, sure of what you 
wish to find yet frequently coming out with something different or, 
rarely, nothing at all (since it is usually possible to learn from 
mistakes). 
Given this, how might we view the next stages in the ELl project how 
might the project work towards the provision of a legal expert system? 
10.2 DETERMINISM AND NON-DETERMINISM 
It is useful to use the dichotomy of determinism/non-determinism (of the 
non-mathematical sort) to discuss possible types of system. 
Deterministic systems are those which encapsulate one particular 
framework of knowledge and present it in a pedagogical manner. Such 
systems accord with the classic expert system model - the user of such a 
system is cast in the role of recipient where the expertise of the 
system is proffered on a "take it or leave it basis". Such 
deterministic systems are, of course, those which we have been referring 
to as rule-based in this paper. But such systems cannot be as 
potentially powerful in legal areas as they might be in non-legal areas 
(such as medicine, engineering etc.) for the very reason that the legal 
process is not, I have argued, am area where people have an interest in 
coming to agreement about the "facts", "rules" or "principles" of a 
case; rather, the interest which those involved in the case have is one 
of argument over those facts, rules and principles. 
But that does not mean that rule-based systems are without any use at 
all; it only means that in the legal process proper (i.e. where the 
barrister presents a case in court) they are of little use. Ye can 
imagine that they might have a use in a semi-legal situation, where a 
given interpretation of the law is handled. Niblett has proposed that 
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their use as contrasting expert models: 
"It is a mistake to suppose that one expert system is sufficient 
for one area of law. Some systems, like some lawyers, will be 
better than others for they will have a more refined knowledge base 
and superior powers of reasoning. Just as some lawyers are 
plaintiff's men whilst others are more at ease representing 
defendants, so some expert systems will be tuned to the 
requirements of plaintiffs and others to defendants. Some tax 
systems will favour the Revenue whilst others will be more suited 
to the taxpayer. 
of law, then 
Of course if two expert systems differ on a point 
when that issue has been resolved (for example by 
judicial decision) then one or both of their knowledge bases must 
be modified to include the new result." 
[Niblett, 1981] 
I would argue that, yes, different legal rules and suchlike can be 
inserted into a legal expert system, but the adding of these rules will 
do very little to aid the user in court - simply having a rule inserted 
into a knowledge base cannot help the defendant to present his case. He 
cannot hold up the printout and cry, "My rule clearly says " for 
it is impossible to tell for how long "that issue has been resolved (for 
example by judicial decision)". The judge, also, may well decide that 
that's not what the rule actually is, or that another rule is more 
important. 
Ve can imagine deterministic legal expert systems having some, if 
limited use, as a clerical system which presents to, say, employees of 
the D.H.S.S. or some other govermental service. Then, users might be 
able to refer to the system as an aid in applying the rules; these rules 
are, of course, those which the govermental agency would wish to apply -
they would still be open to legal challenge through the legal process 
proper. Typically, in the UK at present, such challenge is less easy 
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than under previous political masters but it can be done - for example, 
challenges through European courts frequently point out the utility to 
the appellant of not accepting "the rules". 
Thinking beyond the deterministic system it might be considered how 
systems might be built which can aid the person trying to prepare a 
case. The system might do this by helping to pinpoint the various 
potential outcomes - or rule breaking strategies. If a user interacts 
with a deterministic system, only one of those outcomes can be proposed 
(what the expert who trained the system - in a rule based system this 
might simply be an interpretation of the legislation - would do in that 
case). Experts are often wrong, so it seems essential to build legal 
advisory systems which can encapsulate various expert models, and which 
might allow the user to add to the expertise that he or she has to the 
decision process - in other words, we are basing our systems upon a 
"textbook model" rather than a rule based model. 
Legal textbooks have a substantial advantage over primarily rule based 
legal systems: they can offer a substantial amount of contextual 
information - they can provide an introduction, an index to the parts, 
and much in the way of anecdotal extracts from case reports. But a 
legal textbook does not attempt to tell the user how to apply the rules; 
it might well be that this is the only advantage that rule based expert 
systems can offer the lawyer. 
Taking this textbook analogy further (and we should note that the first 
stop in legal research is usually a textbook, it is not simply something 
utilized by undergraduates) we might propose that trying to incorporate 
that sort of information into a computer system (together with any other 
useful information) might well be the way in which we can produce 
non-deterministic "expert" systems. 
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One of the important aspects of this type of system would be that the 
supplicant role of system and user is broken down, and the computer 
attempts to use as much of the human ability for intuition as possible. 
In the type of systems we propose, the intuition is dependant upon the 
fact that the users will share the common culture of being legally 
trained. Such a non-deterministic system can be described as a decision 
support tool; it operates within a framework, where the law is seen to 
be a complex social process which cannot be totally or formally 
modelled. Therefore, the user's non-formality ("intuition") should be 
seen as an intrinsic part of the system. 
There should be some extra advantages accruing from the use of computer 
tools though, even if only to make the expense worthwhile. Vhat might 
they be? For one thing, the systems might make use of and interface 
with legal data bases. Commentaries and suggested interpretations of 
the law might be handled (and easily updated). Also, other factors can 
be handled which cannot be held in a textbook; for instance, the builder 
of the system may inform the program that an extremely conservative bias 
might well be present in the eventual judicial decision, or that past 
experience has shown Judge X to have a view Y on the type of problem 
under investigation (see for example [Lawlor, 1980] and [Nagel, 1977] 
for mathematical techniques which have been used with some success in 
this area). 
Such non-deterministic systems are perhaps more complex to design (and 
for experts to pass their expertise to) than rule based deterministic 
systems, but we see this type of system as that which will best accord 
with the needs of the lawyers. 
Of course, such an outline admits that we are no longer attempting to 
design systems with "artificial intelligence"; but that may be no such 
bad thing. 
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There is a practical problem in attempting to discover the needs of the 
legal profession relating to how they actually do research and what the 
materials of research are. Some limited work has been done; for example 
[Foster, 1984J and some (sadly as yet) unpublished research by Colin 
Campbell (Oueen's, Belfast). Though a large number of texts have been 
written covering access to legal research materials, and texts have been 
produced describing legal research for students, they offer little 
insight into actual legal research. 
There seems to be some suggestion from Campbell's research that little 
legal research is carried out by solicitors (this is of course relevant 
in the English, Yelsh and Northern Irish context); whenever a real 
problem of law appears an outline of the situation is passed onto 
counsel for opinion. This puts the solicitor in the position of the 
general practitioner from medicine; whenever a medical/legal problem is 
met this is passed onto counsel/consultant. 
If we are to look for alternatives to rule based methods in legal 
knowledge engineering, I would argue, it is vital to extend the 
quanitity of empirical study into just what the real needs of the 
profession are. I would be unhappy to learn from this research that 
there was indeed very little need for computer tools; but at least then 
we would not be following a wild goose; a wild goose that told us it 
knew which rules of law were clear. 
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A.1 INTRODUCTION 
APPENDIX A 
THE ELl COMMANDS 
The specific functions of the system are detailed below. Generally, the 
program has been designed to be easy to interact with - something which 
was made relatively easy by use of the INTERLISP language. INTERLISP 
can be seen as a large collection of programmer's utilities surrounding 
a LISP core [Sandewall, 1976], each of the utilities being accessible 
both to aid the programming and debugging process and also available 
from within LISP programs themselves. In several parts of the program 
these utilities have been used - the structure editor is used to edit 
rules for example. Another example is the use of the ASKUSER facility 
which allows correct input to be explicitly stated; any other input is 
therefore ignored. 
Within the program, any operation can be cancelled and the user left at 
the next higher level simply by giving the "OK" command. At ay point in 
the interaction, the user can receive a "help message" by typing "?". 
The help message contains information about the valid inputs and 
options. 
The system does not currently incorporate an UNDO facility but, should 
this be required, it can be relatively easily incorporated by using the 
history lists and UNDO facility which INTERLISP possesses. As a testbed 
system, however, such a requirement was not considered essential; it 
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would be necessary in any usefully implemented legal consultative 
system. 
Ve here describe, for each of the program's modules, the most important 
commands which are available to the user. In the examples given, user 
input is underlined, although usually only the first one or two letters 
are required before unambiguous recognition is achieved. 
A.2 THE SETUP MODULE 
The SETUP module is used by the expert to input/edit the rules prior to 
their being input to the knowledge base. 
setup) 
Current, old or new file: new file to be set ~ 
Name of new rules file: test:" rUle - - -
The last rule entered has the rule number 0 
There are 0 rules which have not been entered to the rules file. 
SS: 
1) VRITE - prepare and name a rule ready for input or editing. 
Operation: 
Vhen first called, the system prompts with the number of the new rule 
an increment on the number of the last input rule. 
For each condition to be input the system prompts "Condition:" and 
requires the input text to be enclosed within parenthesis - e.g. "(this 
is a condition)". To terminate input of the rule and discard any 
conditions which have been input, the subcommand "OK" is given; to 
terminate condition input (and then input the goal), a null list must be 
input. 
The system then prompts "Goal:" for the goal. The goal input is similar 
to that of the condition (i.e. it must be parenthesized and the 
subcommands "OK" and "()" operate in the same manner). 
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Vhen properly input, the rule name is printed on the terminal (e.g. 
"RULE-1" ) • 
Example: 
ss: write rules. 
This-ruIe wil! be numbered 1 
Condition: (this is the first condition) 
Condition: rana-thIs-rs ~econd) 
Condition: 1-- - -
Goal: (this is the goal) 
Rule is named: RULE:r---
This rule will be numbered 2 
Condition: ok 
ss: 
2) EDIT - edit a rule which has been input. This command makes use of 
the INTERLISP EDITV facility (a structure as opposed to text editor) and 
uses INTERLISP EDIT commands. The structure editor's prompt is "*". 
Operation: 
To edit a rule the rule number should be input. The system will check 
that the rule actually exists before entering the editor. 
Vhile the INTERLISP EDIT facility is large and powerful, it is possible 
to achieve simple, positive editing with a few subcommands: 
The rule is held as the following LISP S-expression: 
(IF «cl) •.• (cn» THEN (goal» 
where (cl) to (cn) are any number of conditions. 
structure requires only the following commands: 
Moving about this 
To go to the first element in the rule (Le. "IF") input "1"; for the 
second (i.e. the list of conditions) input "2", etc. To go to the "top 
level" input """ (the up arrow). 
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Vhen accessing the conditions, these numbers can be used in the same 
manner - to go to the first condition, input "1" etc. 
These commands only move about the structure. To print out any of the 
items in the structure input "p" or "pp" (for prettyprint). 
Deleting an element in the structure is done with a colon (":"). 
Anything appearing after the colon on the EDITV input line is used to 
replace the deleted structure. 
To insert something in the structure, use "A" (meaning, insert After 
this element) or "B" (inset Before this structure) followed by the 
item(s) to be input. 
For other commands see the INTERLISP manual. 
Example: 
ss: edit rule 
Rule:numoer-for rule to be edited: 1 
edit 
l*pp (IF «THIS IS THE FIRST CONDITION) 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND» 
THEN (THIS IS THE GOAL» 
1*2 1 
2*p (THIS IS THE FIRST CONDITION) 
2*3 a very 
3*p 
•• THE VERY FIRST CONDITION) 
3*ok 
SS: 
3) DELETE - rules which have been input are held on the rule list - this 
command removes them from this list. Vhen the rules file is next 
written the deleted rule is not written to it. 
Operation: 
The system prompts for the number of the rule which is to be deleted. 
If it exists (has been input and not already deleted) then it is printed 
out, then deleted. 
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4) COpy - makes a copy (with, of course, a new name) of a rule already 
wri tten. In combination with the EDIT command this allows rules with 
slightly different elements to be quickly input. 
Operation: 
The system prompts for the number of the rule which is to be copied. On 
receipt of this, a copy is made and the copy is named. 
5) DIRECTORY - lists the filenames held in the user's directory. This 
will print out all filenames - not only those used by the system. In 
other parts of the system when the DIRECTORY command is given only those 
.RULE, .KNOW or .LSP files in the directory are named. 
Example: 
SS: directory of files 
<RL.LEITH> 
ANIHALS.LSP.l 
BUILD.LSP.2 
DESIGN.RNO.l 
EEC.DIC.2 
BEALTH.RULE.2 
BOUSEBEN.RULE.2 
INTERPRET.LSP.7 
SETUP.LSP.3 
SOCIAL.RNO.7 
SS: 
6) UPDATE - writes to the file which will contain the rules. When the 
SETUP function is called it will check to see whether a suitable rules 
file has been loaded. If there is no suitable file, then the system. 
will set up a new one, or load an old file which already contains some 
rules. Thus several rules files can be kept in the directory and 
manipulated easily. 
Operation: 
The system informs the user that it is updating a named file. 
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Example: 
SS: u1date rules file 
Vrit ng to TEST.RULE 
SS: 
7) INITIALIZE - removes and initializes all rules from rule list after 
preparing a named backup file. 
Operation: 
The system first prompts for the name of a backup file to which it can 
write the present rules. This file is then written to, and all relevant 
lists within working memory are initialized. 
Example: 
SS: initialize rules file 
Name of backupIIIe: DaCkup.rule 
Current rule collection now being written to BACKUP.RULE 
Vriting to TEST.RULE 
SS: 
8) PRINT - prints any specified rules or all rules. If all rules are to 
be printed, then they can either be written to the terminal or to a 
named file. 
Operation: 
The system prompts for either the number of the rule to be printed or 
the name of the output file (which is "T" if the terminal is to be 
used). If a number is input then that rule is printed on the terminal 
(if it exists). If the input is neither a number nor "T" then the 
system will prettyprint the rules to that text file. The file must 
exist before the rules can be printed to it. The rules are printed in 
the order in which they appear in the rule list. 
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Example: 
ss: print rules 
Print request: t 
RULE-l (IF «THIS IS THE VERY FIRST CONDITION) 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND» 
THEN 
(THIS IS THE GOAL» 
RULE-2 (IF «THIS IS THE FIRST CONDITION OF THE SECOND RULE) 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND OF THE SECOND RULE» 
THEN 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND GOAL» 
SS: 
9) HOVE - when the rules held on the rule list are input to a knowledge 
base they are input in the order in which they appear on rule list. 
This facility enables them to be moved about the list easily. 
Operation: 
The system prompts for the number of the rule which is to be moved; then 
whether it is to be moved to "before" or "after"; and then the rule 
number which is to be moved in relation to. An error is reported if 
either of the rules do not exist. 
Example: 
SS: move rules in rule list 
HovewniCJl"rUle: r- --
B(efore) or A(fter): a 
Vhich rule: 2 
SS: print rules 
Print request: ! 
RULE-2 (IF «THIS IS THE FIRST CONDITION OF THE SECOND RULE) 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND OF THE SECOND RULE» 
THEN 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND GOAL» 
RULE-l (IF «THIS IS THE VERY FIRST CONDITION) 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND» 
THEN 
(THIS IS THE GOAL» 
SS: 
10) SEARCH - when the number of rules in rule list grows, it is useful 
to be able to search for instances of various words and phrases. The 
SEARCH facility allows this, printing out either one or more rule 
numbers or rules themselves. 
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Operation: 
The system prompts for the search strategy - the first incidence of a 
string, one specific incidence or all incidences. If all incidences are 
required, the user is then asked whether only rule numbers are to be 
printed on the terminal, or whether the rule texts are to be printed on 
the terminal or a file. 
Having this information the user then specifies the string to be 
searched for (specifying it between inverted commas). Searching then 
begins from the first rule in rule list onwards. 
Depending upon which search strategy was chosen, the output information 
is presented to the user. 
Example: 
SS: search for text in rules 
Search request:-rIrst rncroence 
String to be searcheQ for: "first" 
String found in rule RULE-2: 
(IF «THIS IS THE FIRST CONDITION OF THE SECOND RULE) 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND OF THE SECOND RULE» 
THEN 
(AND THIS IS THE SECOND GOAL» 
SS: 
A.3 THE BUILD MODULE 
The function of the BUILD module is to allow the expert to input rules 
to the knowledge base and to "fine-tune" the advice produced from the 
knowledge base. 
Vhen the BUILD facility is called it requests information from the user 
on which knowledge base is to be used or, if a new knowledge base is 
required, what the file to hold it should be called. having this 
information, the system can then indicate how many rules are currently 
in the knowledge base: 
build] 
Current knowledge base or New or Old file? new file to hold new 
--------
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knowledfe base 
Name 0 fIre:: test.know 
Delete any word and concept lists? 
Highest rule-number in KB is: 0 
BB: 
Yhen in the BUILD environment (where the prompt is "BB:") the following 
commands are available. 
1) INSERT - insert rules into the knowledge base structure. These rules 
can either be brought from a rules file, written and edited or be 
individual rules which already exist. 
Operation: 
The user is prompted for information on which format the rules are to be 
input either from a file prepared by the SETUP function, as a named 
rule, or made up. The latter two are useful when fine-tuning the 
system. The former is most useful when in the initial stages of 
building the knowledge base. 
Rules can be input from a file which has previously been used as input -
information on which rules have been input from that file is kept in the 
rule file; if this is the case, the user is asked whether all the rules 
or only those which have not been input should be input. 
The user is asked whether words should be added to the words list prior 
to input from the file starting, or whether the symbols should be 
extracted as the individual rules are being input. 
As the rules are being input, the number of the rule is printed together 
with whether the rule was input top down ("T"), goal up ("G") or alone 
("1"). 
Example: 
BB: insert rules into knowledge base 
Input request: froiilfile --
Name file contaIDIng-ruIes: animals. rule 
FILE CREATED 18-Sep-83 14:02:12 
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RULESCOMS 
18 rules in this file have not yet been input 
Rule numbering starts at: 1 
After how many rules have been input do you wish the knowledge 
base file and rule file to be updated: 10 
Extract words before inputting rules: Y/N: yes 
.••.•....•..•..••. I1I2I3I4ISI6T7T8T9T10 
Knowledge base being updated to: TEST.KNOV 
Vriting to ANIMALS.RULE 
I11T12I13T14T1SI16I17I18 
Knowledge base being updated to: TEST.KNOV 
Vriting to ANIMALS.RULE 
Done. 
BB: 
2) DELETE - deletes rules from the knowledge base. 
Operation 
The rule number to be deleted is prompted for. If it exists, then it is 
removed from the knowledge base. An option which is available allows 
the user to search for rules containing a string before deleting them. 
Example: 
BB: delete rules from knowledge base 
Deletion request: Rule 
Delete rule: 1 --
BB: print rules from knowledge base 
Print request: y---
Sorry, no rule number 1 
BB: 
3) INTERROGATE - this calls the INTERPRET module and is useful for 
moving between knowledge base editing and fine-tuning, allowing the user 
to oscillate between testing and amending. 
The operation of the INTERPRET module is dealt with in the next 
subsection. 
4) DIRECTORY - this prints out all the file names of files held in the 
user's directory. The operation of this command is identical to that in 
the SETUP module. 
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5) PRINT - prints rules from the knowledge base to the terminal or to a 
file. 
Operation: 
The operation of the print facility is similar to that in the SETUP 
module, differing in only the respect that when printing out the rules 
from the knowledge base, the rules can either be printed in rule number 
order, or the order that the are stored in the knowledge base. 
Example: 
BB: print rules from knowledge base 
Print request: ~ 
(IF «ANIMAL EATS MEAT» 
THEN 
(ANIMAL IS CARNIVORE» 
BB: 
6) INITIALIZE - removes all rules from the knowledge base structure 
after writing to a backup file. 
Operation: 
The name of the backup file is first prompted for, then every relevant 
list and data structure is initialized. 
Example: 
BB: initialize knowledge base 
Confirm to delete all rules: Y/N: yes 
Name of backup file: backk*.knOW 
Vriting backup to backup. ow 
Deleting rules from knowledge base. 
Delete all word and concept matching lists: Y/N: yes 
BB: 
7) NOTATE - is used to either write annotations to a rule or rule 
element or to read one of the already written annotations. 
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Since much manipulation of the knowledge base will be done during the 
fine tuning of the system, it is inadvisable to add notations until the 
system is fairly well organised and defined. 
Operation: 
Vriting annotations: 
Vhen the notate command is given the user should give the "Rule" or 
"Condition" subcommand which, respectively, allow either an entire rule 
to be annotated or an element (including the goal). For both options 
the rule number must be specified, and to annotate an individual element 
of the rule the element must be specified. Vhen this is done input from 
the terminal is requested; this can be in either upper or lower case. 
Example: 
BB: notate rules and rule Pirts 
Annotation request: conait on £E goal to be annotated 
Rule-number: 1 
1 (ANIMAL GIVES MILK) 
Current annotation: 
2 (ANIMAL IS MAMMAL) 
Current annotation: 
Vhich to be annotated: 1 
Input text; paragraph wIth" Terminate by ZZZ: 
we do not necessarily mean cows milk here 
ZZZ-
Rule-number: 1 
1 (ANIMAL GIVES MILK) 
Current annotation: 
we do not necessarily mean cows milk here 
2 (ANIMAL IS MAMMAL) 
Current annotation: 
Vhich to be annotated: 2 
Input text; paragraph wIth" Terminate by ZZZ: 
mammals are those animals whose young ~ not 
Dorn from YE ZZZ 
BB: 
Printing annotations: 
To print all the annotations connected with a rule (that is both the 
annotation to the rule and to the elements of that rule) the "Print" 
subcommand is given. 
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Example: 
BB: notate rules and rule parts 
Annotation request: print annotations 
Rule number: 1 
Rule annotation: 
Other annotations are: 
1 (ANIMAL GIVES MILK) 
we do not necessarily mean cows milk here 
2 (ANIMAL IS MAMMAL) 
mammals are those animals whose young are not born from eggs 
BB: 
Editing annotations: 
To edit an annotation the rule number must be given just as when 
printing and inputting the notations. Entering the notation editor is 
then done with the "Edit" subcommand, followed by either "Rule" or 
"Condi tion" for, respectively, to edit a rule or rule element 
annotation. 
The annotation editor uses, like the editor in SETUP, the INTERLISP 
EDITV facility. These editing commands are described above. 
8) ADD \lORDS - is used to add words to the "important", "noise" or 
"permanent noise" word lists. These lists are used by the conceptual 
matching module within the system. This facility is useful during the 
BUILD process, where the expert may realize that the prepared rules do 
not specify a word as either "important" or "noise". Using this command 
is the only means of adding words to the permanent noise list. 
In addition to allowing words to be input to the lists, this facility 
will also allow these lists to be printed out or for specific words to 
be deleted from the lists. 
Operation: 
To add words, the subcommands "NOISE", "IMPORTANT", "PERMANENT" allow 
words to be added to the relevant lists. 
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Example: 
BB: add to or delete words from word lists 
Yorarequest: noise word -- -- --
Yord: this 
BB: 
To print word lists, the "PRINT" subcommand should be given. 
To delete a word from one of the lists give then "Delete" subcommand and 
then specify which of the lists the word is to be removed from, and then 
the word itself. 
A.4 THE INTERPRET MODULE 
The INTERPRET module uses the knowledge base which has been created by 
the BUILD module and "interrogates" it, i.e. it allows advice to be 
given from the knowledge base. 
Like the other two modules the INTERPRET module requests information on 
whether a new file is to be loaded, or the currently loaded file (if 
any) is to be used: 
Yhen in the INTERPRET environment, the following commands are available. 
The "?" and "ok" commands operate in this environment as they do in the 
two earlier ones. 
1) INITIALIZE - this sets all relevant interrogating information to 
initial values, and puts traversal information into the knowledge base. 
2) PRINT - print rules. This operates as the PRINT command in the BUILD 
module. 
3) COMMENT - allows the user to determine the amount of information 
about processing to be printed. "All" information is obviously required 
by an expert fine-tuning the system, "SOME" when only some is required 
and "NONE" when only information is required. To find out the current 
state of the COMMENT flag, give the "?" command. 
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4) MATCHING - switch between full and reduced conceptual matching. 
This switch allows the user to determine whether the conceptual matching 
module of the system should be used. In the initial stages of testing 
it provides a useful means of matching conditions, but not in later 
stages. 
5) EDIT - edits concept matching lists, as in the BUILD module. 
6) START - begins interrogation of the knowledge base. This command 
must be used after the knowledge base has been initialized; although, 
one interrogation can be halted (by the OK command) and restarted at the 
point which it was halted so long as the system is not reinitialized. 
7) INFORMATION - on the various goals/conditions proven true or false 
and other aspects of the interpretation can be got at the Interpret 
level or whilst the system is waiting for a decision on whether a 
presented condition is true or false. The amount of information 
available is comprehensive; the "?" command will list all relevant 
information which can be output. 
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APPENDIX B 
A FRAGMENT OF EL! IN USE 
In this section we give an example of a small section of the ELl rule 
corpus being printed out from the SETUP module, then input into a 
knowledge base held in the file TEST.KNOV. After this, the knowledge 
base is interpreted. Ve have chosen this small section of the entire 
rule corpus because is represents one small coherent section of that 
corpus (dealing with heating additions), and because it represents well 
the use of the negation handling. In order to demonstrate this latter 
operation, full information on interpretation is printed out - a 
situation which mars clarity; for an example without this detail being 
printed, see the following Appendix C. 
Setup, build or interpret: iat¥l 
Current, old or new file: 0 le to be loaded 
Name of old rules file: Directory- -- --
YoUr • RULE fIles are: 
<RL.P-LEITH> 
ADDREQU.RULE.4 
CERTHOUSEBEN.RULE.3 
FUEL. RULE. 12 
HEALTH.RULE.2 
HOUSEBEN.RULE.1 
ODDDEF.RULE.2 
REQUCALC.RULE.6 
RESOURC.RULE.3 
VELFARE.RULE.8 
Current, old or new file: old file to be loaded 
Name of old rules file: FUEL:R~ -- --
FILE CREATED 27-Nov-84 12:50:17 
RULESCOHS 
The last rule entered has the rule number 11 
There are 0 rules which have not been entered to the rules file. 
There are 11 in this file which have been inserted 
to the knowledge base held in the file OLD.KNOV 
Do you wish to re-enter these rules? yes 
SS: print !!!!!! 
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Print request: T 
RULE-1 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS HEATED BY CENTRAL HEATING SYSTEM) 
(NIL APPLICANT'S HOME HAS FIVE OR MORE ROOMS -
EXCLUDING BATHROOM, LAVATORY AND BALL) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 4.1» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 2.05» 
RULE-2 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(WARMTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO ILL-HEALTH OF APPLICANT OR 
DEPENDANT - OR MOBILITY IS RESTRICTED DUE TO 
SOME PHYSICAL REASON) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 4.1» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 2.05» 
RULE-3 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) (NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(WARMTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO SERIOUS ILLNESS OF APPLICANT 
THEN 
OR DEPENDANT - OR APPLICANT OR DEPENDANT IS 
HOUSEBOUND» 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05» 
RULE-4 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS DIFFICULT TO HEAT ADEQUATELY, 
PARTICULARLY DUE TO ROOMS BEING DRAUGHTY, 
DAMP OR VERY LARGE) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION 9F 4.1» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 2.05» 
RULE-5 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT TO HEAT, 
THEN 
PARTICULARLY DUE TO IT BEING VERY DAMP OR 
IN A VERY EXPOSED POSITION» 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05» 
RULE-6 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS HEATED BY CENTRAL HEATING SYSTEM) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME HAS FIVE OR MORE ROOMS - EXCLUDING 
BATHROOM, LAVATORY AND HALL) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 4.1» 
RULE-7 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS ON AN ESTATE CONSIDERED BY DHSS TO 
HAVE HIGH HEATING COSTS) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
(NIL APPLICANT'S HOME HAS FIVE OR MORE ROOMS - EXCLUDING 
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BATHROOM, LAVATORY AND HALL» 
THEN 
RULE-8 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 4.1» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS ON AN ESTATE CONSIDERED BY DHSS TO 
HAVE HIGH HEATING COSTS) 
(APPLICANT'S HOME HAS FIVE OR MORE ROOMS - EXCLUDING 
BATHROOM, LAVATORY AND HALL» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2» 
RULE-9 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(APPLICANT OR DEPENDANTS IS RECEIVING MOBILITY OR 
ATTENDANCE ALLOVANCE OR EQUIVALENT PAID VITH 
A SERVICES OR DISABLEMENT PENSION) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF @ 5.05 PER 
PERSON IN HOUSEHOLD RECEIVING MOBILITY OR 
ATTENDANCE ALLOVANCE OR SERVICES OR 
DISABLEMENT PENSION» 
RULE-10 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(APPLICANT'S HOUSEHOLD CONTAINS SOMEONE OVER 70 OR UNDER 
5 YEARS OLD) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 2.05» 
RULE-11 (IF «APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
(APPLICANT PAYS A SEPARATE FIXED CHARGE FOR HEATING, 
VHICH IS NOT SUBJECT TO REBATE OR SURCHARGE» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT PAYS HEATING IN RENT» 
SS: ok 
Setup, build or interpret: build 
Current knowledge base or New or Old file? new file to hold new 
KnOwreOge Dase -
Name of file:: TEST.KNOV 
Delete any word and concept lists? no 
Lists remain 
Highest rule-number in KB is: 0 
BB: insert rules into knowledge base 
Input request:"""""from file --
Current file is-yufL.RULE 
Use current rule file: Y/N: yes 
Rule numbering starts at: 1 
After how many rules have been input do you wish the 
knowledge base file and rule file to be updated: 20 
Extract words before inputting rules: Y/N: yes 
•••••••••• I1T2T3T4T5T6T7T8T9T10Tl1 
Knowledge base being updated to: TEST.KNOV 
Vriting to FUEL.RULE 
Done. 
88: ok 
Setup, build or interpret: interrogate 
Current or new knowledge base: current knowledge base 
used 
File name is: TEST.KNOV 
CC: ini tialize 
CC: start inter~retation 
Cur~condit on under consideration is 
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to be 
(APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT 
:: yes 
Current condition under consideration is 
(NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT 
:: no 
Current condition under consideration is 
(APPLICANT'S HOME IS HEATED BY CENTRAL HEATING SYSTEM) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT'S HOME IS HEATED BY CENTRAL HEATING SYSTEM 
:: no 
Current condition under consideration is 
(VARMTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO ILL-HEALTH OF APPLICANT OR 
DEPENDANT - OR MOBILITY IS RESTRICTED DUE TO 
SOME PHYSICAL REASON) 
Is this true?:: 
VARHTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO ILL-HEALTH OF APPLICANT OR DEPENDANT 
- OR MOBILITY IS RESTRICTED DUE TO SO HE PHYSICAL REASON 
:: yes 
Current condition under consideration is 
(NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
Trying to prove the goal GOAL-4 by backtracking 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT'S HOHE HAS FIVE OR HORE ROOMS - EXCLUDING BATHROOM, 
LAVATORY AND HALL 
:: no 
The-Unnegated version of the condition PLANE-9 has not been proven. 
Therefore the condition (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION 
OF 8.2) is proven by default. 
Current condition under consideration is (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO 
HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
Trying to prove the goal GOAL-2 by backtracking 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
Is this true?:: 
VARHTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO SERIOUS ILLNESS OF APPLICANT OR 
DEPENDANT - OR APPLICANT OR DEPENDANT IS HOUSEBOUND 
:: no 
TryIng to prove the goal GOAL-2 by backtracking 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT'S ROME IS EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT TO REAT, 
PARTICULARLY DUE TO IT BEING VERY DAMP OR IN A VERY 
EXPOSED POSITION 
:: l!! 
TryIDi to prove the goal GOAL-2 by backtracking 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
The plane PLANE-12 is already known to be true. 
Value is: (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
Trying to prove the goal GOAL-2 by backtracking 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
The plane PLANE-6 is already known to be true. 
Value is: (NIL APPLICANT PAYS FOR HEATING IN RENT) 
Trying to prove the goal GOAL-2 by backtracking 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
The plane PLANE-7 is already known to be true. 
Value is: (APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
The current (true) condition (APPLICANT IS QUALIFIED AS CLAIMANT) 
is on the top level. 
Therefore the goal (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
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has been proven. Returning to last downward search. 
The unnegated version of the condition PLANE-10 has been proven. 
Therefore the condition (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION 
OF 5.05) is false. 
Current condition under consideration is (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO 
HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
The plane PLANE-12 is already known to be true. 
Value is: (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 8.2) 
Current condition under consideration is (VARHTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO 
SERIOUS ILLNESS OF APPLICANT OR DEPENDANT - OR APPLICANT OR DEPENDANT IS 
HOUSEBOUND) 
The plane PLANE-13 is already known to be false. 
Value is: (VARMTH IS REQUIRED DUE TO SERIOUS ILLNESS OF APPLICANT OR 
DEPENDANT - OR APPLICANT OR DEPENDANT IS HOUSEBOUND) 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT'S HOME IS DIFFICULT 
TO HEAT ADEQUATELY, PARTICULARLY DUE TO ROOMS BEING DRAUGHTY, DAMP OR 
VERY LARGE) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT'S HOME IS DIFFICULT TO HEAT ADEQUATELY, PARTICULARLY 
DUE TO ROOMS BEING DRAUGHTY, DAMP OR VERY LARGE 
:: no 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT'S HOME IS 
EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT TO HEAT, PARTICULARLY DUE TO IT BEING VERY DAMP 
OR IN A VERY EXPOSED POSITION) 
The plane PLANE-17 is already known to be true. 
Value is: (APPLICANT'S HOME IS EXCEPTIONALLY DIFFICULT TO HEAT, 
PARTICULARLY DUE TO IT BEING VERY DAMP OR IN A VERY EXPOSED POSITION) 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO 
HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
The final condition in the downward search has been proven. 
Therefore the goal GOAL-2 has been proven. 
Value is (APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT'S HOME IS ON AN 
ESTATE CONSIDERED BY DHSS TO HAVE HIGH HEATING COSTS) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT'S HOME IS ON AN ESTATE CONSIDERED BY DHSS TO HAVE 
HIGH HEATING COSTS 
•• no 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT OR DEPENDANTS IS 
RECEIVING MOBILITY OR ATTENDANCE ALLOVANCE OR EQUIVALENT PAID VITH A 
SERVICES OR DISABLEMENT PENSION) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT OR DEPENDANTS IS RECEIVING MOBILITY OR ATTENDANCE 
ALLOVANCE OR EQUIVALENT PAID VITH A SERVICES OR 
DISABLEMENT PENSION 
:: no 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT'S HOUSEHOLD 
CONTAINS SOMEONE OVER 70 OR UNDER 5 YEARS OLD) 
Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT'S HOUSEHOLD CONTAINS SOMEONE OVER 70 OR UNDER 5 
YEARS OLD 
:: yes 
Current condition under consideration is (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO 
HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
The plane PLANE-28 is already known to be false. 
Value is: (NIL APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO BEATING ADDITION OF 5.05) 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT'S HOME IS ON AN 
ESTATE CONSIDERED BY DHSS TO HAVE HIGH HEATING COSTS) 
The plane PLANE-24 is already known to be false. 
Value is: (APPLICANT'S HOME IS ON AN ESTATE CONSIDERED BY DHSS TO HAVE 
HIGH HEATING COSTS) 
Current condition under consideration is (APPLICANT PAYS A SEPARATE 
FIXED CHARGE FOR HEATING, VHICB IS NOT SUBJECT TO REBATE OR SURCHARGE) 
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Is this true?:: 
APPLICANT PAYS A SEPARATE FIXED CHARGE FOR HEATING, vnICH IS 
NOT SUBJECT TO REBATE OR SURCHARGE 
:: no 
CC: Information 
Information on what: ~oals proven to be printed 
The following goals ave been proven: 
: APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO HEATING ADDITION OF 5.05 
Information on what: ok 
CC: ok --
Setup, build or interpret: 
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APPENDIX C 
ANOTHER EXAMPLE - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAV 
C.l INTRODUCTION 
It has been proposed that the techniques employed by the ELl project can 
be expanded into areas of the law apart from British Vel fare Rights 
Legislation. It has also been proposed that the method of inputting 
rules into the ELl system makes it relatively easy to normalize and 
prepare rules from legislation. 
In this Appendix we examine input dealing with the European Community 
sickness insurance scheme which was prepared by a legally qualified 
researcher (Helene Bauer-Bernet of the University Libre, Brussels and 
the Legal Service Department of the Commission of the European 
communities); prior to producing these rules, Bauer-Bernet had seen one 
small demonstration of the system but had no access to it to aid in the 
preparation of her rule corpus. The legislation from which the rule 
corpus was prepared appears at the end of this section. 
The inputting of the rules to the ELl system was carried out as follows, 
user input being underlined: 
BUILD] 
Current knowledge base or New or Old file? new file to hold new knowledge 
Name of file:: EEC.KNOV 
Delete any word and concept lists? yes 
Highest rule-number in KB is: 0 
BB: insert rules into knowledge base 
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Input request: from file 
Name file containing rules: EEC. RULE 
FILE CREATED 10-Jun-84 13:20:58 
RULESCOMS 
17 rules in this file have not yet been input 
Rule numbering starts at: 1 
After how many rules have been input do you wish the knowledge base file 
and rule file to be updated: 20 
Extract words before inputting-rules: Y/N: no 
Words will be extracted as rules are input 
1112G314G516T7G8G9110111112113114T15116T17 
Knowledge base being updated to: EEC. KNOW 
Writing to EEC.RULE 
Done. 
BB:~rint rules from knowledge base 
Pr nt request: T 
Print in which order (R)ule, (K)knowledge base or (OK): Knowledge base order 
Writing in KB order: (FILECREATED "10-Jun-84 13:48:33" T) -- ---
1 (IF «A PERSON IS COVERED» 
THEN 
(THE INSURANCE SCHEME WILL GUARANTEE TO THE PERSON REIMBURSEMENT OF 
EXPENSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF ILLNESS, ACCIDENT OR CONFINEMENT 
AND THE PAYMENT OF AN ALLOWANCE TOWARDS FUNERAL EXPENSES» 
2 (IF «THE PERSON IS A MEMBER» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED» 
3 (IF «THE PERSON IS COVERED BY THE INSURANCE OF A MEMBER» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED» 
4 (IF «THE PERSON IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITIES) 
(NIL THE PERSON IS ON LEAVE ON PERSONAL GROUNDS - UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF 
THE STAFF REGULATIONS, SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 4{1) OF THESE RULES» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON IS A MEMBER» 
5 (IF «THE PERSON IS PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT OR MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION 
THEN 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, OR PRESIDENT, JUDGE, 
ADVOCATE-GENERAL OR REGISTRAR OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES» 
(THE PERSON IS A MEMBER» 
6 (IF «THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE) 
(NIL THE PERSON IS A MEMBER) 
(NIL SIHE IS GAINFULLY EMPLOYED» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE» 
7 (IF «THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE) 
(NIL HIS/HER ANNUAL INCOME FROM SUCH EMPLOYMENT EXCEEDS BF 500,000 
BEFORE TAX) 
(S/HE IS COVERED BY A PUBLIC SCHEME OF SICKNESS INSURANCE) 
(S/HE IS GAINFULLY EMPLOYED) 
(NIL SIHE IS A MEMBER» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE» 
8 (IF «THE PERSON IS A DEPENDANT CHILD WITHIN THE MEANING OF STAFF 
REGULATIONS, ANNEX VII, ART.2{2}» 
THEN 
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(THE PERSON IS COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE» 
9 (IF «NIL THE PERSON CAN OBTAIN COVER UNDER ANY OTHER PUBLIC SCHEME OF 
SICKNESS INSURANCE) 
(THE PERSON IS TREATED AS A DEPENDANT CHILD OF THE MEMBER PURSUANT TO 
THE STAFF REGULATIONS, ANNE EX VII, ART.2{4}» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE» 
10 (IF «A PERSON IS MEMBER OF THE TEMPORARY STAFF) 
· 
(THE PERSON IS SUBJECT TO A RESTRICTION FOR THE REIMBURSEMENT OF 
CERTAIN EXPENSES {CF. 7.1}) 
(THE PERSON IS MEMBER OF THE TEMPORARY STAFF SINCE TVO YEARS OR MORE) 
(THE MEDICAL OFFICER OF THE INSTITUTION IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE 
SICKNESS OR INVALIDITY HAS NOT REAPPEARED OR GIVEN RISE TO 
UNUSUAL SEQUELAE IN THE COURSE OF THE SAID PERIOD» 
THEN 
(THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY {= THE AUTHORITY EMPOVERED TO CONCLUDE 
CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT ON BEHALF OF THE INSTITUTION TO VHICH THE 
PERSON CONCERNED BELONGS} MAY RAISE THE RESTRICTION» 
11 (IF «AN ACCIDENT OF ILLNESS IS CAUSED BY A THIRD PARTY TO A PERSON 
· 
COVERED» 
THEN 
(THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF THE PERSON CONCERNED OR OF THOSE ENTITLED 
UNDER HIM AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY SHALL REST IN THE COMMUNITIES» 
12 (IF «NIL A MEMBER HAS APPLIED FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY 
HIM OR BY A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE DURING THE 
CALENDAR YEAR FOLLOVING THAT IN VHICH TREATMENT VAS ADMINISTERED) 
(NIL FORCE MAJEURE IS DULY ESTABLISHED» 
THEN 
(NIL THE MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT» 
13 (IF «NIL THE MEMBER APPLIES FOR SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT REFERRED TO IN ART. 
8{2) VI THIN 24 MONTHS OF THE DATE ON VHICH THE EXPENSES LAST 
INCURRED IN RESPECT OF TREATMENT VITHIN THE TVELVE-MONTH PERIOD 
IN QUESTION VERE REIMBURSED» 
· 14 
· 15 
· 16 
· 17 
THEN (NIL THE MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT» 
(IF «THE PERSON RECEIVES UNDUE PAYMENT) 
(THE PERSON VAS AVARE THAT THERE VAS NO DUE REASON FOR THE PAYMENT» 
THEN 
(THE SUM OVERPAID SHALL BE RECOVERED» 
(IF «THE PERSON RECEIVES UNDUE PAYMENT) 
(THE FACT OF THE OVERPAYMENT VAS PATENTLY SUCH» 
THEN 
(THE SUM OVERPAID SHALL BE RECOVERED» 
(IF «A MEMBER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINS OR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN BENEFITS FOR 
HIMSELF OR FOR A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE» 
THEN 
(NIL THE PERSON IS ENTITLED TO SUCH BENEFITS» 
(IF «A MEMBER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINS OR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN BENEFITS FOR 
HIMSELF OR FOR A PERSON COVERED BY TBB MEMBER'S INSURANCE» 
THEN 
(THE PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION» 
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Only some parts of the legislation have been normalized, since this was 
undertaken as a test of the system; thus, for example, in Article 2, 
(which deals with the description of those who are members of the 
Sickness Insurance Scheme) only the first and final clauses have been 
dealt with. Obviously, the remaining clauses are easily handled if 
these can be. Rules 4 and 5 are formalizations of these membership 
clauses. 
An example interaction with this rule base is as follows: 
(INTERROGATE) 
Current or new knowledge base: new knowledge base to be loaded 
Name of file: EEC.KNOV 
FILE CREATED 10-Jun-84 15:33:01 
KNOVBASECOMS 
CC: initialize 
CC: start interpretation 
Is tIiIS"true?:: 
THE PERSON IS ON LEAVE ON PERSONAL GROUNDS - UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE 
STAFF REGULATIONS, SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 4{1} OF THESE RULES 
:: no 
Is tnis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS A AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITIES 
:: ~ 
Is ills true?:: 
THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE 
:: no 
Is tnis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS A DEPENDANT CHILD VITHIN THE MEANING OF STAFF 
REGULATIONS, ANNEX VII, ART.2{2} 
:: no 
Is tnis true?:: 
THE PERSON CAN OBTAIN COVER UNDER ANY OTHER PUBLIC SCHEME OF SICKNESS 
INSURANCE 
:: l!! 
Is This true?:: 
A PERSON IS MEMBER OF THE TEMPORARY STAFF 
:: ~ 
Is ills true?:: 
THE PERSON IS SUBJECT TO A RESTRICTION FOR THE REIMBURSEMENT OF 
CERTAIN EXPENSES {CF. 7.1} 
:: no 
Is tnis true?:: 
AN ACCIDENT OF ILLNESS IS CAUSED BY A THIRD PARTY TO A PERSON COVERED 
:: ~ 
Is This true?:: 
A MEMBER HAS APPLIED FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY HIM OR 
BY A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE DURING THE CALENDAR 
YEAR FOLLOVING THAT IN vaICH TREATMENT VAS ADMINISTERED 
:: ~ 
Is ills true?:: 
THE MEMBER APPLIES FOR SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT REFERRED TO IN ART. a{2} 
VI THIN 24 MONTHS OF THE DATE ON vaICH THE EXPENSES LAST INCURRED 
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IN RESPECT OF TREATMENT VITHIN THE TVELVE-MONTH PERIOD IN 
QUESTION VERE REIMBURSED 
:: no 
Is tfiis true?:: 
THE PERSON RECEIVES UNDUE PAYMENT 
:: ~ 
Is ills true?:: 
THE PERSON VAS AVARE THAT THERE VAS NO DUE REASON FOR THE PAYMENT 
:: no 
Is tfiis true?:: 
THE FACT OF THE OVERPAYMENT VAS PATENTLY SUCH 
:: no 
Is tfiis true?:: 
A MEMBER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINS OR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN BENEFITS FOR 
HIMSELF OR FOR A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE 
:: no 
CC: Information 
Information on what: known facts to be printed 
The following items are-kDown=-- -- --
NIL THE PERSON IS ON LEAVE ON PERSONAL GROUNDS - UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF 
THE STAFF REGULATIONS, SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 4 (1) OF THESE RULES 
THE PERSON IS A AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITIES 
THE PERSON IS A MEMBER 
THE PERSON IS COVERED 
THE INSURANCE SCHEME VILL GUARANTEE TO THE PERSON REIMBURSEMENT OF 
EXPENSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF ILLNESS, ACCIDENT OR CONFINEMENT 
AND THE PAYMENT OF AN ALLOVANCE TOVARDS FUNERAL EXPENSES 
A PERSON IS MEMBER OF THE TEMPORARY STAFF 
AN ACCIDENT OF ILLNESS IS CAUSED BY A THIRD PARTY TO A PERSON COVERED 
THE RIGHT OF ACTION OF THE PERSON CONCERNED OR OF THOSE ENTITLED 
UNDER HIM AGAINST THE THIRD PARTY SHALL REST IN THE COMMUNITIES 
NIL THE MEMBER APPLIES FOR SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT REFERRED TO IN ART. 
8{2} VITHIN 24 MONTHS OF THE DATE ON VHICH THE EXPENSES LAST 
INCURRED IN RESPECT OF TREATMENT VI THIN THE TVELVE-MONTH PERIOD 
IN QUESTION VERE REIMBURSED 
NIL THE MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT 
: THE PERSON RECEIVES UNDUE PAYMENT 
Information on what: not true facts are to be printed 
The following items are-inown not to oe-true:-
THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE 
THE PERSON IS A DEPENDANT CHILD VITHIN THE MEANING OF STAFF 
REGULATIONS, ANNEX VII, ART.2{2} 
NIL THE PERSON CAN OBTAIN COVER UNDER ANY OTHER PUBLIC SCHEME OF 
SICKNESS INSURANCE 
THE PERSON IS SUBJECT TO A RESTRICTION FOR THE REIMBURSEMENT OF 
CERTAIN EXPENSES {CF. 7.1} 
NIL A MEMBER HAS APPLIED FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY HIM 
OR BY A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE DURING THE 
CALENDAR YEAR FOLLOVING THAT IN VHICH TREATMENT VAS ADMINISTERED 
THE PERSON VAS AVARE THAT THERE VAS NO DUE REASON FOR THE PAYMENT 
THE FACT OF THE OVERPAYMENT VAS PATENTLY SUCH 
A MEMBER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINS OR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN BENEFITS FOR 
HIMSELF OR FOR A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE 
C.2 DISCUSSION 
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C.2.1 Conceptual Hatching 
The first point to be noted it that in the small test corpus, there was 
no use made of the important word or noise word lists - those lists 
which respectively highlight or remove words from the input conditions 
to aid the conceptual matching module of ELl. The absence of these 
words made no difference to the inputting of the rules into the 
knowledge base in the BUILD process (as seen above); what does occur 
though is that in the first interpretations, the system finds similar 
words in the conditions/goals (for example, "PERSON") and asks the user 
whether these match. This can become, after a little while, quite 
tedious: 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED) 
(A PERSON IS COVERED) 
Do these match :: yes 
(NIL THE MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT) 
(NIL THE PERSON IS ON LEAVE ON PERSONAL GROUNDS - UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE 
STAFF REGULATIONS, SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 4(1} OF THESE RULES) 
Do these match :: no 
Is this true?:: 
THE PERSON IS ON LEAVE ON PERSONAL GROUNDS - UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE 
STAFF REGULATIONS, SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 4 (1) OF THESE RULES 
:: no 
Is TIiis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS A AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITIES 
:(Tft:spERSON IS A AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITIES) 
(A PERSON IS COVERED) 
Do these match :: no 
(THE PERSON IS A HEMBER) 
(A PERSON IS COVERED) 
Do these match :: no 
(THE PERSON IS A ~OFFICIAL OF THE COMHUNITIES) 
(THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE) 
Do these match :: no 
(THE PERSON IS A MEMBER) 
(THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE) 
Do these match :: no 
(THE PERSON IS COVERED) 
(THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE) 
Do these match :: no 
Another point related to the operation of the system is that in some of 
the rules there is a slight difference of format. For example, rule 1 
has the condition, "A PERSON IS COVERED" and rules 2 and 3 have the goal 
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"THE PERSON IS COVERED". These slight aberrations (and many more 
serious ones) must be expected as normal. A system which operated 
purely upon the basis of exact textual matching would not recognize the 
condition of rule 1 as matching the goals of rules 2 and 3, but the ELl 
system does. 
Currently the ELl system carries out the processing for this conceptual 
matching during the BUILD or INTERPRET stage, rather than in the SETUP 
stage. The reason for doing it this way was that the originally 
envisaged manner of inputting the rules was to develop them on paper and 
then input them to the system. It is now becoming clear that perhaps 
more processing should be put into the SETUP operation - so that, in 
fact, the SETUP module interactively aids the expert in the 
normalization process. The type of activities which it might carry out 
are those administrative ones, including indexing of rules where 
specified words are contained, the segmentation of the entire corpus 
into smaller more conceptualizable blocks of rules, and the keeping of 
aides-memoire - rather than the current practice of making little notes 
on odd pieces of paper. 
Such a module would be very much more complex than the current one, but 
we would suggest that in any commercially viable system such a complex 
but user directed module is essential. 
c.2.2 The Use Of Negation 
The test corpus provided by Bauer-Bernet made no use of that form of 
negation which the system cannot understand (that is, where "not" is 
included within the text of the condition/goal); only that negation of 
conditions/goals which is introduced by the prefix "NIL" and which is 
'recognized' by the system is used. This tends to imply that such 
inclusion of 'artificial' english within the production rules is not too 
difficult. When preparing the original rules for the ELl system (those 
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dealing with Supp. Ben.) it was sometimes inadvertently forgotten that 
it was better to use the prefixed negation and include it within the 
text. Vhen glancing at the rules though, it was easy to realize what 
had happened and amend the conditions/goals to the preferred format. Ve 
would suggest that this might well be how others would do it as well. 
One aspect of the use of negation in the system which becomes relatively 
easy to use - when some practice and experience with the system has been 
achieved - is the pruning of rules from the knowledge base. This, of 
course, requires rules designed specifically to do this rather than 
rules which are a direct normalization of the legislation. The pruning 
of rules from the knowledge base leads to quicker interaction with the 
system (because "unnecessary" questions are not being asked) and less 
frustration with the system (once again, because unnecessary questions 
are not being asked). 
As an example of this, take the case where the person in question is not 
a member nor covered by a member's insurance. The interpretation in 
this case might look something like this: 
Current or new knowledge base: ~ knowledge base to be loaded 
Name of file: EEC.KNOV 
FILE CREATED 12-Jun-84 21:43:12 
KNOVBASECOMS 
CC: initialize 
CC: start interpretation 
Is tliTStrue?:: 
THE PERSON IS ON LEAVE ON PERSONAL GROUNDS - UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE 
STAFF REGULATIONS, SUBJECT TO ARTICLE 4{1} OF THESE RULES 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS A AN OFFICIAL OF THE COMMUNITIES 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT OR MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, OR PRESIDENT, JUDGE, ADVOCATE-GENERAL 
OR REGISTRAR OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS COVERED BY THE INSURANCE OF A MEMBER 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS THE SPOUSE 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON IS A DEPENDANT CHILD VI THIN THE MEANING OF STAFF 
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REGULATIONS, ANNEX VII, ART.2{2} 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON CAN OBTAIN COVER UNDER ANY OTHER PUBLIC SCHEME OF SICKNESS 
INSURANCE 
:: ~ 
Is ills true?:: 
A PERSON IS MEMBER OF THE TEMPORARY STAFF 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
AN ACCIDENT OF ILLNESS IS CAUSED BY A THIRD PARTY TO A PERSON COVERED 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
A MEMBER HAS APPLIED FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES INCURRED BY HIM OR 
BY A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE DURING THE CALENDAR 
YEAR FOLLOVING THAT IN vaICH TREATMENT VAS ADMINISTERED 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
FORCE MAJEURE IS DULY ESTABLISHED 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE MEMBER APPLIES FOR SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT REFERRED TO IN ART. 8{2} 
VITHIN 24 MONTHS OF THE DATE ON VHICH THE EXPENSES LAST INCURRED 
IN RESPECT OF TREATMENT VITHIN THE TVELVE-MONTH PERIOD IN 
QUESTION VERE REIMBURSED 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
THE PERSON RECEIVES UNDUE PAYMENT 
:: no 
Is tliis true?:: 
A MEMBER FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINS OR ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN BENEFITS FOR 
HIMSELF OR FOR A PERSON COVERED BY THE MEMBER'S INSURANCE 
:: no 
CC: Iiiformation 
Information on what: ~oals proven to be printed 
The following goals ave been proven: 
NIL THE MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT 
NIL THE MEMBER IS ENTITLED TO SPECIAL REIMBURSEMENT 
There are still several questions being asked which are not relevant 
after the system has received advice. It would be desirable to allow 
the system to remove the rules which drive these questions when it was 
known by the system that it was pointless to ask them. 
In the ELl system this meta-level control of rule invocation is done 
either by using a proven goal to remove its negated or non-negated 
corresponding goal from the knowledge base, or by having a top-level 
condition which, when disproven, removes all rules which have it as 
their top condition from the knowledge base. As an example of the 
first, proving the goal (NIL this is today) will remove from the 
knowledge base all rules whose goal is (this is today). As example of 
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the second is where the first condition met is (today is friday); if 
this is untrue, then all rules with it as their top condition are 
removed from the knowledge base. 
This latter kind of meta-control is used frequently in the ELl Supp. 
Ben. rules by creating the notion of "applicant satisfies rules of 
entitlement to supplementary benefit" (which is not a truly "legal" 
concept) and using this as the top level condition of many rules then 
whenever the condition is proven false all these rules are removed from 
the knowledge base. 
In effect, what is being said is that not all the rules within the 
knowledge base must necessarily be direct representations of normalized 
legislation; in order to aid speed and fluency of interpretation other 
rules can be easily added. 
C.2.3 Legislative Self-reference 
Bauer-Bernet's rule corpus indicates one of the aspects of the 
production system formalism which is particularly disadvantageous for 
legal advisory systems - that of the need for the rules to encapsulate 
more than the information required for interpretation. Analogically, we 
can see that this need arises from what Bar-Hillel [Bar-Hillel, 1964] 
has noted as the two types of information retrieval - that of the 
retrieval of facts and the retrieval of reference. The first type of 
fact retrieval we can see as that which the interpreter requires for 
processing - it needs to know whether a given condition or goal is false 
or true. The second type of retrieval is that where the rules refer, 
not to other rules, but to specific parts of the legislation. The 
second condition of rule number 4, above, is an example of this: 
NIL the person is on leave on personal grounds - under 
article 40 of the staff regulations, subject to article 
4(1) of these rules) 
- 261 -
This condition could be broken down into more basic rules, but doing so 
removes much information which is understood by someone with experience 
in the legislative domain. By producing more production rules from it, 
there is a danger of "seeing the trees, but not the wood". 
This is a disadvantage because we can expect the users of such a system 
to have some legal competence, whether they are legally qualified or 
not. There may be some occasions when a complete step by step 
interpretation through the rules is necessary, but on many occasions the 
user will have the ability to short-circuit the interpretation by, in 
effect, saying - "yes, the person is not on leave according to that 
specified article". 
It seems that one future area of research is in the area of using the 
system's annotation facility to encapsulate information about where the 
rule is leading, and then the user has the option of continuing with the 
interpretation or terminating that line of enquiry. Such a facility 
would be useful as a means of making the system much more user friendly 
than it currently is. 
C.2.4 Difficulties Found In Normalization 
The two main difficulties in normalizing the legislation found by 
Bauer-Bernet were those in providing a formulation for Article 11 on 
procedure and Article 16 on appeals. 
It may be that the problems found were due to the fact that these two 
articles concern procedures rather than "legal rules"; that is, they do 
not define legal concepts or memberships of legal groups only the 
procedures which must be followed in certain circumstances. This 
supports our view that the production system formalism is not sufficient 
for useful legal systems; even though it is possible that these articles 
could be normalized. For example, one possible manner to handle Article 
11 is: 
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IF (application for prior authorization is required) 
(prior authorization has been given) 
(correct procedures for prior authorization have been followed) 
THEN 
(application for prior authorization is allowed) 
IF (the application for prior authorization, together with a 
prescription and/or an estimate made out by the attending 
practitioner, has been submitted by the member to the 
office responsible for settling claims, which has referred the 
matter to its medical officer if required. In the latter case, 
the medical officer has transmitted his Opinion to the office 
responsible for settling claims within two weeks) 
(the office responsible for settling claims has taken a 
decision on the application if it has been appointed to do 
so or has transmitted its decision and, where applicable, that 
of the medical officer to the appointing authority for a 
decision. The member has then been informed of the decision 
forthwith.) 
THEN 
(correct procedures for prior authorization have been followed) 
This latter rule could have been broken down into smaller rules, and 
can, of course, have annotations added. 
One interesting point which this example brings to light is that the 
manner in which the rules are prepared must be designed with the 
eventual user in mind. Thus if the system is designed to allow 
interaction with a member, it will present different advice from a 
system which is designed to be used by someone involved in the 
administration of the scheme. Niblett [Niblett, 1981] has pointed out 
that these expert systems will have different views of law and different 
potential users; we would agree with him. 
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C.2.S Presentations Of Conclusions 
As can be seen by the example interpretation above, the system simply 
tries to effect all goals in the knowledge base and only terminates when 
they there are no more rules left to test. At that point, the user can 
ask for information about the goals which have been proven and about 
conditions and goals which are true or false. 
Such an attempt to prove all goals is important in the welfare rights 
system - because, after all, the more goals (that is, monetary or other 
benefits) which can be achieved the better. 
Other legislative areas are not appropriate for this type of processing 
_ a much better strategy is to assert the specific goal which we wish to 
discover is true or not: 
Is it true that the person is a member of the sickness scheme? 
or alternatively to specify a stopping position: 
Stop when it is proven that the person is not a member of the 
sickness scheme. 
But such strategies are relatively easy to implement, using a user 
interface between the user and the program. Each implementation of a 
legal expert system, we would suggest, would require an engineered 
interface designed specifically for each type of application. 
- 264 -
APPENDIX D 
A LISTING OF PART OF THE ELl KNOYLEDGE BASE 
In this appendix we list 50 rules from the knowledge base. These rules 
were not chosen to demonstrate any particular aspects - they are simply 
the first fifty in the knowledge base and are thus representative of the 
system rules. The remaining rules are omitted for reasons of space, but 
can be listed from the ELl program. 
RULE-l 
RULE-2 
RULE-3 
RULE-4 
RULE-5 
RULE-6 
RULE-7 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS A YORK PERMIT» 
THEN 
(NIL APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT IS A BRITISH CITIZEN» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT IS NATIONAL OF COMMON MARKET COUNTRY» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT IS A NATIONAL OF ICELAND, MALTA, NORYAY, 
PORTUGAL, SVEDEN OR TURKEY» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS BEEN GRANTED FOREIGN HUSBAND STATUS, 
REFUGEE STATUS OR POLITICAL ASYLUM» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS RIGHT OF ABODE IN OK» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
(IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS CERTIFICATE OF PATRIALITY OR A 
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THEN 
CERTIFICATE OF ENTITLEMENT TO ABODE FROM THE 
HOME OFFICE» 
(APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-a (IF «APPLICANT IS AVAILABLE FOR YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS BEEN GRANTED INDEFINITE LEAVE TO ENTER OR 
RESIDE IN THE UK» 
THEN (APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-9 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) (APPLICANT IS A BRITISH OVERSEAS CITIZEN YITH RIGHT OF 
READMISSION TO THE UK» 
THEN (APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-10 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT OVER NORMAL AGE OF RETIREMENT» 
THEN (SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT IS KNOVN AS SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION» 
RULE-11 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT UNDER NORMAL AGE OF RETIREMENT) 
(APPLICANT IS OVER 16 YEARS OLD» 
THEN 
(SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT IS KNOVN AS SUPPLEMENTARY 
ALLOYANCE» 
RULE-12 {IF ({APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT ENTITLED TO HOUSING BENEFIT» 
RULE-13 {IF ({APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT'S IS INCAPABLE FOR YORK THROUGH ILLNESS OR 
DISABILITY) 
(APPLICANT'S EVIDENCE OF INCAPACITY IS ACCEPTED BY DHSS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-14 {IF ({APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT CANNOT YORK FULL-TIME BECAUSE OF DISEASE OR 
DISABLEMENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-1S {IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS LOOKING AFTER A SEVERELY DISABLED PERSON 
VHO CANNOT BE LOOKED AFTER ANY OTHER YAY» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-16 {IF {(APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS BLIND) 
(APPLICANT BAS BEEN USED TO YORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME FOR 
THE LAST 12 MONTHS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-17 {IF ({APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS FEMALE) 
(APPLICANT IS PREGNANT) 
(APPLICANT HAS A MEDICAL CERTIFICATE OF INABILITY TO 
YORK» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-la (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS FEMALE) 
(APPLICANT IS DUE TO GIVE BIRTH IN LESS THAN 12 YEEKS» 
THEN 
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(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-19 (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT HAS A PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DISABILITY CAUSING 
NO FURTHER PROSPECTS OF FINDING YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS VORKED LESS THAN 4 HOURS PER VEEK FOR THE 
LAST 12 VEEKS) 
(APPLICANT HAS SINGED ON FOR AT LEAST 39 VEERS) 
(APPLICANT HAS MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO FIND YORK) 
(APPLICANT HAS NOT REFUSED SUITABLE YORK»~ 
THEN (APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-20 (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS VITHIN 10 YEARS OF RETIREMENT AGE) 
(APPLICANT HAS NO PROSPECT OF FUTURE EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE 
OF LACK OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE) 
(APPLICANT HAS BEEN UNEMPLOYED FOR 10 YEARS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-21 (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) (APPLICANT IS ATTENDING AN OPEN UNIVERSITY COURSE» 
THEN (APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-23 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT RECEIVES A JOB RELEASE SCHEME ALLOVANCE» 
THEN (APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-24 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS A REFUGEE) 
(APPLICANT HAS LIVED IN BRITAIN FOR LESS THAN A YEAR) 
(APPLICANT IS LEARNING ENGLISH IN A PART-TIME COURSE» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-2S (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) (APPLICANT MUST ATTEND COURSE FOR MORE THAN 2 DAYS AS 
JP, JUROR, VITNESS OR PARTY TO PROCEEDINGS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-26 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT HAS BEEN REMANDED IN CUSTODY OR COMMITTED IN 
CUSTODY FOR TRIAL OR TO BE SENTENCED» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-27 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) (APPLICANT IS A DISABLED STUDENT) 
(APPLICANT'S DISABILITY DEBARS HIM/HER FORM GETTING YORK 
AS EASILY AS OTHERS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-28 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS A STUDENT) 
(APPLICANTS UNMARRIED PARTNER IS A NON-STUDENT) 
(APPLICANT'S PARTNER HAS BEEN ILL FOR 8 VEERS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-29 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) (APPLICANT IS A STUDENT) 
(APPLICANT'S PARTNER HAS A CHILD IS vaICH IS NOT 
APPLICANTS) 
(APPLICANTS'S UNMARRIED PARTNER IS A NON-STUDENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK»~ 
RULE-30 (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS 19 YEARS OLD) 
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(APPLICANT IS ON A NON-ADVANCED COURSE» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-31 (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS A FULL-TIME SCHOOL STUDENT» 
THEN (APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-32 (IF «APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS ON STRIKE» 
THEN (APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR WORK» 
RULE-33 (IF «APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT HAS RETURNED TO YORK AFTER STRIKE» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT NEED NOT SIGN AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK» 
RULE-34 (IF «APPLICANT SATISFIES RULES OF ENTITLEMENT TO 
SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT) 
(APPLICANT IS OVER 16 YEARS OLD) 
(APPLICANT IS USUALLY RESIDENT IN GREAT BRITAIN) 
(NIL APPLICANT IS IN FULL-TIME YORK» 
THEN (APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-35 (IF «APPLICANT IS RECEIVING A CATEGORY A RETIREMENT PENSION) 
(APPLICANT OVER NORMAL AGE OF RETIREMENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-36 (IF «APPLICANT RETIRED FROM FULL-TIME YORK ON OR AFTER 
REACHING PENSIONABLE AGE) 
(APPLICANT OVER NORMAL AGE OF RETIREMENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-37 (IF «APPLICANT RETIRED IN THE FIVE YEARS BEPORE REACHING 
PENSIONABLE AGE) 
(APPLICANT OVER NORMAL AGE OF RETIREMENT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT CAN HAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEPIT» 
RULE-38 (IF «NIL APPLICANT IS DISABLED) 
(APPLICANTS YORKS 30 OR MORB HOURS PER WEEK) 
(NIL APPLICANT SATISFIES PULL-TIME YORK EXCEPTIONS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN FULL-TIME YORK» 
RULE-39 (IP «NIL APPLICANT IS DISABLED) 
(APPLICANT YORKS LESS THAN 30 HOURS PER WEEK» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN PART-TIME YORK» 
RULE-40 (IP «APPLICANT IS DISABLED) 
(APPLICANT YORKS 35 OR MORB HOURS PER WEEK) 
(NIL APPLICANT SATISFIES FULL-TIME WORK EXCEPTIONS» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN PULL-TIME YORK» 
RULE-41 (IP «APPLICANT IS DISABLED) 
(APPLICANT YORKS LESS THAN 35 HOURS PRE WEEK» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN PART-TIME YORK» 
RULE-42 (IF «APPLICANT IS OFF YORK DUE TO A RECOGNIZED OR CUSTOMARY 
HOLIDAY» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN FULL-TIME YORK» 
RULE-43 (IF «APPLICANT IS AYAY PROM WORK YITHOUT GOOD REASON» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN FULL-TIME YORK» 
RULE-44 (IF «APPLICANT IS UNEMPLOYED BUT STILL HAS FINAL EARNINGS 
PROM LAST JOB» 
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THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN FULL-TIME YORK»~ 
RULE-45 (IF «APPLICANT IS UNEMPLOYED BUT LESS THAN 2 VEEKS AGO VAS 
SELF-EMPLOYED» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT IS IN FULL-TIME YORK»~ 
RULE-46 (IF «APPLICANT ACCORDS VITH RULES CONCERNING 6 MONTHS 
PRECEDING CLAIM» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT CAN MAKE A CLAIM FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT» 
RULE-47 (IF «DURING 6 MONTHS PRECEDING CLAIM APPLICANT HAS VORKED 
FOR AT LEAST 8 HOURS PER VEEK» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT ACCORDS VITH RULES CONCERNING 6 MONTHS 
PRECEDING CLAIM» 
RULE-48 (IF «DURING 6 MONTHS PRECEDING CLAIM APPLICANT HAS SIGNED ON 
AS AVAILABLE FOR YORK OR REGISTERED VITH JOB 
CENTRE OR CAREERS OFFICE» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT ACCORDS VITH RULES CONCERNING 6 MONTHS 
PRECEDING CLAIM» 
RULE-49 (IF «DURING 6 MONTHS PRECEDING CLAIM APPLICANT VAS INCAPABLE 
OF YORK BECAUSE OF ILLNESS OR DISABILITY AND 
RECEIVED BENEFIT AS A RESULT» 
THEN 
(APPLICANT ACCORDS VITH RULES CONCERNING 6 MONTHS 
PRECEDING CLAIM» 
RULE-50 (IF «DURING 6 MONTHS PRECEDING CLAIM APPLICANT VAS OFF YORK 
DUE TO A TRADE DISPUTE AT THE PLACE HE/SHE VORKS) 
) 
THEN 
(APPLICANT ACCORDS VITH RULES CONCERNING 6 MONTHS 
PRECEDING CLAIM» 
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